America's founding fathers designed the Constitution as a malleable contract for governance, envisioning a republic with a struggle among co-equal actors that would serve to constrain and channel the struggle for power. The problem this study was designed to address is that presidents have used executive orders (EOs) when legislation is too difficult to pass due to divided party government, or when making sweeping changes to executive departments or agencies that historically required congressional approval. The purpose of this analysis was to explore whether a contemporary Democratic president are more likely than a Republican to use the EO as a unilateral strategy to pursue domestic/economic policy objectives during times of divided party government. This study compared the use of executive orders under divided government by Republican President Ronald Reagan and Democratic President Barack Obama, examining three EOs issued by each. Reagan and Obama viewed government differently. President Obama saw government as a solution to problems and President Reagan saw government as a source of problems. From this, I inferred that Democrats would be more likely than Republicans to favor federal government intervention in domestic/economic policy. Yet, though both presidents had different agendas and approaches, they both used the EO as a unilateral strategy under divided government. This may reflect that presidents understand that many in the public hold the president accountable for the economic performance of the United States, and economic wellbeing may lead to reelection of a president. / Master of Arts / America's founding fathers designed the Constitution as a flexible contract for control, imagining a republic with a struggle among co-equal actors that would serve to limit and guide the struggle for power. The problem this study was designed to address is that presidents have used executive orders (EOs) when laws were too difficult to pass due to divided party government, or when making far-reaching changes to departments or agencies that usually need congressional approval. The purpose of this study was to gain more insight as to whether a Democratic president was more likely than a Republican president to use executive orders to pursue domestic/economic policy goals when different parties controlled Congress and the presidency. The study examined the use of executive orders by Republican President Ronald Reagan and Democratic President Barack Obama under divided government, looking in depth at three executive orders each President issued. Reagan saw government as a source of problems and Obama saw government as a source of solutions. This led to the expectation that Democratic President Obama might use domestic/economic intervention by the federal government more often than Republican President Reagan would. Yet, although both presidents had different plans and methods, they used the executive order similarly during times of divided government. This likely reflects that presidents -- regardless of party -- understand that many in the public hold the president accountable for the economic performance of the United States, and economic wellbeing may lead to reelection of a president.

This thesis contains three chapters. Chapter One provides an analysis of Carter's campaign for president. Carter's battle with Kennedy in the Democratic primary is examined. Additionally, an analysis of Carter's acceptance speech at the Democratic convention and an overview of the fall campaign is provided. Chapter Two has two foci. First, to present a holistic analysis of the debate, this chapter presents an analysis of the questions which were posed to the debaters. Moreover, it argues that Carter's debate preparation books enabled Carter to ignore certain questions and to recite a pre-written answer which reflected the overall strategy of his campaign. The second portion of this chapter delineates Carter's debate tactics, and in the closing portion of this analysis, it will become evident that Carter attempted to use the debate to appeal to specific segments of the population as well as to deny Reagan the "credibility threshold." It will be argued that Carter's debate strategy was fundamentally guided by this concept. Chapter Three will demonstrate that Carter did not achieve either of his debate objectives: Carter was unable to make a persuasive case to blue-collar males, and he was unable to deny Reagan the "credibility threshold." Finally, this chapter evaluates the relative success of Reagan and Carter in achieving their primary debate objectives. / Master of Arts

Thesis (M.A.)--Brandeis University, 2008. / Title from IR (viewed on May 29, 2009). Includes bibliographical references.

No description available.

The Reagan Administration took office in 1981 and began to implement against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), what became known as the Reagan Doctrine. The was an effort to break with previous the previous presidential administration’s policies toward the USSR and would involve the rollback of Communism, instead of simply just co-existing with Communism (Détente) or containing the spread of it. Part of the area that was subject to the Reagan Doctrine included the volatile southern African region, which had two Marxist-Leninist Regimes, namely Angola and Mozambique. Using Graham Allison’s bureaucratic political model, this study attempts to answer the question: “Even when all the prerequisites were met, why was there a decision to only implement a modified form of the Reagan Doctrine in Mozambique, instead of a full-blown effort, such as in, for example Angola or Afghanistan?” As will be shown in the research, the Reagan Doctrine was not a written doctrine, but had many different facets, as will be shown. The most significant part of the Reagan Doctrine was the recognition and arming of insurgents who confronted the Soviet backed regimes including RENAMO. There have been claims that the US Government did not recognize RENAMO. This is false as will be shown by the fact that President Reagan urged FRELIMO to negotiate with the RENAMO resistance. The real significance of this is that even if all prerequisites were met, why was there such reluctance to apply the doctrine with the veracity as compared to the effort in Angola and Afghanistan in arming RENAMO. Was the United States Government still trapped in the “Vietnam Syndrome”? Did the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) have the 3 same political and charismatic qualities as the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)? Were special interests or lobbyists influencing government bureaucrats to view decisions in a specific way? A significant part of this study is devoted to the question of how much influence did the bureaucracy and the politicians (both appointed and career) had on the important national security decision-making process involving Mozambique. Another question that could be asked is: Was the doctrine indirectly applied through third parties? In 1989 when the Reagan Administration ended, did President Reagan and the Reagan Administration achieve their objectives toward Mozambique. If so, was this due to the Reagan Doctrine or other factors? If not, did any actors or events interfere with the strategy? / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)

The Reagan Administration took office in 1981 and began to implement against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), what became known as the Reagan Doctrine. The was an effort to break with previous the previous presidential administration’s policies toward the USSR and would involve the rollback of Communism, instead of simply just co-existing with Communism (Détente) or containing the spread of it. Part of the area that was subject to the Reagan Doctrine included the volatile southern African region, which had two Marxist-Leninist Regimes, namely Angola and Mozambique. Using Graham Allison’s bureaucratic political model, this study attempts to answer the question: “Even when all the prerequisites were met, why was there a decision to only implement a modified form of the Reagan Doctrine in Mozambique, instead of a full-blown effort, such as in, for example Angola or Afghanistan?” As will be shown in the research, the Reagan Doctrine was not a written doctrine, but had many different facets, as will be shown. The most significant part of the Reagan Doctrine was the recognition and arming of insurgents who confronted the Soviet backed regimes including RENAMO. There have been claims that the US Government did not recognize RENAMO. This is false as will be shown by the fact that President Reagan urged FRELIMO to negotiate with the RENAMO resistance. The real significance of this is that even if all prerequisites were met, why was there such reluctance to apply the doctrine with the veracity as compared to the effort in Angola and Afghanistan in arming RENAMO. Was the United States Government still trapped in the “Vietnam Syndrome”? Did the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) have the 3 same political and charismatic qualities as the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)? Were special interests or lobbyists influencing government bureaucrats to view decisions in a specific way? A significant part of this study is devoted to the question of how much influence did the bureaucracy and the politicians (both appointed and career) had on the important national security decision-making process involving Mozambique. Another question that could be asked is: Was the doctrine indirectly applied through third parties? In 1989 when the Reagan Administration ended, did President Reagan and the Reagan Administration achieve their objectives toward Mozambique. If so, was this due to the Reagan Doctrine or other factors? If not, did any actors or events interfere with the strategy? / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)

Il est assez difficile pour la jeune génération d’électeurs démocrates qui ont contribué à porter Barack Obama au pouvoir en 2008 et 2012 d’imaginer l’état de déroute dans lequel se trouvait le parti démocrate après les victoires électorales de Ronald Reagan en 1980 et 1984. Obama doit sa double élection à la fois à l’efficacité de ses campagnes et aux changements qui ont affecté le parti démocrate depuis les années 1980. Certes, les élus démocrates n'avaient pas attendu l'échec humiliant de Jimmy Carter en 1980 pour engager un travail de réflexion mais c'est pendant les années Reagan que certains démocrates influents commencèrent à se mettre concrètement au travail. Le Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) fut la pièce maîtresse d'une sorte d'aggiornamento politique et idéologique qui permit au parti démocrate de reconstituer ses forces en moins de dix ans et de reconquérir la présidence en 1992 avec l’élection de Bill Clinton. Depuis le début des années 1980 jusqu’à sa disparition en 2011, le DLC se consacra à la modernisation idéologique du parti démocrate. / It is quite difficult for the young generation of Democratic voters who contributed to bring Barack Obama into power in 2008 and 2012 to imagine the electoral losing streak the Democratic Party endured after Ronald Reagan’s electoral victories in 1980 and 1984. Obama owes credit to both his efficient campaigns and the changes which have affected the Democratic Party since the 1980s for winning the executive office twice. The Democratic elected officials certainly had not waited for Jimmy Carter’s humiliating defeat in 1980 to reflect upon the situation but it is during the Reagan years that some Democratic influential members started taking action. The Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) became a key part of a sort of political and ideological aggiornamento which allowed the Democratic Party to rebuild its forces in less than ten years and to win back the executive office in 1992 with Bill Clinton’s election. From the early 1980s to its dissolution in 2011, the DLC devoted itself to the ideological modernization of the Democratic Party.

Data obtained through content analysis of articles about or concerning President Reagan in Newsweek, Time and U.S. News & World Report during two time periods indicated that no relationship existed between time and variance of news coverage given to Reagan. Three content analysis measures were used: comparison of favorable and unfavorable statements, amount of coverage and number of quoted words. The study is composed of four chapters: Chapter I introduces the study, Chapter II presents the data, Chapter III evaluates the data and Chapter IV summarizes and makes recommendations.

This study examines the possible effect of the president's vote totals in states on Presidents Carter's and Reagan's support among senators. Using senators' Congressional Quarterly (CQ) presidential support scores as the dependent variable, this paper hypothesizes that Carter and Reagan's support is significantly and positively related to their electoral success in that Senator's state for the years 1977 through 1988. Several control variables are included to help explain support. There is qualified corroboration for the hypothesis that senator's presidential support scores are significantly and positively related to the president's electoral success for specific administrations and for specific-party senators, although not for the original hypothesis that aggregated the period 1977 to 1988.

Master of Science / Curriculum and Instruction Programs / F. Todd Goodson / This study analyzes the power of rhetorical forms from a historical perspective. Ronald Reagan's presidency (1981-1989) will serve as the historical time period used for analysis. By looking at President Ronald Reagan‘s ―War on Drugs, this study provides historical research on the legislative initiatives leading up to this war, as well as on the various aspects of Reagan‘s drug policies. In addition, this study also outlines concurrent educational policies respectively. This background information provides a foundation for examining the role of education within the -War on Drugs, as well as how rhetorical similarities between Reagan‘s drug and education policies are indicative of his administration‘s larger aims and beliefs.