Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2005. / Title from title screen. Richard D Phillips, committee chair; Neil A Doherty, Sanjay Srivastava, Jayant R Kale, Ajai Subramanian, committee members. Electronic text (133 p. : ill. (some col.)) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed June 26, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 69-74).

This dissertation consists of three chapters that study issues in Corporate Finance and Industrial Organization related to the behavior of markets with asymmetric information. The first two chapters study the economics of credit rating agencies; the third chapter examines a process of social learning about product quality. Chapter 1 models the effect of rating agency competition on the quality of rated securities. I compare equilibria across a regime of competition between two rating agencies and a monopolistic regime. In both regimes, all available agencies are hired in equilibrium, so under competition more ratings are observed. However, competing agencies do not fully internalize the return of a reputation for being honest. Whenever strategic agencies are not very concerned about their reputation, competition can induce more issuer effort than monopoly. Otherwise, a monopolistic agency induces more effort. Chapter 2 analyzes the effect of the Cuomo Plan, a much-discussed regulation that prohibits issuers of residential mortgage-backed securities from making payments to rating agencies contingent on the assigned ratings. I construct a certification model which consists of the following features: (i) an issuer privately informed about her security's quality can hire a rating agency to assign a rating; (ii) the agency can observe, at a cost, a private signal correlated with the quality of the security; (iii) an undeserved favorable rating reduces the agency's future revenues. I show that the Plan has an effect on the informative content of the rating only if the agency's signal is not too costly. In this case, the Plan ensures that the rating is more informative; otherwise the Plan has no effect. In chapter 3, I study the pricing strategy of a monopolistic firm in a market characterized by consumers with heterogeneous preferences and private information about the product quality. Consumers purchase sequentially and observe the history of purchasing decisions, prices, and consumers' preferences. I characterize the conditions under which the monopolist gains when consumers learn the true quality, and, which pricing strategy ensures that learning takes place.

The question of whether ratings agencies convey new information to financial markets when they assign new ratings or change previous ratings has been debated for at least 40 years. In this study I first examine equity market, bond market and CDS market reactions to long and short term rating changes from S&P, Fitch and Moody's. I find that not all the credit rating changes affect the market but only those classified as unanticipated. Subsequently, I study whether the regulatory setting, in which the Credit Ratings Agencies work, can possibly affect the financial markets reactions. Lastly I show that the probability of a future rating change is severely affected by different factors proportional hazard rate models.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität zu Köln, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 293-306).

The thesis is devoted to the position of rating agencies in the financial markets. The main aim is to predict the position of these companies, which is currently mainly influenced by the European politicians. Politicians criticize them and try to limit their power. The essence of this thesis is to summarize the reasons for their criticism, focusing on reduction of sovereign ratings. Then it's discussed a downgrading the USA and France. For the first time in a history they lost their AAA rating. The last chapter is devoted to the possible position of rating agencies. The first option is the establishment of the European rating agency, the other one is tightening regulation and the last is a situation if the rating agencies were abolished.

Cette thèse étudie l’impact de la réputation des agences de notation sur la perception de leurs annonces par les investisseurs, ainsi que sur leur propre comportement à divulguer des informations précises et ponctuelles. Elle est constituée de quatre chapitres. Dans les premier et second chapitres, nous étudions comment la perception des investisseurs des notations des agences change suite à l’observation d’une erreur de notation. Les résultats montrent que les investisseurs réagissent peu ou pas aux changements d’annonce après avoir observé des notations erronées, ce qui suggère que la mauvaise performance des agences de notation affecte négativement leur réputation. Dans les troisième et quatrième chapitres, nous étudions les déterminants de la ponctualité et de la précision des annonces de notation financière. Il ressort que la réputation de l’agence de notation affecte la qualité des notations. En particulier, plus la réputation est élevée, et plus la note semble surévaluée et non-ponctuelle. / This thesis studies the impact of the reputation of rating agencies on investors’ perception of ratings, and on rating agencies ability to disclose accurate and timely information. It consists of four chapters. In the first and second chapters, we study changes in investors’ perception of rating agencies’ ratings following the observation of rating failures. The results show that investors either ignore or react less to ratings after such failures, which suggests that rating agencies poor performance affects negatively their reputation. In the third and fourth chapters, we study the determinants of ratings timeliness and accuracy disclosed by credit rating agencies. The results suggest that the reputation of the rating agency affects the quality of ratings. In particular, the higher the rating agency s reputation, the less accurate and timely the rating is.

The need for regulation of the credit rating agencies (CRAs) arose due to their role in the subprime mortgage crisis. The CRAs awarded risky securities '3-A' investment grade status and then failed to downgrade them quickly enough when circumstances changed which led to investors suffering substantial losses. The causes identified by the regulators for the gatekeeper failure were conflicts of interest (as the issuers of these securities pay for the ratings); lack of competition (as the Big Three CRAs have dominated the market share); and lack of CRA regulation. The regulators, both in the US and EU, have tried to address these problems by introducing soft law self-regulation in accordance with the International Organisation of Securities Commissions Code and hard law statutory regulation such as that found in the "Reform Act" and "Dodd-Frank Act" in the US and similar provisions in the EU. This thesis examines these provisions in detail by using a doctrinal black-letter law method to assess the success of the regulators in redressing the problems identified. It also examines the US case law regulation relating to the legal liability of CRAs. The findings are that the US First Amendment protection, exclusion clauses and case law, all lack a deterrent effect on the actions of CRAs. As CRAs have escaped substantial damages, investors are left uncompensated for their losses. The thesis concludes that the issues of conflicts of interest and an anti-competitive environment persist. This thesis recommends the introduction of liability for the CRAs based on the Australian Bathurst case and which should be put in a statutory footing, including the requirements that are needed for making exclusion clauses effective. Rotation of CRAs for every three years would minimise the conflicts of interest. Regulators should require CRAs to purchase professional indemnity insurance, if available, to compensate investors.

The dominant role of credit ratings, along with the failure of important FIs, exacerbated the 2008 crisis and caused further damage to European economies, which highlighted the need for effective regulation to prevent a reoccurrence. This thesis investigates the effect of EU and US recent regulatory reforms of the rating industry on the quality of credit ratings of financial institutions (FIs), as well as the impact of the new EU financial regulatory initiatives on the performance of FIs. The first empirical Chapter focuses on the EU reforms of credit rating agencies (CRAs) and provides evidence supporting the presence of a conservative rating bias in the post regulatory period, as increased scrutiny, fines and liability increase the cost of over rating. CRAs exhibit an unwarranted decrease in EU FI ratings, evidenced by an increase in false warning and a fall in the informativeness of FI rating downgrades in the post regulatory period. A subsequent rise in stock market responses to rating upgrades is consistent with CRAs expending greater effort to ensure they are justified. The second empirical Chapter focuses on the US reforms of CRAs and reports no significant impact on FI ratings, rather each CRA has responded differently to the passage of the US Dodd-Frank Act (DFA). There is, however, a significant reduction in stock market reactions to FI credit rating signals, consistent with diminishing reliance on credit ratings by market participants in the US. The third empirical Chapter builds and estimates a dynamic model of FI behaviour using discrete choice dynamic programming (DCDP). The model is used to simulate and examine the impact of regulations, including EU reforms of CRAs, capital adequacy regulation (Basel III), and the bail-in regime, on FIs' behaviour in the real economy. The results show that the shift to increasingly conservative rating behaviour triggered by the CRA reforms has caused FIs to respond by manipulating their capital ratios and to reduce lending activities. The results also show that more stringent capital requirements stimulate FIs to hold more capital, reduce lending and reveal a positive influence in reducing bank insolvency rates, particularly during the crisis period. The introduction of a bail-in regime reveals similar results, but crucially stimulates the adoption of a stable equilibrium (unlike Basel III). This thesis highlights drawbacks with the current regulatory reforms of the EU and US FI rating industries and suggests potential solutions. The thesis also informs the policy debate surrounding the best way to regulate both CRAs and FIs and ensure that there is not a reoccurrence of the problems present in the 2008 financial crisis.

[pt] O rating soberano pode ser definido como uma nota dada pelas agências de risco às obrigações do governo central de um país. Apesar do primeiro rating atribuído ao país datar de 1986, percebe-se que sua importância cresceu muito a partir de 1994, com a emissão dos brady bonds. Em teoria, as agências de ratings teriam o papel de antever acontecimentos no mercado, e conseqüentemente, seriam suas análises que influenciariam o comportamento dos mesmos; no entanto, severas críticas vêm sendo feitas no sentido de que elas apenas reagem a acontecimentos já amplamente conhecidos. Este trabalho tem, portanto, o objetivo de analisar o impacto das avaliações de risco do país emitidas por estas agências sobre o principal título da dívida externa brasileira, o c-bond. Para avaliar estes impactos, foi analisado o comportamento do spread do c-bond em períodos anteriores e posteriores às divulgações das análises destas agências. O estudo indicou que os ratings soberanos influenciam as cotações do c-bond, sendo os impactos de suas alterações mais significativas para os casos de downgrade ou rebaixamentos das notas soberanas do país. / [en] Sovereign rating can be defined as an assessment of the relative likelihood that a Government will default on its obligations. Although the first rating assigned to Brazil dates from 1986, the importance of sovereign rating increased as from 1994, by which time brady bonds were issued and begun to be actively traded. In theory, the role of credit rating would be to add new information to the market, and therefore, their analyses would influence market behaviour; however, several financial market observers have criticized them for just reacting to completely available information. This study therefore analyses the impacts of sovereign rating changes announcements on c-bond spreads. We analysed how c-bond spreads respond to the agencies´ announcements of changes in their sovereign risk assessments and our analyses indicate that the ratings changes do influence c-bond spreads, most significantly in downgrades events.

<p>This study aims to investigate the relationship between systematic risk and credit ratings. The systematic risk, frequently measured by beta, is an important consideration for both investors and corporations. Therefore it is interesting to examine if indications about the systematic risk could be gained by looking at credit ratings, especially on the Nordic market, where credit ratings are seemingly growing in importance. Consequently, the following research hypothesis is posed;<em> We intend to establish a relationship between market risk (Beta) and credit ratings for firms in the Nordic countries.</em></p><p><em> </em></p><p>In order to confirm or deny the research hypothesis, theories from peer reviewed databases were collected. These were divided into three sections; background theories, hypotheses about credit ratings and a literature review. The background theories consisted of two classical financial theories, the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which are the foundation upon which the research field have progressed. The hypotheses is specifically designed to explain the relationship between credit ratings and either systematic risk or stock price. The literature review contains information about studies which did not contribute to theory building, but produced results interesting in the research area.</p><p> </p><p>The actual sample in the thesis consisted of the 58 credit rated companies on the Nordic stock market. These companies were rated by Moody’s and/or Standard & Poor’s, the two largest credit rating agencies in the world. As a measure of the systematic risk, betas for each of the companies were calculated. To investigate the relationship between these variables a regression analysis was performed, as well as one sample T-test using the software SPSS.</p><p> </p><p>The result revealed a moderate relationship between beta and credit risk, a relationship which was not statistically significant on the five percent level. Our results suggest that credit ratings contain some information about companies’ systematic risk, a finding that might be useful for market participants.</p><p> </p>