This thesis studies the poor development performance of resource-rich developing economies, known as the resource curse. In the first chapter we provide a comprehensive literature review of the topic and the channels through which resource abundance can result in the resource curse. Issues of corruption and governance have been emphasised to be the main driver of the resource curse. This has been illustrated by a negative relationship between resource abundance and corruption control in the literature. However, there is a gap in how natural resources facilitate corruption. In the second chapter, using empirical analysis, we study the role of taxation in the relationship between natural resources and corruption. Taxation is usually seen as a social contract between citizens and government -- people pay taxes and in return they hold their government accountable for efficient allocation of their taxes. Resource abundance shifts the reliance of government from tax incomes to resource rents. People therefore, have no sustainable mechanism to hold their government responsible for corruption and wrongdoings inside public institutions. Using different econometric methods, Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects and 3SLS, our results show that natural resource revenues crowd out incomes from tax revenues. Meanwhile, taxation has a positive and significant impact on the control of corruption throughout our analysis. The results suggest that resource-rich developing countries should invest in building their tax systems to increase their non-resource tax revenues. This will increase state capacity and demand for accountability in the public sector among citizens and hence decreases corruption. Related to our second chapter, in the third chapter we study a cash transfer programme, known as oil-to-cash, which has gained support as a tool to re-establish taxation and fight corruption. Under such a plan, resource revenues are distributed directly among the public and then each citizen is taxed optimally. Through this, government relies directly and fully on its citizens for its income. Hence, taxation is reinstated and the social contract is revived. Within a general equilibrium model we show how this happens and what the implications are of the oil-to-cash programme for economic growth. Our results clearly show how corruption results in a resource curse. Furthermore, the model explains the variation that is seen in the degree of the resource curse across countries. The study also analyses the practical barriers of the oil-to-cash plan. The study suggests that parallel to (or even prior to) such a plan countries need to invest in building their tax system and increasing their administrative capacities.

Cette recherche apporte une contribution à la problématique de l'évaluation économique et comptable des actifs de réserves et de ressources de l'industrie extractive. Elle vise à répondre à la question suivante: Quelles sont les valeurs économiques des réserves et des ressources qui sont appréhendées par la comptabilité d'entreprise et quelles sont, en cas de choix entre plusieurs types de valeurs, les raisons de ces choix?Elle montre dans sa première partie qu'il n'existe qu'une correspondance partielle entre les valeurs économiques et les valeurs comptables, ce qui privilégie la théorie économique néoclassique. Elle montre dans sa deuxième partie que diverses méthodes comptables cohabitent au sein des six pays étudiés en considération des intérêts des entreprises majors et juniors de cette industrie. La troisième partie de la thèse analyse le processus de normalisation de l'IASB et souligne l'influence du pouvoir des majors et l'influence indirecte exercée par les juniors. Cette thèse s'inscrit dans le prolongement de la recherche en comptabilité critique. / This research contributes to the problem of economic and accounting valuation of the assets reserves and resources in the extractive industry. It aims to answer the following question: What are the economic values of reserves and resources that are recognized by corporate accounting and what are, in cas of a choice between several types of values, the reasons for these choices? It shows in the first part there is only partial matching between economic values and accounting values that favors neoclassical economic theory. It shows, in the second part, that different accounting methods coexist in the six countries studied, taking int consideration the interests of majors and juniors companies in this industry. The third part of the thesis analyzes the IASB's standard-setting process and underlines the influence of the majors power and the indirect influence of the juniors. This thesis is a continuation of research in critical accounting. / Esta investigación aporta una contribución a la problemática de la evaluación económica y contable de los activos reservas y recursos de la industria de extracción. Su objetivo es responder a la siguiente pregunta: ¿Cuáles son los valores económicos de las reservas y los recursos que son reconocidos por la contabilidad de empresas y cuáles son, en el caso de escoger entre varios tipos de valores , las razones de estas decisiones? En la primera parte se demuestra que sólo hay correspondencia parcial entre los valores económicos y los valores de contables, lo que favorece la teoría económica neoclásica. En la segunda parte se demuestra que diversos métodos de contabilidad coexisten en los seis países estudiados tomando en cuenta los intereses de las empresas majors y las empresas juniors de esta industria. La tercera parte de la tesis analiza el proceso de normalización del IASB y subraya la influencia del poder de las grandes multinacionales y la influencia indirecta de los juniors. Esta tesis es una continuación de la investigación en contabilidad crítica.