In South Africa, as in most jurisdictions which profess to be based on an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, the right against compelled self-incrimination is a guaranteed Constitutional right. This study is prompted by the realization that the right against self-incrimination is being undermined and eroded by an aspect of South Africa’s bail laws. The current study addresses the constitutional validity of section 60(11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 in so far as it allows for the admission of incriminating evidence at trial, in contravention of the accused’s right against self-incrimination, which incriminatory evidence was tendered by the applicant during a bail application in circumstances where the applicant was compelled to prove that he would be acquitted at trial where reliance is placed on a weak State’s case in proving exceptional circumstances in compliance with section 60(11)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Whilst section 60(11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is undoubtedly aimed at combatting crime, the pre-occupation with crime control measures threatens to undermine individual liberty and poses a threat to our Constitutional project of building a human rights culture. I advance an argument which supports the view that section 60(11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 is unconstitutional, in the above context, in that it infringes upon the accused’s right against compelled self-incrimination at trial and does not amount to a justifiable limitation on the rights of an accused in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. I also advance an alternative legal remedy aimed at fulfilling the initial mischief which Section 60(11B)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 was designed to prevent in order to bring the section in line with the Constitution and a rights-based society. / Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2017. / Procedural Law / LLM / Unrestricted

Magister Legum - LLM / Several international instruments relating to the forfeiture of assets derived through unlawful means have been developed in the last decade. These relate to both civil and criminal forfeiture proceedings. Nevertheless, the processes of tracing the assets and having them forfeit to the State present formidable obstacles to justice authorities enforcers around the world. The fact of the matter is that the advent of the internet has made it easier for money launderers to camouflage the nature and the physical locality of their ill-got gains. This has made it all the more necessary for states and financial institutions to co-operate more closely in hitting the criminals where it hurts most – their pockets. However, the international structures that provide for mutual legal assistance procedures are drafted in broad terms or in guideline-form. Most of the books and journal articles dealing with money laundering devote scant attention to this very important aspect of combating transnational economic criminality. In most of the literature, this topic is simply avoided. This paper, which confines itself to civil recovery proceedings, strives to determine first, what international mechanisms are available for obtaining information located abroad that could be used for domestic civil forfeiture, and second, to identify some of the most intractable problems encountered by justice authorities in their attempts to attach property situated abroad. The idea is to identify the principal point of discordance, and to suggest ways in which the international instruments governing civil forfeiture could be amended so as to make them more user friendly.

The Zuma case - important as the first decision of the Constitutional Court - is primarily concerned with the constitutionality of section 217(l)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In trying to fmd an answer to this question, the Constitutional Court also addressed other important issues. In this dissertation the Constitutional Court's decision on the constitutionality of section 217(1)(b)(ii) is examined, as well as important general principles laid down by the Court regarding incompetent referrals by the Supreme Court; constitutional interpretation; reverse onus provisions and the right to a fair trial; as well as the application of the general limitation clause. A closer look is taken at adherence to these principles in subsequent Constitutional Court decisions, and finally a conclusion is reached on the value of the Zuma case. / Law / LL.M. (Law)

The Zuma case - important as the first decision of the Constitutional Court - is primarily concerned with the constitutionality of section 217(l)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In trying to fmd an answer to this question, the Constitutional Court also addressed other important issues. In this dissertation the Constitutional Court's decision on the constitutionality of section 217(1)(b)(ii) is examined, as well as important general principles laid down by the Court regarding incompetent referrals by the Supreme Court; constitutional interpretation; reverse onus provisions and the right to a fair trial; as well as the application of the general limitation clause. A closer look is taken at adherence to these principles in subsequent Constitutional Court decisions, and finally a conclusion is reached on the value of the Zuma case. / Law / LL.M. (Law)

Prior to 1994, South African taxpayers had little protection from fiscal legislation or the decisions, actions or conduct of the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) that violated their common law rights. Parliament reigned supreme and in tax matters, the strict and literal approach to the interpretation of statutes was employed, with the judiciary often quoting the mantra that there is “no equity about tax”. The Income Tax Act (Act No 58 of 1962) was littered with discriminatory and unfair provisions based on age, religion, sex and marital status. Even unreasonable decisions taken by SARS could not be reviewed by the judiciary as “unreasonableness” was not a ground for review of the exercise of a discretion by SARS. On 27 April 1994, the constitutional order changed. Parliamentary supremacy was replaced with constitutional supremacy and the rights to privacy, equality, human dignity, property and just administrative action were codified in a Bill of Rights. The codification of these fundamental rights has materially changed the nature and extent of the rights of South African taxpayers. The objective of this thesis, therefore, is to identify, analyse and discuss South African taxpayers’ rights from a constitutional perspective. The following major conclusions can be drawn from the research done: - the judiciary have been forced to reappraise their approach to the interpretation of statutes from a “strict and literal” to a “purposive” approach that is in accordance with the values underpinning the new constitutional order; - new legislation has amended some of the so-called “reverse” onus of proof provisions that were constitutionally unsound – this should result in greater fairness and consistency for affected taxpayers especially in the area of when penalties may be imposed; - the concept of clean hands and good facts can influence the judiciary when arguing that a taxpayer’s right to just administrative action has been violated; and - discriminatory and unfair legislation and conduct on the part of SARS may and should be attacked on a substantive law basis, especially where human dignity is at stake. The overall conclusion is that taxpayers’ rights are more far-reaching than prior to 1994 but still have some way to go before they are fully interpreted and developed. / Accounting Science / D.Compt.

Prior to 1994, South African taxpayers had little protection from fiscal legislation or the decisions, actions or conduct of the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) that violated their common law rights. Parliament reigned supreme and in tax matters, the strict and literal approach to the interpretation of statutes was employed, with the judiciary often quoting the mantra that there is “no equity about tax”. The Income Tax Act (Act No 58 of 1962) was littered with discriminatory and unfair provisions based on age, religion, sex and marital status. Even unreasonable decisions taken by SARS could not be reviewed by the judiciary as “unreasonableness” was not a ground for review of the exercise of a discretion by SARS. On 27 April 1994, the constitutional order changed. Parliamentary supremacy was replaced with constitutional supremacy and the rights to privacy, equality, human dignity, property and just administrative action were codified in a Bill of Rights. The codification of these fundamental rights has materially changed the nature and extent of the rights of South African taxpayers. The objective of this thesis, therefore, is to identify, analyse and discuss South African taxpayers’ rights from a constitutional perspective. The following major conclusions can be drawn from the research done: - the judiciary have been forced to reappraise their approach to the interpretation of statutes from a “strict and literal” to a “purposive” approach that is in accordance with the values underpinning the new constitutional order; - new legislation has amended some of the so-called “reverse” onus of proof provisions that were constitutionally unsound – this should result in greater fairness and consistency for affected taxpayers especially in the area of when penalties may be imposed; - the concept of clean hands and good facts can influence the judiciary when arguing that a taxpayer’s right to just administrative action has been violated; and - discriminatory and unfair legislation and conduct on the part of SARS may and should be attacked on a substantive law basis, especially where human dignity is at stake. The overall conclusion is that taxpayers’ rights are more far-reaching than prior to 1994 but still have some way to go before they are fully interpreted and developed. / Accounting Science / D.Compt.