I re-examine “rating shopping” and “rating catering” in the market for AAA rated collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) by replicating the study of Griffin and Tang (2013) using post-crisis data. I find a sharp increase in the amount of CDOs that received a single rating, suggesting that CDO underwriters were more cautious about formally soliciting multiple ratings. However, I also find a decrease in AAA rating disagreements between S&P and Moody’s, implying that issuers shopped their CDOs through informal conversations with agencies. Finally, I find investors correctly accepted tighter credit spreads for dual-rated CDOs because dual-rated CDOs experienced fewer rating downgrades than single rated deals. These results differ from the pre-crisis findings of Griffin and Tang (2013) and are consistent with the existence of rating shopping and disappearance of rating catering during the post-crisis period.

Title: Credit Rating Impact on Information Environment – A study on the informational impact of credit ratings in financial markets using equity analysts’ performance as proxy. Introduction: The credit rating agencies provide risk assessment for a massive amount of financial assets around the world. These risk assessments are in turn used by numerous different market participants. The general idea behind this industry is that the credit ratings provide additional information or alternatively increase the quality of information in financial markets. Recent studies (most of which is written after the financial crisis of 2008) argue that there are several issues in the rating processes leading to failure to provide accurate ratings. Other studies still claim that credit rating agencies still provide useful information or alternatively increase the quality of information by sorting and ranking public knowledge of assets. We see the need for an investigating study examining the informational benefits of credit rating in the information environment of markets. Research Approach: How does the issuing of credit ratings impact the information environment in financial markets? Purpose: The study aim to contribute to the understanding of the current and historical effects that credit ratings have, and have had, on the information quality of markets and hence the efficiency of markets. Method: Our study takes a deductive research approach where the methodology is one of a quantitative and explanatory character. To analyze the effects on market information we use the BKLS model (Barron, Kim, Lim & Stevens, 1998), which uses equity analysts’ performance as proxy for the information environment. These data are then used in a long-term time-series study looking for long-term changes in analysts’ performance with yearly observations. Furthermore we test the instant market effects on stock prices from the issuing of a credit rating in a secondary short-term time-series study with daily observations. Conclusions: We find that the issuing of a credit rating in fact decreases the amount/quality of information available in financial markets (both public and private information). We contribute these effects to conflicts of interest in the rating processes and agency problems in the relationship between issuer and credit rating agency. Several practical examples of this are found such as ratings shopping, solicitation of ratings issuing, agencies offering consultant services and the lack of regulatory measures taken by regulators such as ESMA and SEC. We propose several ways of developing the research in this field; most importantly we want to see future studies on the differences between solicited/unsolicited issuing of ratings.