Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1974. / Vita. Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

No description available.

Thesis--University of Florida. / Description based on print version record. Manuscript copy. Vita. Bibliography: leaves 153-155.

Habilitationsschrift--Giessen. / Bibliography: p. 173-189.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2004. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains ix, 61 p.; also includes graphics. Includes bibliographical references (p. 59-61). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.

Inaug.-diss.--Erlangen.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2005. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file viewed on (January 23, 2006) Includes bibliographical references.

In this thesis an attempt is made to shew that moral responsibility -- that a man merits praise or blame as he acts well or badly -- is compatible with the idea of an omnipotent God and a causal determinism. Moreover, a man's responsibility for his acts depends on their being his acts; i.e. he has a will, is free to choose, and acts voluntarily. Chapter one sets forth what the writer considers the best definitions of causality, chance, volition, freedom, determinism, indeterminism and necessity, Aristotle's systematic philosophy seeming the most practicable. The Christian concepts of will and predestination receive their first explanation in Saint Augustine. In the succeeding chapters the historical approach is used to set forth the attitudes of various philosophers to the problems Involved. The belief appears widespread that freedom (which is essential if one is to have responsibility) is incompatible with determinism; yet Aristotle and Spinoza shew that such is not the case. Indeterminism, rather than permitting freedom, makes it impossible, for then, man becomes subject to chance. The majority of the philosophies examined shew inconsistencies with a systematic theology and, although certain truths may be found in each, are rejected as being either unfruitful or incapable of being developed in the direction intended. The writer concludes that the most consistent and fruitful interpretation of moral responsibility Is given by Aristotle and Saint Thomas Aquinas. Aristotle gives us a consistent philosophical system which Saint Thomas interprets in the light of Christian doctrine, and it is this philosophy which seems best to correlate with Catholic teaching. For Saint Thomas, that the will is free and human acts voluntary does not conflict with the idea of a divine, omnipotent Being; and necessity, providence and predestination do not conflict with free will in man. Both chance and determinism make freedom in man possible, more especially as man has intellect and reason to deliberate on courses of action. As all acts of the will are voluntary, man may be, and is, commended or censured for his acts as they are good or bad. He has choice, and this choice is free, so that the outcome of his actions is his own responsibility. As this view, despite its many difficulties, appears to be the most complete, it seems to be the best one on which to build in the future. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

No description available.

The aim of my thesis is to fill a gap in virtue ethics. I present an account of moral responsibility that is consistent with the core assumption of virtue ethics, that character and not action is the primary locus of ethical appraisal. Virtue ethics typically does not include a notion of moral responsibility. The reason for this omission is that traditionally attributions of moral responsibility are determined by the causal aetiology of our actions. Because virtue ethics is primarily concerned with our characters and not our actions, virtue ethicists typically assume that causal aetiology is irrelevant to ethics. So, in order to fill the gap in virtue ethics I need to show how the core assumption of virtue ethics does not require virtue ethicists to hold that causal aetiology is irrelevant to ethics. The project of filling this gap in virtue ethics is important because virtue ethics is a popular modern ethical theory and in order to fulfil this ·function it must say something about moral responsibility. It is a deficit of virtue ethics that it provides us with no basis for judgements about moral responsibility. It restricts the scope of ethics to simply grounding moral assessments of our characters. An ethical theory needs to provide a basis for making practical decisions in legal and political matters. My thesis is that by shifting the locus of moral responsibility from the notion of action to that of character, virtue ethics can include a notion of moral responsibility. I present an account of the notion of moral responsibility for character. It operates as an amendment to virtue ethics and is intended to demonstrate how differences in the causal aetiologies of our characters determine the extent to which we can be attributed moral responsibility for them. In contrast to, for example, Classical Utilitarianism ii which holds that being morally responsible is an all-or-nothing affair, my account explains how the differences among the causal aetiologies of our characters create a spectrum along which moral responsibility can be assigned to varying degrees. By focusing on the formation of character and not of action as the basis for attributions of moral responsibility we can make use of the notion of a causal aetiology without being forced to abandon the core assumption of virtue ethics. My method is a standard philosophical method of critical analysis and synthesis of philosophical literature. My account consists of two conditions that are both necessary and together sufficient for making attributions of moral responsibility for character. The first condition, which derives from Harry Frankfurt's theory of moral responsibility, is that we 'identify' with our characters. The second condition, which incorporates Daniel Dennett' s notion of a 'narrative self', is that we are to a significant extent 'morally responsible selves'. My conclusion is that we are morally responsible for our characters only if (1) we are to a significant extent morally responsible selves and (2) we identify with our characters. The extent of the attribution of moral responsibility is determined by the extent to which we identify with our characters.