Diploma thesis tests the existence of luck premium on U.S. CEOs' compensations. Luck premium means that in case of high principal-agent costs, CEOs are rewarded for random luck and not only for their productivity. Thesis uses financial crisis in 2008 as a breaking event after which attention and control of CEOs' remuneration by owners, public, and media intensified. Using regression with fixed effects on panel data between years 2004 and 2012 thesis proved impact of luck premium before 2008 while the influence was not significant after 2008. Results were not robust for other model specifications, which might be caused by selectivity of the dataset. Thesis then presents overview of theoretical approaches to CEOs' compensation analysis and recommendations for optimal compensation set-up.

Submitted by William Justo Figueiro (williamjf) on 2015-06-27T12:35:42Z No. of bitstreams: 1 45.pdf: 1909890 bytes, checksum: a826b23d33eab50cce7d62b7876d703e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-06-27T12:35:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 45.pdf: 1909890 bytes, checksum: a826b23d33eab50cce7d62b7876d703e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Nenhuma / O objetivo principal deste estudo foi identificar associações entre os pacotes de remuneração dos agentes das empresas brasileiras listadas no Novo Mercado com os seus indicadores de desempenho financeiro. Em segundo lugar, buscou-se verificar o cumprimento de normativo que prevê a divulgação das informações relativas à remuneração desses agentes, bem como mapear a composição de tais remunerações. A governança corporativa e a teoria da agência são usadas para desenvolver o arcabouço teórico que sustenta o estudo. A pesquisa baseia-se nos dados de 100% das empresas listadas no segmento de Novo Mercado no período de 2008 a 2012. Os dados são estudados por meio de métodos estatísticos, em particular análises descritivas e de correlação. Contrariamente às expectativas, o estudo conclui que há poucas correlações estatisticamente significativas entre as remunerações dos agentes das empresas brasileiras do Novo Mercado e seus indicadores de desempenho financeiro. Ademais, observa-se uma melhora na transparência de informações pelo cumprimento da exigência de informar a composição das remunerações dos agentes. Este estudo contribui para a literatura de gestão, sobretudo a literatura que discute a remuneração como ferramenta para mitigar os problemas de agência no Brasil. / The main objective of this study was to identify correlations between the remuneration packages of agents in Brazilian public entities listed in the “Novo Mercado” with their financial performance indicators. Secondly, it aimed to evaluate the compliance with technical standard of the disclosure of information related to the remuneration of such agents as well to map the components of this remuneration. Corporate governance and Theory of Agency were used to develop the theoretical background that supports this study. The research is based on the data from 100% of entities listed in the New Market from 2008 to 2012. Data is analyzed through a variety of statistical methodologies, in particular, descriptive analyses and correlation. Against the expectations, the study concluded that there are few correlations statistically meaningful between the remuneration of the agents of the Brazilian entities in the Novo Mercado and their financial performance indicators. In addition, an improvement in the clarity of information due to the requirements of disclosing the components of agent's remuneration is noted. This study contributes to the literature in Management, in particular, to the literature that discuss remuneration as a tool to mitigate the problems of Theory of Agency in Brazil.