The purpose of this thesis is to illustrate how the role of knowledge may be the missing link in economics and to argue that the assumption of unbounded rationality, which underpinned neoclassical economics, should be replaced by bounded rationality and that bounded rationality should be redefined as people are rational, but are constrained by asymmetric and imperfect knowledge. This decomposition of bounded rationality makes it possible for us to operationalize bounded rationality, which was founded by Herbert Simon in the 1950s, but has not been widely adopted in economics because the concept was considered too difficult to formalize. The inclusion of asymmetric and imperfect knowledge considerations in microeconomics provides new insights into the existence and boundaries of firms, the role and nature of institutions, financial market inefficiency and political choices. The inclusion of asymmetric knowledge considerations in macroeconomics can help explain the unequal distribution of wealth between individuals, firms and nations. A lack of knowledge, and the difficulties in overcoming a lack of knowledge, can help to explain aspects of economic fluctuations, prices rigidities, monetary non-neutrality and unemployment. Most importantly, when the role of knowledge is considered, it provides better explanations to various anomalies in economics, helps reconciles differences between various theories and may opens up the possibility of unifying various schools of economic thought.

published_or_final_version / Politics and Public Administration / Master / Master of Philosophy

Interviews were conducted with 20 parents in the US who have adopted one or more children from China. The study focuses on the motivation to adopt, decision making regarding adoption and the process in relation to rational choice theory. The interviews also inquired about their required adoption trip to China and the post-adoption adjustment phase including bonding and developmental delays, as well as about why families chose to adopt from China, how they learned about the adoption agency they used and whether or not they knew families that had adopted internationally and more specifically from China. This information provided insight into the way that families obtained information that helped them reach important decisions throughout the adoption process. / Master of Science

The thesis considers the career of the Student Christian Movement (SCM) which was founded in 1892 to promote missions and to recruit students for missionary work. As it grew, the SCM extended its operations to the founding and servicing of Christian Unions in colleges and progressively abandoned its evangelical roots and come to play a major part in the development of liberalism and ecumenism. In the nineteen sixties it became more radical than liberal and developed an interest in Marxism and alternative life styles. The career of the conservative evangelical Inter-Varsity Fellowship (IVF), formed as a result of a number of schisms from SCM, is also charted. These two movement organisations are considered in the light of ideas derived from the sociology of social movements. In the Introduction a brief critical account of various dominant theories of social movement origination is presented and elements of an alternative, voluntaristic, and essentially processual account are advanced. The careers of SCM and IVF are used to suggest correctives to a number of theoretical insights that have been developed on the basis of an exaggeration of the division between stable society and social movement. Particular topics dealt with include the growth and spread of social movements, goal transformation, schism and decline. It is argued that the rapid rise of SCM can be understood as resulting from (a) the existence of a wealthy milieu which accepted the movement as legitimate and (b) the SCM's attitude towards its own purpose and ideology which was open and inclusive. This denominationalism allowed the SCM to utilise the resources of the milieu and to recruit rapidly. It also laid the foundation for an erosion of purpose and identity. Many of the problems that promoted the decline of the SCM were caused by the particular nature of its constituency, recruiting as it did among students and experiencing therefore a high membership turnover, but a full understanding of the contrast between the decline of SCM and the stability of lVF requires consideration of the ideologies that informed the two organisations. For this reason the final chapter is concerned with the reasons for the precariousness of liberal protestantism and the strength of conservative evangelicalism.

In 2002, Reginald Bibby surprisingly asserted that a renaissance of religion is, or soon will be taking place in Canada. However, the assertion clashes with the dominant belief based largely on Bibby’s accumulated data about Canadians’ religious beliefs and practices, that Canada is becoming an increasingly secularized society. Based on forty-two in-depth interviews, this dissertation tests the “renaissance thesis” and improves our grasp of how Canadians subjectively understand their religious involvements by comparing the views of active religious affiliates (those who identify with a religious group and attend religious services nearly every week) and marginal religious affiliates (those who identify with a religious group and attend religious services primarily on Christmas or Easter, or for rites of passage such as weddings and funerals). What explains their higher and lower levels of religious involvement, what is the likelihood that marginal affiliates could eventually become active affiliates, and how does this understanding help us to assess the degree of religiosity or secularity in Canada? I argue that active and marginal affiliates are distinct mainly because of their different experiences with the supernatural or their local congregation, and the social influences that either encourage or discourage involvement in a religious group. These conclusions emerge from a close examination and testing of fundamental principles in Rational Choice Theory, a theory currently popular in the sociology of religion and in Bibby’s ongoing analysis of religion in Canada. Contrary to Bibby’s prediction, there is little reason to believe that marginal affiliates will eventually become active affiliates, regardless of changes to the supply of religion in Canada. In general, marginal affiliates appear content with their current levels of religiosity. As a result, I think it is likely that we will witness continued secularization at the individual level in Canada, which if proven correct, could strain Canada’s civic fabric in the future.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 145-166). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Uppsatsen handlar om huruvida sociologin fortfarande är relevant när ekonomivetenskapen breddar sitt studiefält till att inte längre vara självklart ekonomisk utan också ställa frågor som traditionellt legat på sociologins bord. Genom en teoretisk analys av statistiska resultat angående användandet av inköpslista i samband med matvaruinköp undersöker uppsatsen huruvida ekonomins klassiska handlingsteori, rational choice, och dess antaganden om homo economicus är tillräckligt för att förklara de resultat som uppkommer. Jürgen Habermas teori om kommunikativt handlande, och Webers handlingsteori används som exempel på utpräglat sociologiska handlingsteorier vars förklaringsförmåga av de uppkomna resultaten jämförs med rational choice theory. Arbetet visar hur ekonomivetenskapen i sin strävan att bredda sitt studiefält behöver ifrågasätta vissa klassiska antaganden, något som under senare årtionden har inträffat, och att sociologin kan ge förklaringar där klassisk ekonomisk teori faller kort.

This research aims to explore if rational choice theory can be applied to explain money laundering in Hong Kong by drawing on the characteristics of stooges and their motives for colluding in money laundering activities and the effectiveness of imprisonment or other forms of punishments as a means of deterrence. An actor has limited cognitive capacity, makes decisions based on incomplete information and his actions reflect personal optimal beliefs (Piquero and Tibbetts, 2002; Hindmoor, 2006). Findings from the seven in-depth interviews conducted as part of the research and documentary reviews of local court cases support that financial reward is the major reason “why” offenders engage in money laundering activities at both the individual and institutional level. The findings also show that, in addition to ignorant and vulnerable individuals being chosen as stooges, well-regarded individuals and charitable organizations are also possible candidates. The research highlights a luring process experienced by the stooges which supports the psychosocial dynamics of rational choice. The research findings also challenge one of the cornerstones of classical criminology that maximum penalty is an effective means of deterrence. / published_or_final_version / Criminology / Master / Master of Social Sciences

No description available.

La théorie moderne de la dissuasion et la rationalité coûts/bénéfices sont étroitement liées l’une à l’autre. En fait, sans cette dernière, la théorie de la dissuasion n’aurait plus de fondements puisqu’elle repose sur la croyance voulant que sous certaines conditions — ayant trait notamment à sa sévérité et à sa certitude — la sanction pénale peut décourager quiconque aurait l’audace de défier la norme pénale. La rationalité coûts/bénéfices constitue donc cette prémisse selon laquelle l’être humain gouvernerait son comportement, incluant le comportement criminel, à partir d’un calcul fait de coûts et de bénéfices. La généralisation de la portée de cette théorie de la décision constitue notre objet de recherche. La question qui se pose est celle de savoir si la théorie elle-même n’aurait pas trop exagéré la portée de cette rationalité coûts-bénéfices. Il ne s’agit pas tant de remettre en question le fait qu’elle puisse opérer ici et là, mais bien de réfléchir aux limites de sa généralisation, de se poser la question de savoir si compte tenu des données dont on dispose il est encore raisonnable, aujourd’hui, d’entretenir cette croyance à l’effet que tous les comportements dits criminels sont opérés dans le cadre de cette rationalité coûts/bénéfices. C’est la question que nous posons dans cette recherche exploratoire dont l’objectif est de cerner une rationalité inédite développée théoriquement par Pires (2002) et vérifiée empiriquement par Dubé (2012) : la rationalité du risque. Dans cette recherche, ces dernières considérations nous amènent à traiter les postulats de la rationalité coûts/bénéfices comme des hypothèses et non comme des faits. Cette posture épistémologique se situe en dehors du positivisme et réintroduit le doute dans l’observation. Ce doute est alors confronté à une empirie particulière : il ne s’agit plus de tester la sévérité ou la certitude des peines telles que les conçoivent le droit criminel, mais bien de comprendre comment, dans la commission de leurs infractions, les individus se les représentent, comment ils les perçoivent, et quel poids leur attribuent-ils dans la décision de commettre ou de commettre à nouveau une infraction. Dans cette perspective qui s’inspire directement des approches phénoménologiques, la dissuasion est ainsi conçue comme un phénomène d’abord et avant tout subjectif. Au plan méthodologique, nous avons cherché à saisir ces « réalités subjectives » à partir d’entretiens qualitatifs semi-dirigés réalisés auprès d’individus ayant commis des crimes graves. Dans ces entretiens, plusieurs postulats de la théorie de la dissuasion sont ébranlés sous le poids d’une phénoménologie faisant ressortir les traits et fondements de la rationalité du risque, rationalité qui réduit la portée de la rationalité coûts/bénéfices tout en frappant d’impertinence le réductionnisme qui associe à la qualité de la peine la qualité de l’effet dissuasif. À partir de nos observations empiriques, nous avons élaboré quatre (4) idéaux-types de trajectoires décisionnelles : pris dans leur ensemble, ceux-ci suggèrent que l’effet dissuasif de la sanction pénale est loin d’être aussi déterminant que nous a habitués à le croire le droit criminel moderne. Les résultats de notre recherche semblent en effet indiquer que dans bien des cas, la menace de la conséquence pénale se retrouve neutralisée par la rationalité du risque qui intervient dans l’esprit de l’individu pour reconvertir la « certitude » du coût en incertitude, en probabilité. Le coût n’est alors plus vécu comme un coût, mais bien comme un risque, comme une possibilité parmi d’autres et que l’individu a l’impression de pouvoir contrôler. La dissuasion générale se retrouve ainsi fragilisée. Par ailleurs, face à la condamnation, lorsque l’individu l’associe à l’échec du passage à l’acte, la rationalité du risque intervient encore pour remettre en question non pas tant, dans l’absolu, la décision de commettre le crime, mais bien la manière de le commettre. L’échec est alors associé soit à une mauvaise décision (qui n’est pas celle de commettre le crime), soit au fruit du hasard contre lequel on ne pouvait rien. Dans un cas comme dans l’autre, la dissuasion spécifique se retrouve ainsi fragilisée.