In constructing and evaluating a theory of justice, it is crucial to determine the scope of justice---that is, the range of cases to which considerations of justice are appropriately applied. One important strand of contemporary political thought, best exemplified by John Rawls, argues that the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, i.e., its major political and social institutions. Rawls' position has not, however, been without its share of critics. An alternative to institutional egalitarianism begins by emphasizing that the structure of institutions alone is of uncertain benefit when it comes to meeting the demands of justice. If we are truly concerned with social justice, we should be sensitive to the fact that individual choices can go a long way towards upsetting the balance of equality that justice requires. This thesis defends Rawls' focus on the basic structure against this challenge.

This thesis explores the role of the concept of equality in John Rawls' theory of justice. Rawls argues that the Kantian idea of the moral equality of persons translates into a primary principle of equal basic liberties, followed by a principle of fair equality of opportunity that addresses the moral arbitrariness of social and natural contingencies. Furthermore, the "difference principle" specifies that social and economic inequalities are only justified if they benefit the worst-off group. Libertarian critics such as Robert Nozick argue that Rawls' "difference principle" is inconsistent with a Kantian respect for the moral equality of persons as ends in themselves. Communitarians such as Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor argue that Rawls' egalitarian commitments are not supportable via a Kantian conception of the moral subject of justice as an autonomous pre-social self. This thesis defends Rawls' theory of justice against these challenges.

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This thesis examines the idea of desert as expounded in the work of John Rawls, and some of the implications of this conception of desert for moral and political philosophy. In this work, I analyse a series of arguments against retaining this particular conception of desert.I argue that none of these arguments sufficiently diminishes the force of Rawls’ argument for desert, while many of them do state, and I argue that they are correct in doing so, that this conception of desert is dangerous for political or moral philosophy to maintain. I argue that the moral, political and legal implications of accepting this account of desert severely undermine various institutions of differential treatment, and indeed, moral assessment. I regard it as obvious that societies must, on occasion, treat members of those societies differently, for moral, as well as practical reasons. The Rawlsian account of desert, and the account of responsibility on which it rests, however, will endanger the legitimacy of such procedures. I argue further that the Rawlsian account of desert requires that differences in wealth, and inheritance of wealth, influence and privilege be diminished, if not abolished, if we are to talk of any form of desert meaningfully. I argue that this is a strength of Rawls’ account, and further that any account of desert that is true to the philosophical tradition of the concept will require similar steps to be taken. The primary aim of this thesis is to show that Rawls’ arguments against desert are serious ones, both in terms of strength and scope, and that they must be addressed. I intend to show that these arguments are founded on strong moral intuitions, and that it is plausible that these intuitions may need revision. Finally,I intend to show that desert is an important moral and political concept, and that the disciplines of moral and political philosophy will be impoverished by the absence this concept. This absence, I will argue, is a natural consequence of the acceptance of the Rawlsian arguments.

Pour de nombreux architectes du libéralisme politique contemporain, la neutralité constitue une caractéristique définitionnelle du libéralisme politique. Il est pourtant clair que ces nouvelles formulations du libéralisme ne sont pas exemptes de tout présupposé substantiel. Le libéralisme politique de Rawls, par exemple, accorde de la valeur aux notions de liberté, d'égalité et d'équité. Comment la présence de tels présupposés substantiels est-elle conciliable avec la prétention à la neutralité ? Tel est le problème qui est à l'origine de ce travail de recherche. Pour le résoudre, un vaste travail d'explicitation des présupposés du libéralisme, et plus particulièrement du libéralisme politique de John Rawls, ainsi qu'une étude critique du terme « neutralité » ont été réalisés. Avec Rawls, contre une conception procédurale de la neutralité, je défends la neutralité des justifications et démontre qu'elle constitue la conception de la neutralité la plus plausible. Une justification neutre est définie comme justification fondée sur des conceptions communes, c'est-à-dire partagées. Se pose alors la question de la justification de ces présupposés substantiels tenus pour communs. J'indique comment, chez Rawls, la question de la justification reçoit une réponse conceptuelle. Rawls résout cette question en soutenant une conception cohérentiste de la justification et en développant un certain nombre de concepts innovants, au premier rang desquels l'équilibre réfléchi, dont je défends une conception extensive. Si puissants que soient ces outils conceptuels, dans la mesure où les présupposés du libéralisme sont considérés comme étant implicites dans la culture politique publique, ces présupposés semblent néanmoins appeler une autre forme de justification : une justification herméneutique. Si les présupposés du libéralisme sont le résultat d'une interprétation, il faut être capable de rendre raison de cette interprétation. La deuxième partie de ce travail se met en quête d'une telle justification herméneutique, en se fondant sur l'hypothèse qu'elle est disponible dans les travaux que Rawls consacre à l'histoire de la philosophie : les Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy et les Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. / Many supporters of political liberalism consider that neutrality is part of the definition of liberalism. Yet, it is obvious that these new forms of liberalism are not free from substantive presuppositions. Rawls's political liberalism, as an example, values freedom, equality and fairness. But how can such substantive commitments be compatible with the claim for neutrality? This problem is the starting point of this thesis. To solve it, I work to make the presuppositions of liberalism explicit, especially those of Rawls's political liberalism, and I carry out a critical study of the word “neutrality”. With Rawls and against a procedural conception of neutrality, I support a conception of neutrality as justificatory neutrality, which I consider the most believable conception of neutrality. A neutral justification is defined as a justification which is based on shared conceptions. So, the question to be answered is the question of the justification of these substantive presuppositions, which are taken for shared. I study how Rawls gives a conceptual answer to the question of justification. Rawls answers this question supporting a coherentist conception of justification and developing innovative concepts, such as the concept of reflective equilibrium, of which I support an extensive conception. However convincing these concepts may be and because Rawls considers that the liberal presuppositions are implicit in the public political culture, it seems to me that these presuppositions call for another form of justification: a hermeneutic justification. If the presuppositions are the final result of an interpretation, this interpretation has to be justified. The second part of this thesis looks for such a hermeneutic justification. Its main assumption is that such a justification can be found in Rawls's works on the history of philosophy: the Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy and the Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy.

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Akademisk avhandling : Filosofiska Institutionen : Stockholm : 1993. / Bibliogr. p. 137-142. Index.

John Rawls's political liberalism has shaped contemporary political philosophy. Three other theories, feminism, republicanism, and communitarianism, devote a good deal of space to refuting Rawls's theory, and claim to be superior alternatives to it. My main thesis is that they are not alternatives to Rawls's political liberalism but variations of it. That is, although these theories present themselves as external critiques of liberalism, they are ultimately internal critiques, because their own theories are built upon the basic principles of liberalism. This is not to deny that many of their criticisms are well-taken and thus need to be addressed by liberal theorists. I also argue that Rawls's theory of political liberalism is in general terms correct. It needs however to be revised in other to solve what I take to be its main problem: Its lack of a foundation. In my dissertation I propose a revised version of political liberalism, which includes an argument in support of the political liberal conception of justice.

This dissertation argues that Isaiah Berlin and John Rawls can be seen as seminal contributors to two quite distinct revivals of political theory in the latter half of the twentieth century. It suggests that coming to grips with the different underlying character of these revivals and writers is important to understanding political theory and liberalism today. However, while the importance Berlin's of Berlin's work is increasingly recognized, there remain puzzling controversies concerning its overall character and import and in particular concerning its relationship to the dominant forms of American political thought, and Rawls' work in particular. This dissertation offers a novel interpretation of Berlin's political thought and liberalism, and a preliminary exploration of its relationship with Rawls' political thought. / The reading of Berlin develops the following principal themes: (1) Berlin was a moderate but consistent historicist primarily concerned with the interpretive self-understanding of his own form of life; (2) Berlin was a strong but distinctive pluralist who argued for a limited but open-ended range of recognizable and rivalrous ultimate values and for an agitated equilibrium of these values in public life; (3) Berlin focused the bulk of his critical energy on defending an internally pluralistic range of traditionally liberal values within this agitated equilibrium, with an emphasis on liberty and pluralism. He nonetheless recognized that there were other equally ultimate values, not distinctively liberal, which were legitimate and deserving of consideration and even defense. Berlin's essential insight is into the contemporary rivalry of equally ultimate values revealed by the historicist exercise of the sympathetic imagination. / This interpretation of Berlin's thought suggests some deep points of dispute with Rawls' Political Liberalism, in particular over the regulative role of Rawls' political conception of justice in public reason. This dissertation argues that, when explored, these points of disagreement reveal two very different approaches to contemporary political thought, Berlin's grounded in an embrace of strong moral and political pluralism as the basis of political theory, and Rawls' grounded in an effort to tame such "simple" pluralism through the elaboration of a consensual normative framework of public life.