Mémoire (M. Sc.A.)--Université du Québec à Chicoutimi, 1991. / Document électronique également accessible en format PDF. CaQCU

Thesis (M. Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.B.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 88-90).

Thesis (M.M.S.)--Carleton University, 1999. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Cornell University, 1995. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 136-143).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 326-354).

The main purpose of this study has been to establish the chanoino character of the RAs (Research Associations) in the UK from 1970 to 1989 and beyond. The last major piece of research carried out on the RAs was the Bessborough Report which was undertaken in 1972. One of the main problems encountered was the availability of secondary data on the RAs. Most of the data, especiall y statistical ones, had to be generated from primary sources e.g. Annual Reports of RAs, internal papers of RAs and interviews. Consequently, a great amount of time and effort went into the accumulation of data. The thesis is divided into five parts. Part 1 consists of the research methodology. Part 2 and 3 provide the necessary background information in order to map out the changes in the RAs over the two decades. Part 4 forms the core of the thesis and it presents the results of the research model used. Part 5 presents the conclusions and recommendations of the study.

This dissertation consists of two essays dealing with two selected aspects of the investment decision process faced by individuals and corporations. In the first essay, I develop a model of a multiple-stage patent race between two rival firms to study the impact of technological competition on value and return dynamics of Research and Development (R&D) ventures. The model describes a firm's capital budgeting decision process in the presence of technical uncertainty, market uncertainty and preemption. I characterize the equilibrium of the race and derive optimal investment strategies. Analysis of the equilibrium firm value shows that the premium accruing to the technology "leader" is larger than the loss accruing to the technology "lagger" and that the marginal effect of success/failure is increasing in the uncertainty of cash flows. Risk premia demanded by an ownership claim to competing R&D ventures (i) increase when a rival pulls ahead in the race and (ii) are lower when rivals are "closer" to each other in the development process. Compared to the case where rival firms merge, R&D competition reduces the industry value and lowers the expected completion time for a project. The erosion in value, due to preemption, is higher when firms are "neck-and-neck" and in early stages of development. Numerical simulations show that, in later stages of development, risk premia demanded by the perfectly collusive market are generally lower than risk premia demanded by a portfolio of competing firms. The opposite is true in early stages of development, which suggests that R&D competition may actually lower the cost of early stage financing. In the second essay, I solve a portfolio allocation problem for an individual who can select between two risky assets and a riskless asset in the presence of capital gains taxes. I treat capital gains taxes as a form of endogenous transaction costs. Using this analogy, I characterize the trading strategy for the two assets, and study the effect of taxes on optimal portfolio diversification. The optimal strategy contains a "no trade" region and a dynamic tax-timing option. I find that the diversification costs due to capital gains taxes are substantial and the value of the tax deferral option is decreasing in the correlation among assets and in the volatility of the risky assets. By comparing the solution of the multiple asset portfolio problem to the one of an investor who can trade only in a mutual fund I am able to measure the value of the flexibility option of the multi-asset case as well as the cost of mutual fund turnover. Finally, I show that imposing a wash-sale constraint generates discontinuous portfolio rebalancing strategies. / Business, Sauder School of / Finance, Division of / Graduate

Organizations have had difficulty managing the performance of their knowledge work teams. Many of these troubles have been linked to antiquated or inadequate performance management systems along with a scarcity of empirical research on this important human resource initiative. These problems are magnified when managing the performance of research and development teams because greater ambiguity and uncertainty exists in these environments, while projects are unique and continually evolving. In addition, performance management in R&D has only recently been accepted as important while individuals in these settings are often resistant to teams. This study represented the first step in the process of understanding relationships between performance management practices and perceptions of performance in R&D work teams. Participants were 132 R&D team leaders representing 20 organizations that agreed to complete a survey via the Internet. The survey instrument was designed to examine the relationships between performance measurement, feedback, and reward processes utilized by teams in relation to measures of customer satisfaction, psychological and team effectiveness, and resource utilization and development. The most important level of performance measurement occurred at the business unit level followed next by the individual level while team level measurement was unrelated to team performance. A simple measurement system with three to seven performance measures focused on objective results, outcomes, and customer satisfaction appeared ideal. Team participation in the performance management process, most notably the process of setting performance measures, goals, and objectives was also important. The use of multiple raters, frequent performance appraisals, and frequent feedback were identified as meaningful. Specific types of rewards were unrelated to performance although some evidence suggested that business unit rewards were superior to team and individual rewards. It was speculated that R&D teams function more like working groups rather than real teams. The focus in R&D seems to be on business unit projects, products, or designs where the aggregate of individual and team contributions determine larger project outcomes.

Originally presented as the author's thesis: Universität zu Kiel, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references.