<p>The paper studies share repurchases done by 50 randomly chosen U.S. publicly traded companies between 1996 and 2007 and checks if they could have been done at more advantageous prices for long-term shareholders in the two years following repurchases. The paper argues that the lower the price at which a repurchase is done the better it is for long-term shareholders.</p><p> </p><p>The results indicate that on average for 37 % of the years in which a company repurchased shares, it could have done it at a price at least 25 % lower in the next two years. When the results are weighted to take into account the dollar amounts spent on repurchases each year, the figure increases to 56 %. The paper looks also at if the repurchases could have been done at a price at least 50 % lower in the next two years. The unweighted results show that on average it would have been possible for 17 % of the years in which a company repurchased shares. When the result is weighted for the dollars spent on repurchases each year the proportion increases to 32 %.</p><p> </p><p>The results show also that the companies increased massively their repurchases just before the stock market crash that started in the late 2007.</p>

The paper studies share repurchases done by 50 randomly chosen U.S. publicly traded companies between 1996 and 2007 and checks if they could have been done at more advantageous prices for long-term shareholders in the two years following repurchases. The paper argues that the lower the price at which a repurchase is done the better it is for long-term shareholders.   The results indicate that on average for 37 % of the years in which a company repurchased shares, it could have done it at a price at least 25 % lower in the next two years. When the results are weighted to take into account the dollar amounts spent on repurchases each year, the figure increases to 56 %. The paper looks also at if the repurchases could have been done at a price at least 50 % lower in the next two years. The unweighted results show that on average it would have been possible for 17 % of the years in which a company repurchased shares. When the result is weighted for the dollars spent on repurchases each year the proportion increases to 32 %.   The results show also that the companies increased massively their repurchases just before the stock market crash that started in the late 2007.

In group coupon service, customers get merchandise or service which features significant discount from vendor and service provider. However, there are gaps generated during service delivery and had effect on repurchase intention. We extend the E-S-QUAL and HSQM to find the dimensions in respectively service quality. The purpose of this research is to learn how service quality of vendor and service quality of service provider influence the repurchase intention on vendor and service provider, moderating with price sensitivity dimension. PLS (partial least squared) is used to analyze our measurement and structural models. The results include: (1) key dimensions of service provider¡¦s service quality in group coupon service model and group coupon service model with recovery are interaction quality, physical environment, fulfillment, and policy. Dimensions of service quality of vendor in regular case are information quality, efficiency, system availability, and assurance, while dimensions of service quality of vendor in recovery case are responsiveness, compensation, and contact. (2) Service quality of service provider has greater effect on repurchase intention on vendor than service quality of vendor in regular case. (3) Price Sensitivity has no significant moderating effect on the relationship between service quality of service provider and repurchase intention on service provider with regular price. Our research contributes to the nascent body of group coupon advertisement format and offer unique insights for the vendor and service provider on the importance of each role and what should be concern for the future.

Le rachat d’actions est devenu une technique de gestion des capitaux propres et des relations avec les actionnaires de plus en plus courante. Plusieurs études se sont intéressées aux déterminants de rachat d’actions. Cette recherche se positionne alors dans le prolongement de ces travaux en examinant les caractéristiques financières et de gouvernance susceptibles d’expliquer ce phénomène. Cependant, elle s’en différencie en mettant en évidence le rôle du cycle de vie de l’entreprise dans l’identification des périodes où les conditions de rachats sont les plus favorables.S’inscrivant dans le cadre d’une démarche hypothético-déductive, notre étude empirique est réalisée sur un échantillon de 754 programmes de rachat initiés par des firmes cotées sur le marché français entre 2002 et 2004. Afin de tester nos hypothèses de recherche, nous avons utilisé une méthodologie combinant l’analyse typologique, les tests univariés et les modèles de régression. L’examen des résultats montre certaines spécificités financières et de gouvernance des firmes qui réalisent des programmes de rachat d’actions par rapport à celles qui ne les réalisent pas. Par ailleurs, nous révélons une différence dans ces spécificités par rapport à la position dans le cycle de vie de l’entreprise. En effet, les firmes rachètent leurs actions pour couvrir leurs plans de stock-options dans les phases de démarrage et de croissance. Alors que le rachat sert à minimiser le risque des free cash-flows dans les phases de maturité et déclin. En outre, l’influence de la structure du conseil d’administration et l’actionnariat managérial sur la décision de rachat varient en fonction des phases du cycle de vie de la firme. / Stock repurchase is nowadays a widely used technique to manage equities and relations with shareholders. Several studies have dealt with the determinants of stock buyback. This thesis extends this research stream by examining the importance of the firms’ financial and governance characteristics on stock repurchase programs. In particular, it sheds lights on the role of corporate life-cycle in shaping firm behavior in this respect. Using a hypothetical-deductive approach, our study is carried out on a sample of 754 stock repurchase programs announced between 2002 and 2004 by French public firms. To test our research hypotheses, we combine various empirical methods including cluster analysis, univariate tests and logistic regression. The results show common financial and governance characteristics of firms that repurchase shares. More specifically, we provide empirical evidence that the effect of these characteristics varies depending on the life cycle position of the firm. Indeed, firms repurchase stocks to exercise their stock options during the start-up and growth phase to distribute excess free cash flow in the maturity and decline phases. Moreover, the effects of board leadership structures of directors and managers ownership on the decision to repurchase vary with the life-cycle phases.

This dissertation consists of 2 essays in the area of corporate finance. The title of my first essay is “Impact of Institutional Investors on Firms’ Financial Constraint and Liquidity”. We can find ample evidences in existing literature which show that institutional investors play a vital role in the corporate world. Many researchers have linked institutional investors to activism, monitoring benefits, mitigating the cost of debt using government bond, spin off activities and improving information asymmetry problem. In the first essay, I would like to add another dimension to institutional investors’ literature by examining institutional investors’ role in mitigating financial constraint problem in the firm. Institutional investors have large financial networks and make large financial investment in firms. Their presence might help firms attract external capital. I am using 2 financial constraint measurements; KZ index (Lamont, Polk, Saa-Requejo, 2001) and bank line of credit (Sufi, 2009). I am also adding additional measurement for financial constraint using notes payable. I find evidences to support the hypotheses that institutional investors’ presence and ownership mitigate financial constraints. The title of my second essay is “Long- and Short-Term Institutional Investors and Payout Policy”. In the second essay, I examine the relationship between the firms’ payout policy and the presence/ownership of certain type of institutional investors. I classify the types of institutional investors using Bushee’s (1998, 2001) classification of institutional investors. I find that the presence and the magnitude of long term institutional investors positively affect the likelihood and the magnitude of dividend. I also find that the presence and the magnitude of short term institutional investors positively affect the likelihood and the magnitude of share repurchases. This study suggests that the presence of different types of institutional investors can affect certain type of payout policy. Keywords: Transient; dedicated; monitoring; trading

This paper investigates determinants of payout levels and payout composition in multinational corporations and domestic corporations and how payout differs between the two, as well as the effect of a country’s legal tradition on payout, on a worldwide sample. My main findings are that multinational corporations’ total payout is slightly lower than domestic corporations’ payout when taking into account a country’s legal tradition affects. No support is found that multinationals and domestic corporations differ in payout composition and payout composition is not changing over time, according to my results. My findings are partly consistent with theories on how ownership structures and agency problems affect payout policy. Still, the puzzle in unsolved.

This paper examines the effect of corporate governance quality on firms’ payout policy. We analyze a global sample of 3,904 firms (25,773 firm-year observations) over the period 2002-2016. I find that corporate governance quality is positively related to payout ratios, consistent with the perspective of the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) and the outcome dividend model (LLSV, 2000). Moreover, consistent with findings of Mitton (2004) the positive relationship between firm’s corporate governance and dividend payout mainly holds for countries with strong shareholder or creditor protection, suggesting that firm-level corporate governance and country-level protection rights are complements rather than substitutes. This study also shows that firms with high corporate governance quality are less likely to disburse cash to their shareholders when controlling for country-level shareholder rights. Furthermore, this study contributes to the existing literature by investigating share repurchases and finds that well governed firms distribute less cash through share repurchases and total payout when they experience high growth opportunities. Moreover, the results suggest that countries that experience stronger shareholder and creditor rights reduce the positive impact that corporate governance quality has on share repurchases and total payout.

<p>In May 2000 share repurchases were legalized in Sweden, with the purpose to provide companies with an efficient and flexible way to distribute capital. To buy back shares gives companies several benefits which are discussed in our study. The lack of academic research about this topic for Swedish companies gave us an incentive to provide knowledge specifically for this market. When companies announce a share repurchase program they are subject to uncertainty about the society’s reaction and economic consequences. Individuals within a well established organizational field deal rationally with uncertainty by adjusting to their institutional environment. The institutional environment can be defined as an abstract structure of regulations and behavioral norms that guide human’s decisions. This often leads to homogeneity in companies’ culture, structure and output. We ask the question if companies are realizing repurchase programs in a similar way over time, and if share repurchases have been developed as a more common used financial instrument since 2000. Our second question is if companies that decide to buy back shares pursue this under similar economic conditions as a result from becoming homogeneous.</p><p>The purpose of this study is to describe how institutional pressures in form of coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism have affected companies’ decision to repurchase shares. We want to explain if there is an upward going trend of share repurchases, a standardized way to repurchase over time and if this decision can be determined by similarities in certain financial indicators of a company’s economic situation. To answer our purpose we used a quantitative research strategy with a deductive approach. The collected data was analyzed in a logistic regression analysis and by interpretations of descriptive statistics. We decided to examine for mimetic isomorphism public companies listed within the industrial sector on Stockholm Stock Exchange from the years 2000-2006. For the test of coercive and normative isomorphism with a logistic regression analysis we had to limit ourselves to investigate the years 2001-2003.</p><p>In reality the three institutional pressures are working simultaneously and should together lead to a common perception about share repurchases among companies. For our testing we separated institutional isomorphism based on our theoretical preconceptions. This allowed us to analyze each individual institutional pressure and how they interact together. We defined mimetic isomorphism as companies adjusting their repurchase behavior to other companies within the industrial sector. Our result has not shown any indications of such a behavior concerning time, amount or frequency of the buybacks. Testing if certain financial indicators such as excess cash, liquidity, solvency, dividends, volatile operative income, prior year return, growth opportunities, companies’ size, ownership concentration, institutional and individual shareholders could explain stock repurchase activity gave us the possibility to evaluate coercive and normative isomorphism. But the question how institutional isomorphism affects companies’ repurchase decisions still remains unanswered. We have not found any certain financial indicator which motivates companies’ decision to buy back their own shares. The decision might therefore be carried out under very different economic conditions and with different objectives. In the industrial sector and generally in the whole Swedish market only a relatively low proportion of companies buy back shares. The stated findings for the Swedish market imply a need for further investigations over a longer time horizon and for a larger population. Further investigations in this topic which has the potential to provide recent insight into the stock repurchase decision for Swedish companies would enhance and verify our statements.</p>

In May 2000 share repurchases were legalized in Sweden, with the purpose to provide companies with an efficient and flexible way to distribute capital. To buy back shares gives companies several benefits which are discussed in our study. The lack of academic research about this topic for Swedish companies gave us an incentive to provide knowledge specifically for this market. When companies announce a share repurchase program they are subject to uncertainty about the society’s reaction and economic consequences. Individuals within a well established organizational field deal rationally with uncertainty by adjusting to their institutional environment. The institutional environment can be defined as an abstract structure of regulations and behavioral norms that guide human’s decisions. This often leads to homogeneity in companies’ culture, structure and output. We ask the question if companies are realizing repurchase programs in a similar way over time, and if share repurchases have been developed as a more common used financial instrument since 2000. Our second question is if companies that decide to buy back shares pursue this under similar economic conditions as a result from becoming homogeneous. The purpose of this study is to describe how institutional pressures in form of coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism have affected companies’ decision to repurchase shares. We want to explain if there is an upward going trend of share repurchases, a standardized way to repurchase over time and if this decision can be determined by similarities in certain financial indicators of a company’s economic situation. To answer our purpose we used a quantitative research strategy with a deductive approach. The collected data was analyzed in a logistic regression analysis and by interpretations of descriptive statistics. We decided to examine for mimetic isomorphism public companies listed within the industrial sector on Stockholm Stock Exchange from the years 2000-2006. For the test of coercive and normative isomorphism with a logistic regression analysis we had to limit ourselves to investigate the years 2001-2003. In reality the three institutional pressures are working simultaneously and should together lead to a common perception about share repurchases among companies. For our testing we separated institutional isomorphism based on our theoretical preconceptions. This allowed us to analyze each individual institutional pressure and how they interact together. We defined mimetic isomorphism as companies adjusting their repurchase behavior to other companies within the industrial sector. Our result has not shown any indications of such a behavior concerning time, amount or frequency of the buybacks. Testing if certain financial indicators such as excess cash, liquidity, solvency, dividends, volatile operative income, prior year return, growth opportunities, companies’ size, ownership concentration, institutional and individual shareholders could explain stock repurchase activity gave us the possibility to evaluate coercive and normative isomorphism. But the question how institutional isomorphism affects companies’ repurchase decisions still remains unanswered. We have not found any certain financial indicator which motivates companies’ decision to buy back their own shares. The decision might therefore be carried out under very different economic conditions and with different objectives. In the industrial sector and generally in the whole Swedish market only a relatively low proportion of companies buy back shares. The stated findings for the Swedish market imply a need for further investigations over a longer time horizon and for a larger population. Further investigations in this topic which has the potential to provide recent insight into the stock repurchase decision for Swedish companies would enhance and verify our statements.

This paper examines the stock performance around initiation announcements of open market share repurchase programs, the price impact of repurchase trading and the long-run abnormal stock performance following the initiation announcements in a European regulatory framework. The study uses a unique dataset on initiation announcements and actual repurchases conducted by firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange during the period 2000-2009. The results show that initiation announcements of open market repurchase programs exhibit a two-day abnormal return of approximately 2%. The price impact on the actual repurchase days is positively correlated with the daily repurchase volume, and is both statistically and economically significant during the first 3 repurchase days in a repurchase program. The long-run abnormal stock performance is positively associated with the fraction of shares bought in the program and is approximately 7% the first year following the initiation announcement. The results indicate that repurchase trading provides price support and that the market participants detect and perceive the initiation announcement and the first repurchase days in a repurchase program as a signal of undervaluation. / <p>QC 20130515</p>