The debate between theological realists and non-realists has so far resisted resolution. In this thesis I apply the insights of current best theory in evolutionary psychology to the problem of deciding between theological realism, which holds that religious beliefs are about some aspect of mind-independent reality, and theological non-realism, which holds that religious beliefs are mind-dependent only. The most well-known exponent of theological non-realism is Don Cupitt who bases his approach to the problem on a combination of biological naturalism and culturalism. In the first part of this thesis I show that biological naturalism and culturalism are incompatible and that culturalism should be rejected in favor of biological naturalism. Cupitt's biological naturalism is the forerunner of an evolutionary psychological approach to religious beliefs that holds great promise for determining their correct interpretation. In the second part of this thesis I critically examine the foundations of evolutionary psychology and its subsequent development into an approach to religious belief in particular. Current evolutionary theories of culture, including religious belief, use Meme theory, which seems, on the face of it, to be a theory analogous to that of natural selection. I show that the memetic approach to religious belief is mistaken but that there is a sound alternative in the work of Pascal Boyer. Boyer draws on evolutionary psychology, anthropology and cognitive science to develop an account of the origin in the mind of religious beliefs and their spread through the population. My evolutionary argument is that religious beliefs are the result of the current but not proper function of cognitive modules. Only if beliefs are the result of the proper function of cognitive modules are we justified in holding them to be about some aspect of mind-independent reality. Theological realism is blocked because all versions of realism in the literature depend to some degree on the fact of religious experience, which is covered by the evolutionary argument. Theological non-realism is supported, in principle, by the evolutionary argument but, in practice, is not a genuine alternative to realism because religious beliefs are automatically given a realist interpretation that competes with explicit nonrealist interpretations. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

The debate between theological realists and non-realists has so far resisted resolution. In this thesis I apply the insights of current best theory in evolutionary psychology to the problem of deciding between theological realism, which holds that religious beliefs are about some aspect of mind-independent reality, and theological non-realism, which holds that religious beliefs are mind-dependent only. The most well-known exponent of theological non-realism is Don Cupitt who bases his approach to the problem on a combination of biological naturalism and culturalism. In the first part of this thesis I show that biological naturalism and culturalism are incompatible and that culturalism should be rejected in favor of biological naturalism. Cupitt's biological naturalism is the forerunner of an evolutionary psychological approach to religious beliefs that holds great promise for determining their correct interpretation. In the second part of this thesis I critically examine the foundations of evolutionary psychology and its subsequent development into an approach to religious belief in particular. Current evolutionary theories of culture, including religious belief, use Meme theory, which seems, on the face of it, to be a theory analogous to that of natural selection. I show that the memetic approach to religious belief is mistaken but that there is a sound alternative in the work of Pascal Boyer. Boyer draws on evolutionary psychology, anthropology and cognitive science to develop an account of the origin in the mind of religious beliefs and their spread through the population. My evolutionary argument is that religious beliefs are the result of the current but not proper function of cognitive modules. Only if beliefs are the result of the proper function of cognitive modules are we justified in holding them to be about some aspect of mind-independent reality. Theological realism is blocked because all versions of realism in the literature depend to some degree on the fact of religious experience, which is covered by the evolutionary argument. Theological non-realism is supported, in principle, by the evolutionary argument but, in practice, is not a genuine alternative to realism because religious beliefs are automatically given a realist interpretation that competes with explicit nonrealist interpretations. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Philosophy, 2005. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Nov. 11, 2008). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-01, Section: A, page: 0202. Chair: Paul Vincent Spade.

Thèse (M.A.)--Université de Sherbrooke (Canada), 2008. / Titre de l'écran-titre (visionné le 1 février 2007). In ProQuest dissertations and theses. Publié aussi en version papier.

Thesis (M. Sc.)--University of Alberta, 2010. / Title from pdf file main screen (viewed on July 29, 2010). A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, [Department of] Philosophy, University of Alberta. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (PH.D.) -- Syracuse University, 2006. / "Publication number AAT 3242492."

The debate between theological realists and non-realists has so far resisted resolution. In this thesis I apply the insights of current best theory in evolutionary psychology to the problem of deciding between theological realism, which holds that religious beliefs are about some aspect of mind-independent reality, and theological non-realism, which holds that religious beliefs are mind-dependent only. The most well-known exponent of theological non-realism is Don Cupitt who bases his approach to the problem on a combination of biological naturalism and culturalism. In the first part of this thesis I show that biological naturalism and culturalism are incompatible and that culturalism should be rejected in favor of biological naturalism. Cupitt's biological naturalism is the forerunner of an evolutionary psychological approach to religious beliefs that holds great promise for determining their correct interpretation. In the second part of this thesis I critically examine the foundations of evolutionary psychology and its subsequent development into an approach to religious belief in particular. Current evolutionary theories of culture, including religious belief, use Meme theory, which seems, on the face of it, to be a theory analogous to that of natural selection. I show that the memetic approach to religious belief is mistaken but that there is a sound alternative in the work of Pascal Boyer. Boyer draws on evolutionary psychology, anthropology and cognitive science to develop an account of the origin in the mind of religious beliefs and their spread through the population. My evolutionary argument is that religious beliefs are the result of the current but not proper function of cognitive modules. Only if beliefs are the result of the proper function of cognitive modules are we justified in holding them to be about some aspect of mind-independent reality. Theological realism is blocked because all versions of realism in the literature depend to some degree on the fact of religious experience, which is covered by the evolutionary argument. Theological non-realism is supported, in principle, by the evolutionary argument but, in practice, is not a genuine alternative to realism because religious beliefs are automatically given a realist interpretation that competes with explicit nonrealist interpretations. / Subscription resource available via Digital Dissertations only.

Abstract not available.

Taking as a guiding thread the idea of absence or emptiness as a constitutive trait of all images, this dissertation reviews how this idea has been defended or ignored throughout diverse iconoclast moments in Western Christian civilization, focusing on the possible consequences that the basculating movement of acceptance-rejection of the image's emptiness might have for contemporary approaches to the image. The iconoclast debate from the eighth century, and the works of Freud and Lacan will be used as paradigmatic moments to penetrate into the difficult relationship man has had with images and the imaginary throughout an extended period of Western Christian history.

This dissertation challenges the conflict thesis between science and religion promoted by philosophers Alvin Plantinga and Philip Kitcher. I analyze their conflict thesis as an epistemological disagreement about the nature of inquiry. Alvin Plantinga argues that a fideistic method of reasoning is required to make sense of science, while Philip Kitcher promotes a scientisim as the only way to make sense of religion. I argue that fideism and scientism are acceptable in a disciplinary context of inquiry. However, the investigation of the relationship between science and religion is an interdisciplinary context of inquiry where fideism and scientism instigate conflict. Therefore, conflict between science and religion is an artifact of Plantinga's and Kitcher's extension of disciplinary forms of inquiry into an interdisciplinary context. I look to the work of virtue epistemology, having identified the nature of inquiry as a primary cause of their conflict, to help distinguish disciplinary from interdisciplinary forms of inquiry. Disciplinary forms of inquiry are inquires where intellectual faculty virtues are more prominent than character virtues. Thus, one finds a consensus in disciplinary inquiry in how to proceed with research, e.g., Plantinga's fideism and Kitcher's scientism. Interdisciplinary research is a form of inquiry where the method of inquiry itself is in question, a form of inquiry has not been agreed to in terms of how to proceed with inquiry. Thus, intellectual character virtues take precedence to faculty virtues as agents are navigating the borders of different forms of inquiry. This distinction allows me to understand Plantinga and Kitcher as engaging in excellent disciplinary research but less-than-excellent interdisciplinary research. The dissertation concludes with showing how their work represents poor instances of interdisciplinary research, providing a positive example in the work of Michael Ruse. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester 2015. / July 15, 2015. / Alvin Plantinga, interdisciplinary, Michael Ruse, Philip Kitcher, science and religion, virtue epistemology / Includes bibliographical references. / Michael Ruse, Professor Directing Dissertation; John Kelsay, University Representative; Russell Dancy, Committee Member; Piers Rawling, Committee Member.