John Stuart Mill’s Representative Government argues that the ideal form of government is representative. In this paper, I interpret Mill’s argument as a utilitarian argument for a political system with the salient feature of authoritative public participation. Mill argues for this feature in the first three chapters of Representative Government. This argument is interpreted in the context of Mill’s utilitarian views as elaborated in Utilitarianism, with emphasis on Mill’s understanding of pleasure formation and high quality utility.

Thesis (M.P.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 119-126).

In a representative democracy the people's representatives are expected to do what the people would do if they were present in person. To attain this ideal requires that the legislature in its composition embodies the politically relevant diversity that exists within society, and that the legislature has power to act. These two requirements are prevalent among significant theories of representation, post- Charter court rulings, and the commonly accepted expectations of the people themselves. Typically, the composition of the BC legislature is not representative; and the legislature lacks power to act. The Single Member Plurality electoral system manufactures majorities in the legislature where none exist among the people. Most voters are not represented in the legislature, and the artificial majorities give cabinet undue power. When cabinet has too much power, the concept of responsible government is subverted, MLAs lose their independence, and are beholden to their political party, instead of their constituents. Replacing the Single Member Plurality system with the Single Transferable Vote has the potential to give voters more choice, waste fewer votes, bring greater diversity into the legislature, lessen party discipline, weaken the power of the Premier and cabinet, increase the power of the legislature, restore responsible government, render government more responsive to changing public demands, reconnect government to the people, and give voters power over their representatives. Our electoral system is designed to benefit political parties - not people. Therefore, change will not likely originate with parties and party activists. It must come from the people themselves, aided perhaps by the courts.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed December 3, 2007). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 318-343).

Submitted to the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Thesis (Ph.D.)--Tufts University, 2003. / Adviser: William Moomaw. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 223-248). Access restricted to members of the Tufts University community. Also available via the World Wide Web;

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Adelaide, 1973.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Department of Political Science, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--UCLA, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 323-345).

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität zu Köln, 1969. / Includes bibliographical references (p. viii-xxiii).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University. / The Justin Winsor Prize of the American Historical Association was awarded for this essay. From the Annual report of the American Historical Association, 1900, vol. I, p. 237-463, 3 pl. "List of references": p. 461-463.