No abstract available. / Theses (LL.M.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1999.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 1997. / Includes abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 233-244).

This study focuses on the role of the South African judiciary under an entrenched and justiciable Bill of Rights. The lack of an established human rights culture in South Africa results in uncertainty regarding the permissible extent to which judges are empowered, under the Bill of Rights, to employ judicial activism and creativity in order to protect the fundamental rights of citizens. Judicial activism is used in the sense that judges can and should, whenever expressly or impliedly sanctioned to do so by the Bill of Rights, ensure that the fundamental rights of the individual are protected to the extent of granting actual constitutional relief, where this is justified, instead of merely declaring the existence of a right. The essential aim of this study is to outline the parameters of, and the legal basis upon which judicial activism can be justified and accepted into a South African human rights culture. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

M.Ed. / Please refer to full text to view abstract

LL.M. / Constitutions seldom protect the right to occupational freedom by name. When they do, the right is cast in a choice / practise mould or is protected with reference to a right to a livelihood. There is a lot of overlapping between this right and the other rights protected in the South African Constitution. For this reason it is sometimes asked if it is at all necessary to protect the right to occupational freedom by name in the Constitution. There are two considerations in favour of inclusion of the right in the Constitution. The first one is historic — in view of the previous serious human rights violations, it is important to also include this right in the Constitution. The second consideration centres around the importance of the right, where it relates to an activity that occupies an enormous amount of time and very often provides the main, if not the only, source of sustenance to the individual and his or her family. In terms of section 22 of the Constitution, only citizens can be bearers of the right. Whether juristic persons can also be regarded as citizens for purposes of this article, is a difficult question. It is suggested that a wider interpretation of the definition of a citizen is possible that would include juristic persons. This definition is derived from the Constitution itself, rather that from the terms of the Citizenship Act. If the Court finds that a juristic person cannot be regarded as a citizen, the juristic person should be able to turn to other rights in the Constitution that it can be a bearer of, for the protection of its right to occupational freedom. The right to occupational freedom encompasses a wide palette of activities that can all be embraced by the term "occupation". An occupation has two main characteristics: it is practised for a fixed period and provides income to an individual. The economic or social value of the occupation, or its lawfulness or harmfulness to society cannot be used as criteria to exclude a particular activity from the right's field of protection. It is submitted that section 22, despite decisions to the contrary, protects both the choice and the practice of an occupation. A different interpretation would render the right meaningless: it does not make sense to protect the right to choose an occupation, without also protecting the act with which the activity is made externally distinguishable. The fact that the section expressly provides for the regulation of the practice of an occupation would imply that this aspect of the right is also protected. Because the state is bound by the provisions of the Bill of Rights, it has the duty to protect, promote and fulfil the rights. There is however no positive duty on the state to provide work. The right to occupational freedom can also feature in private relationships. The justification of a limitation on the right presents a number of problems. It should firstly be emphasised that the second sentence in section 22 does not constitute a socalled "claw-back clause". Such an interpretation would not be in accordance with the supremacy and the justiciability of the Constitution. The second problem relates to the finding of a proper yardstick to evaluate the justification of limitations on the right. It is suggested that a rational connection test, as is applied in the United States in the case of economic regulation, is too narrow to provide for the wide array of scenario's and activities that is encompassed by the right to occupational freedom. This right provides a battlefield on which difficult choices must be made regarding the weighing of the (sometimes) very important interests of the individual against the, equally important, function of the state in regulating the economy. The situation is even more complicated when two private actors enter the scene, where both may claim protection under the right at the same time. For this reason, it is submitted, that a differential approach must be followed. The general limitation clause with its list of factors provides a very useful tool in this regard. The German Stufenlehre provides an example of how the requirements for a valid limitation can be adjusted to cater for varying degrees of intensity in the factual limitation of the right. The Stufenlehre classification of objective and subjective limitations on the choice of an occupation and measures relating to the practice of an occupation, may also be useful. This classification reflects the formal structure of section 22 and takes the distinction between the choice and practice of an occupation into account. The fact that only the latter incorporates a specific limitation may reflect the intention of the legislature to ease the requirements for the justification of an infringement on this aspect of the right to occupational freedom. The intensity of the infringement and the subsequent level of justification required must be determined separately in the case of each set of facts, while always applying section 36 of the Constitution.

M.Ed. (Sociology of Education) / One of the outstanding characteristics of the present South Africa is an accountable Charter of Human Rights. Rapid changes have taken place on the political, economic and social levels lately. The labour market is influenced by the new dispensation. Most individuals, sometime or another, form part of the labour market and they should be explicitly made aware of their rights and responsibilities. The employer sector requires an education system that will equip people with skills and integrity to take their place in the labour market. The task of the teacher and school cannot be over-estimated. The purpose of this study is to establish to what extent pupils on reaching St 10 have been made aware of their rights in the labour market. In order to achieve this, a questionnaire of six items has been developed based on the literature study in Chapter II of this Script. The variables obtained from this analysis, were applied to test structure and detailed hypothesis concerning the various groups. In this comparison the Hotelling T-test was used to examine the combination of the six facets of labour law and human rights. Where significant multivariate differences were found, they were further investigated by means of the Student's t-test. For three or more groups, the multivariate hypothesis on the six facets of labour relations and human rights were investigated with the use of the one-way Manova. Where significant multivariate differences were found, the univariate differences were investigated further with an Anova and Scheffe.

M.Ed. / Please refer to full text to view abstract

M.Ed. (Educational Psychology) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

Please read the abstract in the section 00front of this document / Thesis (LLD)--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Jurisprudence / LLD / Unrestricted

AFRIKAANS: In 1994 het die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 'n nuwe konstitusionele era betree. Die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika Wet 200 van 1993 (die interim Grondwet), wat in werking getree het op 27 April 1994, het basiese menseregte en vryhede aan alle Suid-Afrikaners gewaarborg. Grondwetlike beginsel II in Bylae 4 daarvan, het onder meer die volgende voorskrif ten aansien van die inhoud van die finale grondwetlike teks bevat: “Elkeen moet alle universeel aanvaarde fundamentele regte, vryhede en burgerlike vryhede genlet, waarvoor voorslening gemaak moet word en wat beskerm moet word deur verskanste en beregbare bepalings in die Grondwet, wat opgestel moet word na behoorlike inagnemlng van, onder andere, die fundamentele regte vervat in Hoofstuk 3 van hlerdle Grondwet." Vervolgens het die Konstitusionele Hof voortgegaan om die finale grondwetllke teks aan grondwetllke beginsel II te toets met die oog op die sertifisering en inwerkingtreding daarvan. Een van die besware wat teen die grondwetlike teks ingebring was, was dat daar geen uitdruklike voorsiening vir die erkenning en beskerming van regte ten aansien van die gesin en die gesinslewe voorkom nie, terwyl sodanige regte in die algemeen erkenning geniet in internasionale menseregte-instrumente en in die grondwette van verskeie state. Die beswaar is deur die Konstitusionele Hof van die hand gewys. Die finale Grondwet, Wet 108 van 1996, het in 1996 in werking getree sonder die uitdruklike insluiting van fundamentele regte betreffende die gesin en gesinslewe. Die moontllke uitdruklike erkenning en beskerming van fundamentele regte ten aansien van die gesin en gesinslewe in die Grondwet; die betekenis en inhoud van die konsep "gesin" en "gesinslewe" vir doeleindes van die beskerming bepleit; die hedendaagse belang van die gesin; die juridiese aard van fundamentele regte ten aansien van die gesin en gesinslewe; die inhoud, omvang en beperking van fundamentele regte ten aansien van die gesin en gesinslewe; die effek van regte ten aansien van die gesin en gesinslewe op die ouer-kind verhouding; die omgangsreg en reg op inllgting van ouers en hul minderjarige kinders asook op diverse aspekte van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg; en laastens, die moontllke toekomstige ontwikkellng en uitbreiding van sodanige reg(te). As basis vir die ondersoek dien 'n regsvergelykende studie van die uitleg van artikel 8 van die Europese Verdrag vir die Beskerming van die Regte en Fundamentele vryhede van die Mens deur die Europese Hof vir die Regte van die Mens. Artikel 8 lui: "1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence (eie kursivering). 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as In accordance with the law and Is necessary in a democratic society In the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." Benewens die beslissings van die Europese Hof vir die Regte van die Mens word die posisie in Nederland spesifiek onder die loep geneem met verwysing na die toepassing van artikel 8 deur die Hoge Raad op die Nederlandse reg. Die waarde van die ondersoek is egter nie afhanklik van die korrektheid al dan nie, van die siening dat die gesin en gesinslewe uitdruklike beskerming behoort te geniet nie. Selfs indien aanvaar word dat die gesin en gesinslewe wel voldoende indirekte beskerming in die Grondwet geniet, 5005 deur die Konstitusionele Hof beslis, is vrae na aspekte soos wat 'n gesin uitmaak en wat 'n reg op die gesin en gesinslewe inhou steeds in 'n groot mate onbeantwoord. 'n Ondersoek van die aard is dus van groot nut om antwoorde op die vrae te bied. Uit die ondersoek blyk verder dat die mate van (indirekte) beskerming wat die gesin (en gesinslede) geniet, groter effektiwiteit sal verkry indien uitdruklike regte ten aansien van die gesin en gesinslewe wel in die Grondwet vervat sou word. Pogings om aspekte van die gesinslewe onder artikels wat indirekte beskerming verleen tuis te bring is dikwels geforseerd terwyl sodanige aspekte internasionaal met groter gemak hanteer word deur dit onder 'n uitdruklike reg op respek vir die gesinslewe tuis te bring. In die proefskrif word ten slotte aanbeveel dat die volgende reg(te) in die Grondwet vervat word: "(1) Die gesin geniet die spesiale beskerming van die staat. (2) Elkeen het die reg op respelk vir die gesinslewe." ENGLISH: In 1994 South Africa entered a new constitutional era. Its interim Constitution, the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, which came into operation on 27 April 1994, guaranteed to all south Africans basic human rights and freedoms. Constitutional principle II thereof contained the following instruction regarding the content of the final constitutional text: "Everyone shall enjoy all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and civil liberties, which shall be provided for and protected by entrenched and justiciable provisions in the Constitution, which shall be drafted after having given due consideration to inter alia the fundamental rights contained In Chapter 3 of this Constitution." Consequently, the Constitutional Court had to ascertain whether the final constitutional text complied with this principle in view of the certification and implementation thereof. One of the complaints against the final text was the absence of explicit recognition and protection of rights with regard to the family and family life, whilst such rights enjoyed general recognition in international human rights instruments and in the constitutions of several states. The Constitutional court rejected this complaint. The final Constitution, Act 108 of 1996, came into operation in 1996 without the explicit inclusion of fundamental rights with regard to the family and family life. The following aspects are investigated in the thesis: The possible explicit recognition and protection of fundamental rights with regard to the family and family life in the Constitution; the meaning and content of the concept "family" and "family life" for the purpose of the envisaged protection; the present-day importance of the family; the content, extent and limitation of fundamental rights with regard to the family and family life; the effect of rights with regard to the family and family life on the parent-child relationship and the right to access and information of parents and their minor children as well as on sundry aspects of the south African law. Lastly, the possible future development and expansion of such right(s) is investigated. As basis for the investigation serve a comparative study of the interpretation of article 8 of the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by the European court for Human Rights. Article 8 stipulates: "1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence (my italics). 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority With the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and Is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others." Apart from the judgments of the European Court for Human Rights the position in the Netherlands is specifically investigated with reference to the application of article 8 by the Hoge Raad on Dutch law. The value, however, of this investigation is not dependant on the correctness or not of the view that the family and family life should enjoy explicit protection in the Constitution. Even if one accepts that the family and family life enjoys sufficient indirect protection in the Constitution as decided by the Constitutional court, aspects such as what constitutes a family and the content of such right(s) are in a large degree unanswered. An investigation of this nature is thus of great value in order to provide answers to such questions. The investigation further indicates that the degree to which the family enjoys indirect protection will receive greater effect if explicit rights with regard to the family and family life are contained in the Constitution. Attempts to deal with aspects of family life under sections of the Constitution which presumably afford indirect protection is often forcing the issue whilst such issues are internationally dealt with great ease under an explicit right to respect for family life. In the thesis it is finally recommended that the following rights should be contained in the Constitution: "(1) The family enjoys the special protection of the state. (2) Everyone has the right to respect for family life." / Thesis (LLD)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Private Law / unrestricted