"Despite the above obligation enshrined in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR), to protect, promote and fulfil the right to peace and security that is binding on them, African states are facing numerous armed conflicts. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Commission) has already found a violation of the right to peace. In that case, the Commission has stated that 'the responsibility for protection is incumbent on the State', which has therefore the obligation to make sure that people's right to peace is not infringed, either by its own forces or by uncontrolled ones. The right to peace has therefore been recognised and interpreted by the relevant and authoritative monitoring body, the African Commission. The African Union (AU), composed of all African states except Morocco, has also committed itself to work towards peace and security in the continent. Most importantly, it has endorsed the ACHPR by committing itself to 'promote and protect human and peoples' rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and other relevant human rights instruments'. These provisions are binding not only on the states parties to the Constitutive Act of the African Union (the AU Act), but also upon the African Union itself, as an international organisation that enjoys international capacity. Indeed, the Constitutive Act of the African Union stands as the constitution of the organisation. There should therefore be no doubt that the provisions of the AU Act bind the AU. However, no effective mechanism designed to ensure the fulfilment of the aims and accountability of international organisations exists. The reality on the ground is that Africa is facing a significant number of situations in which there is no peace. These situations violate the people's right to peace and security as protected under article 23 of the ACHPR. In 2000, it was estimated that 20 percent of Africa south of the Sahara's population lived in countries that were facing war and low intensity conflict. There is therefore a need for assessing the AU institutional capacity to fulfil its constitutional obligation of protecting the people's right to peace and security. ... Chapter one of this paper introduces the matter and defines the context in which it will proceed. It is a general presentation of the study. Chapter two will be devoted to human rights within the African Union. The first part of the chapter will deal with the right to peace and security in particular. The legal position of the AU towards human rights in Africa will then be discussed. Chapter three will be dealing with examples of the involvement of the AU in peace building on the continent. Chapter four will present and assess the AU's framework intended to realise peace and security in Africa. Chapter five will be focussed on the specific programmes of the AU that have a peace and security component. Chapter six will draw conclusions and make recommendations." -- Introduction. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2005. / Prepared under the supervision of Dr. Enid Hill at the Political Science Department, American University in Cairo / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

Juridiquement, plusieurs indices concordants mettent clairement en exergue l’appartenance de la santé publique à l’ordre public en Afrique francophone. Partant de ce constat, la notion d’ordre public sanitaire repose sur de solides arguments qui fondent son existence et son positionnement en tant que démembrement de la définition générale ou traditionnelle de l’ordre public. En revanche, le lien quasi fusionnel entre l’ordre public sanitaire et le droit fondamental à la sécurité met à rude épreuve la pertinence de son action dans la plupart des États africains. En cause, le stade embryonnaire de la sécurité sociale en Afrique francophone qui contraste avec les mesures de police ayant pour objet la protection de la santé publique de sorte que, les mesures de protection (police sanitaire) et l’absence de protection (la très faible couverture de la sécurité sociale) se chevauchent et se contredisent. Évidemment, la jonction de ces deux facteurs : l’inopérance du droit à la santé et l’inefficacité des services publics sont de nature à fragiliser d’avantage l’ordre public sanitaire dans les États d’Afrique francophone. En définitive, au delà de sa justification légale et réglementaire, l’ordre public sanitaire en Afrique francophone manque cruellement de moyens humains, financiers, matériels et institutionnels pour en faire un véritable outil de préservation de la santé publique, composante de l’ordre public. / Legally, there are several concordant indications clearly highlighting the importance of public health to public order in Francophone Africa. On the basis of this finding, the concept of public sanitary order is based on sound arguments based on its existence and positioning as a dismemberment of the general or traditional definition of public order. On the other hand, the almost fusional link between public sanitary order and the fundamental right to security undermines the relevance of its action in most African states. At issue is the embryonic stage of social security in French-speaking Africa, which contrasts with police measures aimed at the protection of public health, so that protective measures (public health police) and lack of protection (The very low coverage of social security) overlap and contradict each other. Obviously, the combination of these two factors: the inoperability of the right to health and the inefficiency of public services are likely to further weaken the public health order in Francophone African states. Ultimately, in addition to its legal and regulatory justification, public sanitary order in Africa is severely lacking in human, financial, material and institutional means to make it a genuine tool for preserving public health, a component of public order

This thesis inquires into the meaning of the right to security of person. This right is found in many international, regional and domestic human rights instruments. However, academic discourse reveals disagreement about the meaning of the right. The thesis first considers case law from the European Convention on Human Rights, the South African Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter. The analysis shows that courts too disagree about the meaning of the right to security of person. The thesis then takes a theoretical approach to understanding the meaning of the right. It is argued that the concept of ‘security’ establishes that the right imposes both positive and negative duties but that ‘security’ does not determine which interests are protected by the right. For this, we need consider the meaning of the ‘person’. The notion of personhood as understood in the ‘capabilities approach’ of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum is then introduced. It is suggested that this theory could be used to identify the interests protected by the right. Next, the theoretical developments are applied to the legal context in order to illustrate the variety of interests the right to security of person would protect and the type of duties it would impose. As a result, it is argued that the idea of ‘security of person’ is too broad to form the subject matter of an individual legal right. This raises a question over the relationship between security of person and human rights law. It is proposed that instead of recognising an individual legal right to security of person, human rights law as a whole could be seen as a mechanism to secure the person, the capabilities approach determining what it takes to fulfil a right and thereby secure the person.

Malgré les reproches qui lui ont souvent été adressés, les nombreuses tentatives de réforme qui ont émaillé son histoire, la vieille loi sur les aliénés n’a pas empêché une évolution remarquable des soins vers plus de liberté, notamment par le biais de la sectorisation. L’inadaptation de la loi monarchiste a justifié l’intervention du législateur en 1990, mais elle était toute relative car la loi n°90-527 n’a fait que reprendre, certes en les rénovant, les moyens de contraindre aux soins fondés sur les exigences de l’ordre public. Or, l’application de la loi nouvelle, destinée à l’amélioration des droits et de la protection des personnes hospitalisées en raison de troubles mentaux, a eu un résultat paradoxal : une extension et un renforcement de la contrainte psychiatrique, qui ont fait ressurgir les critiques du dualisme juridictionnel auquel est soumis le contentieux de l’hospitalisation psychiatrique. Le Tribunal des conflits n’a jamais cessé de réaffirmer le principe de séparation des autorités administratives et judiciaires, écartant l’idée d’une unification du contentieux de l’hospitalisation sans consentement au profit du juge judiciaire. Mais par une décision du 17 février 1997, le Haut tribunal a opéré une rationalisation des compétences contentieuses qui a permis au dispositif juridictionnel de révéler son efficacité : l’administration, aujourd’hui, est contrainte de veiller au respect des procédures d’hospitalisation, la certitude d’une sanction lui est acquise en cas de manquement (Première partie). Toutefois le haut niveau de garantie des droits de la personne hospitalisée sans consentement est menacé. Depuis 1997, une réforme de la loi est annoncée comme imminente. Les propositions avancées par de nombreux rapports et études, qu’elles soient d’inspiration sanitaire ou sécuritaire, suscitaient des inquiétudes. Les dispositions relatives à la déclaration d’irresponsabilité pénale pour cause de trouble mental dans la loi n°2008-174 ne pouvaient que les entretenir, préfigurant une aggravation de la situation des personnes contraintes à des soins psychiatriques. Le projet de loi déposé sur le bureau de la Présidence de l’Assemblée nationale le 5 mai 2010 en apporte la confirmation. Le texte en instance devant les institutions parlementaires révèle une finalité sanitaire, mais le droit individuel à la protection de la santé parviendrait à justifier une contrainte que les motifs d’ordre public ne pourraient fonder ; l’obligation de soins psychiatriques ne serait plus uniquement fondée sur les manifestations extérieures de la maladie du point de vue de la vie civile. En outre, si les exigences récemment dégagées par le Conseil constitutionnel à l’occasion d’une question prioritaire de constitutionnalité portant sur le maintien de la personne en hospitalisation contrainte constituent une amélioration, la présence accrue du juge judiciaire dans les procédures n’apporterait aucun supplément de garantie dès lors que les dispositions nouvelles opèreraient une profonde transformation de la fonction du juge des libertés en la matière, notamment en l’associant à la décision d’obligation de soins. Contre toute attente, l’objet sanitaire de la mesure, lorsqu’il devient une fin en soi et n’est plus subordonné à l’ordre public, se révèle liberticide (Deuxième partie) / The old law on insane people has often been criticized but none of the numerous attempts of reform, that it has met throughout its history, has prevented the outstanding move of cares towards more liberty, notably through sectorization. The lack of adaptation of the monarchist law made the legislator act in 1990, but the action was very relative as 90-527 law only rephrased, with some updates, the means to constrain to a treatment abiding by public policy. But, the new law, intended for the improvement of liberty and the protection of hospitalized insane persons, had paradoxical results: an extension and a reinforcement of psychiatric constraint, which made reappear the criticisms of jurisdictional dualism, which psychiatric hospitalization is subjected to. The court relentlessly reaffirmed its attachment to the principle of separation of administrative and judiciary authorities, while it was rejecting the legal argument’s unification of the psychiatric hospitalization without agreement in favor of the judicial judge. The High Court, with an adjudication dated from February 17th, 1997, made a rationalization of disagreement’s skills which allowed the jurisdictional plan to reveal its efficiency : administration, nowadays, has to make sure the hospitalization is respectful of procedures, it would be compulsorily sanctioned in case of a breach of the rules (First part). Nevertheless, hospitalized persons without acceptance should worry about the high-level of guarantee of their rights. Since 1997, an imminent reform of this law has been expected. Numerous reports and studies have led to sanitarian or security order proposals, which sparked concern. The measures about the statement of penal irresponsibility due to mental disorder, and tackled in 2008-174 law, kept feeding these concerns making the situation of persons forced to psychiatric cares worse. The bill submitted to the President of the national assembly on May 5th, 2010, confirmed this evolution. The text pending the parliamentary institution has a sanitarian aim, but the individual right to health protection would justify a constraint that public order can not establish ; the necessity of psychiatric cares would not only be based on the external manifestation of the disease as an aspect of civilian life. Moreover, even if the constitutional Council’s requirements, defined during a major questioning of the constitutionality of the maintenance of constrained hospitalization, are an enhancement, the increased presence of a judicial judge during the procedure would not ensure better guarantee as long as the new disposals operate a deep transformation of judges' duties, notably if they are associated with the decision of constrained cares. Against all expectations, the sanitarian aspect of the measure, when it turns to be an end in itself and is not dependent on public order, is dwindling liberties (Second part)