In this study three apologetic methodologies (evidentialism, Reformed epistemology, and presuppositionalism) are analyzed to determine which method is most coherently related to Reformed theology. It is argued that comparing how each methodology relates the doctrine of Scripture with the doctrine of the resurrection can demonstrate which method is best suited to defending Christianity in its Reformed interpretation. The doctrine of Scripture is taken to be that of full plenary inspiration and inerrancy, and the question is which apologetic method can be successful in defending that position. After contemporary arguments for the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus Christ are surveyed, each of the three respective apologetic methodologies is subjected to an examination and critique. Each method is intra–systematically evaluated to determine whether it suffers from internal contradictions or incoherencies. Each method is further tested to determine whether, on its own internal principles, it is capable of a logical defense of a high doctrinal view of Scripture. The respective methods are also compared and contrasted with each other. A prominent issue is the direction of the methodology, i.e., its sequence. Some strands of evidentialism attempt to move from the historical fact of the resurrection to their doctrine of Scripture; Reformed epistemologists do not necessarily require any historical argumentation at all; presuppositionalists take their doctrine of Scripture and the resurrection as both necessary and mutually reinforcing points in their worldview. In the final analysis, it is the presuppositional methodology which emerges as that which is most capable of coherently defending a doctrine of Scripture that includes full inspiration and inerrancy. This is due to the transcendental nature of the argument that it presents. It is urged in this study, however, that evidences, historical details, and logical analysis are all critically important for a fully–orbed apologetic system. Presuppositionalism needs to be ramified with evidential arguments, even if they are transposed into a transcendental key, as supporting details in a transcendental framework. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Dogmatics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

In this study three apologetic methodologies (evidentialism, Reformed epistemology, and presuppositionalism) are analyzed to determine which method is most coherently related to Reformed theology. It is argued that comparing how each methodology relates the doctrine of Scripture with the doctrine of the resurrection can demonstrate which method is best suited to defending Christianity in its Reformed interpretation. The doctrine of Scripture is taken to be that of full plenary inspiration and inerrancy, and the question is which apologetic method can be successful in defending that position. After contemporary arguments for the historicity of the resurrection of Jesus Christ are surveyed, each of the three respective apologetic methodologies is subjected to an examination and critique. Each method is intra–systematically evaluated to determine whether it suffers from internal contradictions or incoherencies. Each method is further tested to determine whether, on its own internal principles, it is capable of a logical defense of a high doctrinal view of Scripture. The respective methods are also compared and contrasted with each other. A prominent issue is the direction of the methodology, i.e., its sequence. Some strands of evidentialism attempt to move from the historical fact of the resurrection to their doctrine of Scripture; Reformed epistemologists do not necessarily require any historical argumentation at all; presuppositionalists take their doctrine of Scripture and the resurrection as both necessary and mutually reinforcing points in their worldview. In the final analysis, it is the presuppositional methodology which emerges as that which is most capable of coherently defending a doctrine of Scripture that includes full inspiration and inerrancy. This is due to the transcendental nature of the argument that it presents. It is urged in this study, however, that evidences, historical details, and logical analysis are all critically important for a fully–orbed apologetic system. Presuppositionalism needs to be ramified with evidential arguments, even if they are transposed into a transcendental key, as supporting details in a transcendental framework. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Dogmatics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2011.

The key issue in recent debates of Christian apologetics is whether there is any common ground of data and criteria between believers and unbelievers. Two main schools are divided on this issue, namely: evidential and presuppositional apologetics. The evidential apologists claim that a common ground exists, and that objective proofs of theism are possible from this common ground. In contrast, the presuppositional apologists argue that there is no common ground; and they maintain that theoretical arguments (including apologetic ones) are unavoidably prejudiced by religious presuppositions. In this study, both sides are claimed to have their own flaws. The former apologetics has the flaw that its epistemic foundation (i.e., “classical foundationalism”) is fatally defective; and it is criticised by the reformational philosophical tradition, as well as secular contemporary (postmodern) epistemology. In contrast, the latter apologetics has the flaw that when the existence of common ground is entirely denied, the problems of circular reasoning (hence, relativism) and total communication breakdown are unavoidable. In order to clarify and deepen the issue, the tradition of reformational philosophy, which is represented by Kuyper, Dooyeweerd and Van Til is first examined; and it is shown that all three scholars struggle with the tension between antithesis and common ground; and they attempt their own solution. Secondly, the contemporary anti-foundationalist epistemology is examined; and it is shown that the same tension exists between “radical” and “moderate” postmodern (anti-foundationalist) epistemologies; and their debate is on-going – without any satisfactory conclusion. As a solution, it is suggested that the notion of common ground should be distinguished by the ontological and epistemological dimensions. From the epistemological standpoint, all knowledge is prejudiced; and no objective conclusion (on the issue of e.g., theism) can be arrived at by so-called “neutral” rational arguments. However, from the ontological standpoint, it is undeniable that all kinds of knowledge are made possible by certain universal (transcendental) conditions, which constitute the ontic common ground. In this distinction, the confusion is caused by the false assumption that the ontic common ground is meant to function as an epistemic neutral criterion. In contrast, this study argues that the ontic common ground functions only as the condition for the possibility of legitimate knowledge (including apologetic arguments). As a result, this study claims that traditional apologetics, based on objective theistic proofs should be abandoned, and that (radical) presuppositional apologetics needs to be modified. Therefore, as an alternative approach, a new “integral apologetics” is proposed – on the basis of Dooyeweerd’s modal theory of reality. This approach emphasizes the need to utilize different types of knowledge, which together could strengthen the apologetic persuasion towards Christian theism, and take into consideration of the whole context of apologetic dialogue. / PhD (International Trade), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

The key issue in recent debates of Christian apologetics is whether there is any common ground of data and criteria between believers and unbelievers. Two main schools are divided on this issue, namely: evidential and presuppositional apologetics. The evidential apologists claim that a common ground exists, and that objective proofs of theism are possible from this common ground. In contrast, the presuppositional apologists argue that there is no common ground; and they maintain that theoretical arguments (including apologetic ones) are unavoidably prejudiced by religious presuppositions. In this study, both sides are claimed to have their own flaws. The former apologetics has the flaw that its epistemic foundation (i.e., “classical foundationalism”) is fatally defective; and it is criticised by the reformational philosophical tradition, as well as secular contemporary (postmodern) epistemology. In contrast, the latter apologetics has the flaw that when the existence of common ground is entirely denied, the problems of circular reasoning (hence, relativism) and total communication breakdown are unavoidable. In order to clarify and deepen the issue, the tradition of reformational philosophy, which is represented by Kuyper, Dooyeweerd and Van Til is first examined; and it is shown that all three scholars struggle with the tension between antithesis and common ground; and they attempt their own solution. Secondly, the contemporary anti-foundationalist epistemology is examined; and it is shown that the same tension exists between “radical” and “moderate” postmodern (anti-foundationalist) epistemologies; and their debate is on-going – without any satisfactory conclusion. As a solution, it is suggested that the notion of common ground should be distinguished by the ontological and epistemological dimensions. From the epistemological standpoint, all knowledge is prejudiced; and no objective conclusion (on the issue of e.g., theism) can be arrived at by so-called “neutral” rational arguments. However, from the ontological standpoint, it is undeniable that all kinds of knowledge are made possible by certain universal (transcendental) conditions, which constitute the ontic common ground. In this distinction, the confusion is caused by the false assumption that the ontic common ground is meant to function as an epistemic neutral criterion. In contrast, this study argues that the ontic common ground functions only as the condition for the possibility of legitimate knowledge (including apologetic arguments). As a result, this study claims that traditional apologetics, based on objective theistic proofs should be abandoned, and that (radical) presuppositional apologetics needs to be modified. Therefore, as an alternative approach, a new “integral apologetics” is proposed – on the basis of Dooyeweerd’s modal theory of reality. This approach emphasizes the need to utilize different types of knowledge, which together could strengthen the apologetic persuasion towards Christian theism, and take into consideration of the whole context of apologetic dialogue. / PhD (International Trade), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

The purpose of this study is to assess the cogency of Francis Schaeffer‘s apologetic in light of John Frame‘s triperspectival epistemology, giving special attention to the existential perspective evident throughout Schaeffer‘s trilogy. The study achieves this aim by employing the instrumental case study method to meet five specific objectives. First, the study determines the extent to which Schaeffer‘s existential perspective is recognized within the apologetic literature that critically engages with his ideas. Based on these sources, the study determines that this perspective is recognized in Schaeffer‘s work but not as an integral component within a broader perspectival approach to apologetics. Second, the study discovers the ways in which Frame‘s triperspectivalism may be used in analyzing apologetic systems to reveal their strengths, weaknesses and cogency. By giving attention to Frame‘s system as a meta-apologetic, it is evident that this tool is applicable to Schaeffer and to other apologists. This establishes Frame‘s perspectivalism as an appropriate theoretical model to use in an instrumental case study on apologetics. Third, the study analyzes the ways in which Frame‘s triperspectivalism is reflected in Schaeffer‘s trilogy, highlighting the existential perspective. Meeting this objective establishes the central theoretical argument of the study, showing that Frame‘s epistemology reveals the underlying cogency of Schaeffer‘s apologetic credibly (?) and does so most profoundly with respect to the existential perspective. Fourth, the study compares Schaeffer‘s existential perspective with that of E.J. Carnell and secular existentialism, which both apologists confronted. On the basis of Carnell‘s critique of existentialism and his existential apologetic of personal rectitude, credible support is offered for Schaeffer‘s engagement with this philosophical movement and his own existential perspective. Fifth, support is offered for the current relevance of Schaeffer‘s apologetic of personal rectitude by showing how the postmodern situation he anticipated is best addressed using the apologetic tools he offers. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Dogmatics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012

This study attempts to examine evolutionary theory and creationism objectively without engaging in an apology for or a criticism of either. It compares the presuppositions and assumptions of both systems, and examines the role of faith in religion and in the scientific theory of evolution. After discussing the nature of the scientific method and the development of the theory of evolution, the study explores the dichotomy of faith and reason, the ways in which these operate in theories of intelligent design and theistic evolution, and the question of whether scientific evolutionary theory can be considered to be a secular religion. The thesis argues that acceptance of the scientific theory of evolution is as dependent upon a faith commitment as is adherence to religion, though the type and quality of the two respective faith systems are very different and, therefore, worthy of comparison and contrast. The study concludes that, while science and evolutionary theory share many of the same features and characteristics of faith and presumption, it is presently not appropriate to claim that evolutionary theory is a secular religion, and that when this opinion is asserted it is worthwhile to analyze the motivation, conscious and unconscious, involved. / Thesis (PhD (Dogmatics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus in association with Greenwich School of Theology, U.K., 2013.

This study attempts to examine evolutionary theory and creationism objectively without engaging in an apology for or a criticism of either. It compares the presuppositions and assumptions of both systems, and examines the role of faith in religion and in the scientific theory of evolution. After discussing the nature of the scientific method and the development of the theory of evolution, the study explores the dichotomy of faith and reason, the ways in which these operate in theories of intelligent design and theistic evolution, and the question of whether scientific evolutionary theory can be considered to be a secular religion. The thesis argues that acceptance of the scientific theory of evolution is as dependent upon a faith commitment as is adherence to religion, though the type and quality of the two respective faith systems are very different and, therefore, worthy of comparison and contrast. The study concludes that, while science and evolutionary theory share many of the same features and characteristics of faith and presumption, it is presently not appropriate to claim that evolutionary theory is a secular religion, and that when this opinion is asserted it is worthwhile to analyze the motivation, conscious and unconscious, involved. / Thesis (PhD (Dogmatics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus in association with Greenwich School of Theology, U.K., 2013.

The purpose of this study is to assess the cogency of Francis Schaeffer‘s apologetic in light of John Frame‘s triperspectival epistemology, giving special attention to the existential perspective evident throughout Schaeffer‘s trilogy. The study achieves this aim by employing the instrumental case study method to meet five specific objectives. First, the study determines the extent to which Schaeffer‘s existential perspective is recognized within the apologetic literature that critically engages with his ideas. Based on these sources, the study determines that this perspective is recognized in Schaeffer‘s work but not as an integral component within a broader perspectival approach to apologetics. Second, the study discovers the ways in which Frame‘s triperspectivalism may be used in analyzing apologetic systems to reveal their strengths, weaknesses and cogency. By giving attention to Frame‘s system as a meta-apologetic, it is evident that this tool is applicable to Schaeffer and to other apologists. This establishes Frame‘s perspectivalism as an appropriate theoretical model to use in an instrumental case study on apologetics. Third, the study analyzes the ways in which Frame‘s triperspectivalism is reflected in Schaeffer‘s trilogy, highlighting the existential perspective. Meeting this objective establishes the central theoretical argument of the study, showing that Frame‘s epistemology reveals the underlying cogency of Schaeffer‘s apologetic credibly (?) and does so most profoundly with respect to the existential perspective. Fourth, the study compares Schaeffer‘s existential perspective with that of E.J. Carnell and secular existentialism, which both apologists confronted. On the basis of Carnell‘s critique of existentialism and his existential apologetic of personal rectitude, credible support is offered for Schaeffer‘s engagement with this philosophical movement and his own existential perspective. Fifth, support is offered for the current relevance of Schaeffer‘s apologetic of personal rectitude by showing how the postmodern situation he anticipated is best addressed using the apologetic tools he offers. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Dogmatics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012

This article considers the nature of interpretation as important question in constitutional interpretation from a theonomic epistemological perspective. Theonomic epistemology is summarily described. The modem language philosophy's view of the nature of interpretation is then investigated, after which a theonomic definition of interpretation and hermeneutics is suggested. Different approaches to interpretation commonly found in legal practice are evaluated on the basis of the suggested definition. The theonomic approach is then applied to another issue in constitutional interpretation, the nature of the judicial function, and broad guidelines are given for the practical application of theonomic epistemological considerations. / Hierdie artikel ondersoek die wese van interpretasie as belangrike vraagstuk by grondwetuitleg vanuit die perspektief van die teonome epistemologie. Die teonome epistemologie word oorsigtelik beskryf. Die modeme taalfilosofie se beskouing van interpretasie word dan behandel, waama 'n teonome definisie van interpretasie en hermeneutiek voorgestel word. Die verskillende uitlegbenaderings wat algemeen in die praktyk voorkom, word aan die hand van die voorgestelde definisie geevalueer. Vervolgens word die teonome benadering op 'n ander vraagstuk van grondwetuitleg - die aard van die regterlike funksie - toegepas, en word bree riglyne vir toepassing van teonome epistemologiese oorwegings in die praktyk van regspraak gegee. / Department of Constitutional International & Indigenous Law / LL.M.

This article considers the nature of interpretation as important question in constitutional interpretation from a theonomic epistemological perspective. Theonomic epistemology is summarily described. The modem language philosophy's view of the nature of interpretation is then investigated, after which a theonomic definition of interpretation and hermeneutics is suggested. Different approaches to interpretation commonly found in legal practice are evaluated on the basis of the suggested definition. The theonomic approach is then applied to another issue in constitutional interpretation, the nature of the judicial function, and broad guidelines are given for the practical application of theonomic epistemological considerations. / Hierdie artikel ondersoek die wese van interpretasie as belangrike vraagstuk by grondwetuitleg vanuit die perspektief van die teonome epistemologie. Die teonome epistemologie word oorsigtelik beskryf. Die modeme taalfilosofie se beskouing van interpretasie word dan behandel, waama 'n teonome definisie van interpretasie en hermeneutiek voorgestel word. Die verskillende uitlegbenaderings wat algemeen in die praktyk voorkom, word aan die hand van die voorgestelde definisie geevalueer. Vervolgens word die teonome benadering op 'n ander vraagstuk van grondwetuitleg - die aard van die regterlike funksie - toegepas, en word bree riglyne vir toepassing van teonome epistemologiese oorwegings in die praktyk van regspraak gegee. / Department of Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.M.