A research report submitted to the faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Commerce (specialising in Taxation). Johannesburg - March, 2015 / Where Contracting States to a Double Taxation Agreement (DTA) refer to their respective domestic law concepts in respect of determining residence for purposes of a DTA, conflicting results may arise which can lead to double taxation and Contracting States being denied treaty relief. The interpretation of the concept of ‘Place of Effective Management’ as found in the residency tie-breaker clause in Art 4(3) of DTAs (based on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital) used to resolve issues of dual-resident companies for purposes of applying the DTA, provides a pertinent example of a need for a common international understanding of treaty terms in order to avoid such potential conflicts. This paper explores how the term ‘Place of Effective Management’ should be interpreted in the above context by a South African court of law in order to conform to an internationally accepted meaning of the phrase.

This article considers the nature of interpretation as important question in constitutional interpretation from a theonomic epistemological perspective. Theonomic epistemology is summarily described. The modem language philosophy's view of the nature of interpretation is then investigated, after which a theonomic definition of interpretation and hermeneutics is suggested. Different approaches to interpretation commonly found in legal practice are evaluated on the basis of the suggested definition. The theonomic approach is then applied to another issue in constitutional interpretation, the nature of the judicial function, and broad guidelines are given for the practical application of theonomic epistemological considerations. / Hierdie artikel ondersoek die wese van interpretasie as belangrike vraagstuk by grondwetuitleg vanuit die perspektief van die teonome epistemologie. Die teonome epistemologie word oorsigtelik beskryf. Die modeme taalfilosofie se beskouing van interpretasie word dan behandel, waama 'n teonome definisie van interpretasie en hermeneutiek voorgestel word. Die verskillende uitlegbenaderings wat algemeen in die praktyk voorkom, word aan die hand van die voorgestelde definisie geevalueer. Vervolgens word die teonome benadering op 'n ander vraagstuk van grondwetuitleg - die aard van die regterlike funksie - toegepas, en word bree riglyne vir toepassing van teonome epistemologiese oorwegings in die praktyk van regspraak gegee. / Department of Constitutional International & Indigenous Law / LL.M.

The objectives of this thesis were to observe how the Canadian youth justice system has dealt with the regulation of the transfer of young offenders to the adult court and how the Canadian statutes have regulated the imposition of adult offences for young offenders. For this, I drew a distinction between two levels of observation: first, I observed the process of "creation of statutes" by the political system. Second, I observed the process of "understanding and interpretation of statutes" by the judicial system. The notion of "political system" includes the legislation enacted by Parliament, parliamentary debates, and reports published by the Government of Canada. The notion of "judicial system" includes the decisions of the Montreal Youth Court. For the first level of observation ("creation of statutes"), I observed and analyzed the work of the political system for the period 1842 to 2012. Starting in 1857, many statutes regulated different aspects of the criminal law system as it applied to young people. The first statute to deal with youth offenders comprehensively and different from adult offenders was the Juvenile Delinquents Act (1908); this statute was replaced by the Young Offenders Act (1982). The current statute is the Youth Criminal Justice Act (2002). With regard to the Juvenile Delinquents Act (1908) and the Young Offenders Act (1982), I observed how the political system regulated the mechanism of transferring a young person to the adult court. This mechanism allowed the youth court to decide a question of jurisdiction: whether the young person would be processed and sentenced within the youth justice system, or whether the young person would be sent to the adult court for him to be dealt with and sentenced therein. With regard to the Youth Criminal Justice Act (2002), I observed how the political system has regulated the imposition of adult sentences by the youth court. This statute replaced the mechanism of transfer under the two previous statutes by the imposition of adult sentences within the youth justice system. For the second level of observation ("the understanding and interpretation of statutes"), I observed how the Montreal Youth Court had understood and interpreted the statutory provision that allowed the youth court to transfer a young person to the adult court for the young person to be dealt with and sentenced therein. My period of observation is from 1911 to 1995. I argue that both the political and the judicial systems have been strongly influenced by the theories of deterrence, denunciation, retribution, and rehabilitation. The influence that each theory has exercised on each system varies. The political system, originally focused on the rehabilitation of young people, has been slowly “contaminated” by the most punitive theories, such as deterrence and denunciation. This shift started in the 70’s and slowly increased over the years. Conversely, while the judicial system does not seem to have been originally influenced by the theories of rehabilitation, its focus has slowly shifted towards this objective as the primary goal of their intervention towards young offenders since the 70’s. However, the “successful rehabilitation” of a young person has become a goal in itself, where “unsuccessful offenders” have been transferred to the adult court and dealt with the adult punitive justice system.

This article considers the nature of interpretation as important question in constitutional interpretation from a theonomic epistemological perspective. Theonomic epistemology is summarily described. The modem language philosophy's view of the nature of interpretation is then investigated, after which a theonomic definition of interpretation and hermeneutics is suggested. Different approaches to interpretation commonly found in legal practice are evaluated on the basis of the suggested definition. The theonomic approach is then applied to another issue in constitutional interpretation, the nature of the judicial function, and broad guidelines are given for the practical application of theonomic epistemological considerations. / Hierdie artikel ondersoek die wese van interpretasie as belangrike vraagstuk by grondwetuitleg vanuit die perspektief van die teonome epistemologie. Die teonome epistemologie word oorsigtelik beskryf. Die modeme taalfilosofie se beskouing van interpretasie word dan behandel, waama 'n teonome definisie van interpretasie en hermeneutiek voorgestel word. Die verskillende uitlegbenaderings wat algemeen in die praktyk voorkom, word aan die hand van die voorgestelde definisie geevalueer. Vervolgens word die teonome benadering op 'n ander vraagstuk van grondwetuitleg - die aard van die regterlike funksie - toegepas, en word bree riglyne vir toepassing van teonome epistemologiese oorwegings in die praktyk van regspraak gegee. / Department of Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.M.

The objectives of this thesis were to observe how the Canadian youth justice system has dealt with the regulation of the transfer of young offenders to the adult court and how the Canadian statutes have regulated the imposition of adult offences for young offenders. For this, I drew a distinction between two levels of observation: first, I observed the process of "creation of statutes" by the political system. Second, I observed the process of "understanding and interpretation of statutes" by the judicial system. The notion of "political system" includes the legislation enacted by Parliament, parliamentary debates, and reports published by the Government of Canada. The notion of "judicial system" includes the decisions of the Montreal Youth Court. For the first level of observation ("creation of statutes"), I observed and analyzed the work of the political system for the period 1842 to 2012. Starting in 1857, many statutes regulated different aspects of the criminal law system as it applied to young people. The first statute to deal with youth offenders comprehensively and different from adult offenders was the Juvenile Delinquents Act (1908); this statute was replaced by the Young Offenders Act (1982). The current statute is the Youth Criminal Justice Act (2002). With regard to the Juvenile Delinquents Act (1908) and the Young Offenders Act (1982), I observed how the political system regulated the mechanism of transferring a young person to the adult court. This mechanism allowed the youth court to decide a question of jurisdiction: whether the young person would be processed and sentenced within the youth justice system, or whether the young person would be sent to the adult court for him to be dealt with and sentenced therein. With regard to the Youth Criminal Justice Act (2002), I observed how the political system has regulated the imposition of adult sentences by the youth court. This statute replaced the mechanism of transfer under the two previous statutes by the imposition of adult sentences within the youth justice system. For the second level of observation ("the understanding and interpretation of statutes"), I observed how the Montreal Youth Court had understood and interpreted the statutory provision that allowed the youth court to transfer a young person to the adult court for the young person to be dealt with and sentenced therein. My period of observation is from 1911 to 1995. I argue that both the political and the judicial systems have been strongly influenced by the theories of deterrence, denunciation, retribution, and rehabilitation. The influence that each theory has exercised on each system varies. The political system, originally focused on the rehabilitation of young people, has been slowly “contaminated” by the most punitive theories, such as deterrence and denunciation. This shift started in the 70’s and slowly increased over the years. Conversely, while the judicial system does not seem to have been originally influenced by the theories of rehabilitation, its focus has slowly shifted towards this objective as the primary goal of their intervention towards young offenders since the 70’s. However, the “successful rehabilitation” of a young person has become a goal in itself, where “unsuccessful offenders” have been transferred to the adult court and dealt with the adult punitive justice system.

af / Suid-Afrika is sedert 27 April 1994 'n materiele regstaat, wat deur beide uitdruklike en 'ongeskrewe' fundamentele waardes onderskraag word. Dit is juis hierdie fundamentele waardes wat 'n blote formele konstitusie (as grondslag van 'n relative democracy) van 'n oppermagtige grondwet (as basis van 'n materiele standard-setting democracy) onderskei. Alhoewel daar 'n lewendige debat oor die toepaslikheid van die talle tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodes gevoer word, is daar nietemin tans geen oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma vir grondwetuitleg nie. Soms wil dit voorkom asof fundamentele grondwetlike waardes net as normatiewe retoriek, in stede van materiele riglyn, by grondwetuitleg gebruik word. Die owerheidsgesag is aan hoer normatiewe regsbeginsels gebonde wat grotendeels in die fundamentele regte-akte (as deel van 'n oppermagtige grondwet) vervat is. Die gewaarborgde fundamentele regte dien derhalwe as konkretisering van beide die regstaat en die demokrasie: die materiele regstaatbegrip is die basis van _die grondwetlike staat. Die materiele regstaat, as geregtigheidstaat, kan dus gesien word as die eindbestemming van die grondwet as lex fundamentalis in die regsorde. 'n Oppermagtige grondwet is egter onlosmaaklik verbind aan die materiele regstaat. Daarom behels grondwetuitleg noodwendig die aktivering van die grondwetlik-gepositiveerde waardes. Hierdie normatiewe regsbeginsels en fundamentele waardes wat in die grondwet as grundnorm van die geregtigheidstaat beliggaam is, moet dan deur 'n onafhanklike regbank gehandhaaf en afgedwing word. In beginsel is grondwetuitleg gemoeid met die identifisering, handhawing en aktivering van die fundamentele waardes wat 'n oppermagtige grondwet onderskraag. Waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg is nietemin nie 'n bloudruk waarmee aile praktiese uitlegprobleme opgelos kan word nie, maar 'n oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma: 'n dwingende, normatiewe verwysingsraamwerk waarvandaan, waarbinne en waarheen grondwetuitleg op pad is. Die tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodiek is bloat aanvullende tegnieke wat 'n waarde-aktiverende paradigma van grondwetuitleg ondersteun. Aangesien fundamentele waardes onlosmaaklik deel van die materiele regstaat is, moet grondwetuitleg nie net waardebaseer nie, maar ook waardegerig wees; nie net waardes handhaaf nie, maar ook bevorder en aktiveer; nie net waardes weerspieel nie, maar ook aktief vestig. 86 'n raamwerk vir grondwetuitleg behels die 'animering' en konkretisering van fundamentele waardes, ideale en standaarde wat die materiele regstaat onderle, kortom, waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg as vergestalting van die materiele regstaat. / On 27 April1994 South Africa became a constitutional state (Rechtsstaat), underpinned by both express, and 'unwritten' fundamental constitutional values. These values represent the distinction between a formal constitution (ie the basis of a relative democracy), and a supreme constitution (the foundation of a material standard-setting democracy). Although the merits of various methods of constitutional interpretation are hotly debated, no general value-based paradigm for constitutional interpretation has yet been established. At times it seems as if fundamental constitutional values are merely invoked as normative rhetoric during constitutional interpretation, rather than as substantive guidelines. Government institutions are bound by these higher normative legal principles, which in a supreme constitution are articulated primarily in the bill of fundamental rights. The guaranteed fundamental rights are a concretisation of both the constitutional state and democracy: the material law state principle (Rechtsstaatprinzip) as the foundation of the constitutional state. The Rechtsstaat as 'just state' is the ultimate goal of a supreme constitution as lex fundamentalis in the legal order. A supreme constitution is inextricably linked to the Rechtsstaat. As a result, constitutional interpretation inevitably involves animating and activating values positivised within the constitution.These normative legal principles and fundamental values must be maintained and enforced by an independent judiciary. In principle, constitutional interpretation deals with the identification, maintenance and animation of the fundamental values underlying a supreme constitution. Value-activating constitutional interpretation is not a blueprint for resolving all practical interpretive problems, but it is a general value-based paradigm: a peremptory, normative frame of reference from which, within which and towards which all constitutional interpretation should be directed. The traditional methodologies of constitutional interpretation are merely ancillary techniques supporting a value-activating paradigm of constitutional interpretation. Since fundamental values undeniably form part of the Rechtsstaat, constitutional interpretation should not only be value-based, but also values-directed; should not merely uphold the values, but also promote and activate them; should not only reflect the values, but also actively establish them. Such a framework for constitutional interpretation involves the animation and concretisation of the fundamental values, standards and ideals underlying the constitutional state: valueactivating constitutional interpretation as embodiment of the Rechtsstaat. / Law / LL.D. (Law)

The Constitution stipulates that its value-commitments are to inform the interpretation of statutes and the development of the common law and customary law. Legislative construction and law-application generally are therefore to be perceived as involving an axiological dimension. Three hermeneutical traditions are dealt with to the end of clarifying the approaches to be adopted in everyday legal• argumentation. The study culminates in the adduction of leads for substantive !juridical argument in the process of statutory interpretation and in handling common-law and customary-law sources. These leads are shown to be functional byi way of a critical discussion of recent case law and a conspectus of contemporary t~ought bearing on the nature of customary law. The social dimension of the legal process is throughout underscored as a factor of significance. Concomitantly, it is rcigistered that the jurisprudence of formalism, so marked an attitude of a previous time, should be abjured to the extent that it is disdainful of value-commitment. Conformably, literalist and literalist-cumintentionalist perceptions as well as kindred stances are berated. The penultimate chapter of this thesis suggests an encompassing approach to the interpretation of statutes, comprised of a systematic tabulation of insights previously garnered. The fmal chapter postulates that common law and customary law are not to be dealt with upon an interchangeable basis, inasmuch as the sources go out from radically divergent premises. It then proceeds to elaborate a conceptual framework for dealing respectively with each of these sources. / Law / LL.D.

af / Suid-Afrika is sedert 27 April 1994 'n materiele regstaat, wat deur beide uitdruklike en 'ongeskrewe' fundamentele waardes onderskraag word. Dit is juis hierdie fundamentele waardes wat 'n blote formele konstitusie (as grondslag van 'n relative democracy) van 'n oppermagtige grondwet (as basis van 'n materiele standard-setting democracy) onderskei. Alhoewel daar 'n lewendige debat oor die toepaslikheid van die talle tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodes gevoer word, is daar nietemin tans geen oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma vir grondwetuitleg nie. Soms wil dit voorkom asof fundamentele grondwetlike waardes net as normatiewe retoriek, in stede van materiele riglyn, by grondwetuitleg gebruik word. Die owerheidsgesag is aan hoer normatiewe regsbeginsels gebonde wat grotendeels in die fundamentele regte-akte (as deel van 'n oppermagtige grondwet) vervat is. Die gewaarborgde fundamentele regte dien derhalwe as konkretisering van beide die regstaat en die demokrasie: die materiele regstaatbegrip is die basis van _die grondwetlike staat. Die materiele regstaat, as geregtigheidstaat, kan dus gesien word as die eindbestemming van die grondwet as lex fundamentalis in die regsorde. 'n Oppermagtige grondwet is egter onlosmaaklik verbind aan die materiele regstaat. Daarom behels grondwetuitleg noodwendig die aktivering van die grondwetlik-gepositiveerde waardes. Hierdie normatiewe regsbeginsels en fundamentele waardes wat in die grondwet as grundnorm van die geregtigheidstaat beliggaam is, moet dan deur 'n onafhanklike regbank gehandhaaf en afgedwing word. In beginsel is grondwetuitleg gemoeid met die identifisering, handhawing en aktivering van die fundamentele waardes wat 'n oppermagtige grondwet onderskraag. Waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg is nietemin nie 'n bloudruk waarmee aile praktiese uitlegprobleme opgelos kan word nie, maar 'n oorhoofse waardebaseerde paradigma: 'n dwingende, normatiewe verwysingsraamwerk waarvandaan, waarbinne en waarheen grondwetuitleg op pad is. Die tradisionele grondwetuitlegmetodiek is bloat aanvullende tegnieke wat 'n waarde-aktiverende paradigma van grondwetuitleg ondersteun. Aangesien fundamentele waardes onlosmaaklik deel van die materiele regstaat is, moet grondwetuitleg nie net waardebaseer nie, maar ook waardegerig wees; nie net waardes handhaaf nie, maar ook bevorder en aktiveer; nie net waardes weerspieel nie, maar ook aktief vestig. 86 'n raamwerk vir grondwetuitleg behels die 'animering' en konkretisering van fundamentele waardes, ideale en standaarde wat die materiele regstaat onderle, kortom, waarde-aktiverende grondwetuitleg as vergestalting van die materiele regstaat. / On 27 April1994 South Africa became a constitutional state (Rechtsstaat), underpinned by both express, and 'unwritten' fundamental constitutional values. These values represent the distinction between a formal constitution (ie the basis of a relative democracy), and a supreme constitution (the foundation of a material standard-setting democracy). Although the merits of various methods of constitutional interpretation are hotly debated, no general value-based paradigm for constitutional interpretation has yet been established. At times it seems as if fundamental constitutional values are merely invoked as normative rhetoric during constitutional interpretation, rather than as substantive guidelines. Government institutions are bound by these higher normative legal principles, which in a supreme constitution are articulated primarily in the bill of fundamental rights. The guaranteed fundamental rights are a concretisation of both the constitutional state and democracy: the material law state principle (Rechtsstaatprinzip) as the foundation of the constitutional state. The Rechtsstaat as 'just state' is the ultimate goal of a supreme constitution as lex fundamentalis in the legal order. A supreme constitution is inextricably linked to the Rechtsstaat. As a result, constitutional interpretation inevitably involves animating and activating values positivised within the constitution.These normative legal principles and fundamental values must be maintained and enforced by an independent judiciary. In principle, constitutional interpretation deals with the identification, maintenance and animation of the fundamental values underlying a supreme constitution. Value-activating constitutional interpretation is not a blueprint for resolving all practical interpretive problems, but it is a general value-based paradigm: a peremptory, normative frame of reference from which, within which and towards which all constitutional interpretation should be directed. The traditional methodologies of constitutional interpretation are merely ancillary techniques supporting a value-activating paradigm of constitutional interpretation. Since fundamental values undeniably form part of the Rechtsstaat, constitutional interpretation should not only be value-based, but also values-directed; should not merely uphold the values, but also promote and activate them; should not only reflect the values, but also actively establish them. Such a framework for constitutional interpretation involves the animation and concretisation of the fundamental values, standards and ideals underlying the constitutional state: valueactivating constitutional interpretation as embodiment of the Rechtsstaat. / Law / LL.D. (Law)

The Constitution stipulates that its value-commitments are to inform the interpretation of statutes and the development of the common law and customary law. Legislative construction and law-application generally are therefore to be perceived as involving an axiological dimension. Three hermeneutical traditions are dealt with to the end of clarifying the approaches to be adopted in everyday legal• argumentation. The study culminates in the adduction of leads for substantive !juridical argument in the process of statutory interpretation and in handling common-law and customary-law sources. These leads are shown to be functional byi way of a critical discussion of recent case law and a conspectus of contemporary t~ought bearing on the nature of customary law. The social dimension of the legal process is throughout underscored as a factor of significance. Concomitantly, it is rcigistered that the jurisprudence of formalism, so marked an attitude of a previous time, should be abjured to the extent that it is disdainful of value-commitment. Conformably, literalist and literalist-cumintentionalist perceptions as well as kindred stances are berated. The penultimate chapter of this thesis suggests an encompassing approach to the interpretation of statutes, comprised of a systematic tabulation of insights previously garnered. The fmal chapter postulates that common law and customary law are not to be dealt with upon an interchangeable basis, inasmuch as the sources go out from radically divergent premises. It then proceeds to elaborate a conceptual framework for dealing respectively with each of these sources. / Law / LL.D.

Prior to 1994, South African taxpayers had little protection from fiscal legislation or the decisions, actions or conduct of the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”) that violated their common law rights. Parliament reigned supreme and in tax matters, the strict and literal approach to the interpretation of statutes was employed, with the judiciary often quoting the mantra that there is “no equity about tax”. The Income Tax Act (Act No 58 of 1962) was littered with discriminatory and unfair provisions based on age, religion, sex and marital status. Even unreasonable decisions taken by SARS could not be reviewed by the judiciary as “unreasonableness” was not a ground for review of the exercise of a discretion by SARS. On 27 April 1994, the constitutional order changed. Parliamentary supremacy was replaced with constitutional supremacy and the rights to privacy, equality, human dignity, property and just administrative action were codified in a Bill of Rights. The codification of these fundamental rights has materially changed the nature and extent of the rights of South African taxpayers. The objective of this thesis, therefore, is to identify, analyse and discuss South African taxpayers’ rights from a constitutional perspective. The following major conclusions can be drawn from the research done: - the judiciary have been forced to reappraise their approach to the interpretation of statutes from a “strict and literal” to a “purposive” approach that is in accordance with the values underpinning the new constitutional order; - new legislation has amended some of the so-called “reverse” onus of proof provisions that were constitutionally unsound – this should result in greater fairness and consistency for affected taxpayers especially in the area of when penalties may be imposed; - the concept of clean hands and good facts can influence the judiciary when arguing that a taxpayer’s right to just administrative action has been violated; and - discriminatory and unfair legislation and conduct on the part of SARS may and should be attacked on a substantive law basis, especially where human dignity is at stake. The overall conclusion is that taxpayers’ rights are more far-reaching than prior to 1994 but still have some way to go before they are fully interpreted and developed. / Accounting Science / D.Compt.