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Russia, the Far East, and the sea powers, 1847-1905Vaughan, John F. January 1964 (has links)
Call number: LD2668 .T4 1964 V36 / Master of Science
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Russian-European relations in the Balkans and the Black Sea regionSamokhvalov, Vsevolod January 2015 (has links)
No description available.
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The Far East agreements of the Yalta Conference of February 4-11, 1945, and the Sino-Soviet agreements of August, 1945Davidson, Robert Harold 01 April 1969 (has links)
This paper will present a study of the Far East Agreements of the Yalta Conference, held from February 4-11, 1945, and will trace them through to their conclusion in the agreements signed by the Soviet Union and Nationalist China in August of the same year. These wartime agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States, subscribed to by Great Britain and later Nationalist China, reflected then existing distributions of power. The Far East Agreements, on the part of the United States, were concluded in the national self-interest of the United States for reasons thought necessary at the time. The majority of the information in this paper was obtained from United States Government documents and first-hand accounts by men who took part in, or observed at meetings and conferences that dealt with the issues being discussed. Reed College documents library supplied the greater bulk of the material, with additional materials being obtained at Portland State University library and Multnomah County library. All other information was obtained on order through the offices of Portland State University library from various libraries throughout the Pacific Northwest. A background and history of the issues are presented to give the reader the proper perspective before the issues are discussed. Strategic positions and conditions of World War II, both prior to and after the Yalta Conference are presented to give the reader a further knowledge of the conditions surroundings the issues discussed. The actual negotiations involving the Far East Agreements and the Sino-Soviet agreements are discussed in greater detail. Certain of the concessions regarding China agreed upon by the United States at the Yalta Conference were thought necessary at the time. Though it was known that these concessions were made at the expense of China the conclusions drawn in this paper will show that the Far East Agreements were a compromise of the continuing viability of the great powers, pending the final defeat of Japan, and not a compromise of principles on the part of the United States, as believed by many historians and critics. In the late 1940’s, and early 1950’s, after the Chinese Communists assumed the predominant position in China, these agreements came under heavy attack and criticism from many sources, including a Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. This paper will show that much of the criticism and many of the critics were completely unjustified in their beliefs, in that they failed to look at the complete picture and benefited greatly from hindsight. The Far East Agreements were not a radical shift in American China policy. They were not a radical change in traditional American policy. They were thought necessary for both military and political reasons. These agreements were a carefully worked out plan to accomplish three goals: (1) to insure the Soviet participation in the Pacific War at the earliest possible date; (2) to bring about the best possible cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Nationalist government of China; and (3) to limit Soviet expansion in China and prevent China from being divided and torn apart after the war. With the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet negotiations in August of 1945, it was thought that these three goals had been accomplished.
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The relationship of economic development and social mobilization to anti-Soviet behavior in eastern Europe, 1962-1966Gaines, Kimball Meredith, 1935- January 1970 (has links)
No description available.
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La question française in Russia 1806-1812.West, Dalton Arthur January 1972 (has links)
No description available.
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Courting the West : Nicholas I, cultural diplomacy and the State Hermitage Museum in 1852Digout, Amy Erica. January 2006 (has links)
The State Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg as a royal collection and cultural treasury reveals the aesthetic preferences of a nation that has always stood on the cultural and geographical periphery of Europe. Initially an imperial collection under Peter I, patrons of the Hermitage focused attention on collecting canonical European paintings and also emulating Western models of display. In this way, the Russian aristocracy superimposed itself on Europe's culture through the construction of a collection to rival its great European contemporaries. / The development of a standardized practice of display has widely been studied in relation to Western museums but similar attention has not been extended to the State Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg. I argue that Nicholas was able to use objects of art and strategies of display to assert a greater role in the European state system of the mid-nineteenth century. While the supposed transparency conveyed by the collection's public opening was meant to make Russia seem less threatening to Western powers, in reality the yolk of autocracy was as tight as ever.
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Finland's road from autonomy to integration in the Russian Empire, 1808-1910Laine, Edward W. January 1974 (has links)
No description available.
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Western concepts of Soviet negotiating behaviorHepner, Edward Marshall Rupert January 1965 (has links)
A classification of the negotiating tactics used by Russian diplomats has been a facet of Soviet diplomatic behavior which has been relatively ignored. A survey of Western writings on Soviet negotiating behavior indicates that Russian diplomats employ a wide range of bargaining tactics in attempts to gain concessions from Western negotiators. These various bargaining methods have been classified in this paper as to the type of maneuver they represent. There are four discernible Soviet negotiating maneuvers. The first maneuver is comprised of tactics designed to turn a conference or part thereof into a forum for Russian propaganda. Of all the tactics employed those related to propaganda are found most frequently in negotiations primarily because of the relative ease with which they can be utilized. While some propaganda tactics are straightforward, such as slogans and epithets, others are subtle such as the use of general rather than specific terms.
The second Russian maneuver contains a large number of tactics designed to obstruct negotiations. A common aspect of Soviet diplomatic behavior has been the skillful use of delaying tactics so that negotiations either drag on or collapse. The Russians use obstructionist tactics frequently to prevent a decision on a proposal which they believe will be inimical to Soviet interests. They also use it to stall for time so that a new policy can be formulated as well as to make the West concede points in order to end Russian delays.
The third Soviet maneuver is comprised of offensive tactics designed to obtain as many concessions as possible from the West before an agreement is reached on a particular proposal. Because there are a relatively large number of offensive tactics, for purposes of discussion in this paper, they have been sub-divided into three groups: overt, subtle and those which exploit the inclinations of Western diplomats.
The fourth and last group of maneuvers is comprised of Russian duplicity tactics. According to Western observers, the Russians have utilized a number of tactics designed to deceive Western negotiators. The most prominent duplicity tactic has been the feigning of agreements. During the Second World War the Russians entered into many verbal and written agreements largely to demonstrate to the Western allies their co-operative spirit so that lend lease supplies and any post-war territorial gains promised by the West would not be jeopardized. Before the end of the war the Russians stalled on implementing most agreements but as soon as the war finished and lend lease supplies stopped, Soviet violations of agreements and treaties occurred frequently. However, since Khrushchev enunciated the doctrine of peaceful coexistence in 1956, the Russians have used duplicity tactics less frequently although they have demonstrated as recently as the Cuban missile incident in 1962, that if the stakes are high enough they will resort to deception to gain an advantage.
According to Western observers, the Russian diplomat is more a specialized messenger or a mechanical mouthpiece than a diplomat in the traditional sense. The Western diplomat can comment extemporaneously on proposals and can advise his government on policy whereas his Soviet counterpart cannot. When Western descriptions of their own diplomats are compared with their descriptions of Soviet diplomats it becomes apparent that many Western observers have black and white conceptions with respect to the differences between Russian and Western behavior. Many Westerners see their diplomats as honest, polite, and cooperative whereas they see the Russian diplomat as insincere, rude and intransigent.
Negotiations with the Soviet Union since 1945 have left a number of impressions upon Westerners and some of these impressions have crystallized into a number of strongly held beliefs as to how the West should negotiate with the Russians. These four beliefs concern firmness (temporized by prudence), an anti-conciliatory attitude (because the Soviets supposedly look upon conciliation as appeasement), a stress on specific, written agreements, and a belief that relations between states must be based on trust. However, it is suggested that trust is not a reliable ground upon which to base agreements between states. Basing agreements on mutual self-interest rather than trust might offer greater opportunities for East-West settlements. Moreover, a new Western conciliatory attitude combined with shrewdness in the light of Sino-Soviet difficulties might help to improve East-West relations.
Historical examples of Soviet negotiating behavior lend support to the beliefs of those Western observers who claim that the Russians use negotiations for more than just a method of resolving disputes and accommodating interests. Indeed, Soviet diplomatic behavior seems to have been generally consistent with Communist ideological beliefs on the role of diplomacy as another method for furthering international communism against "bourgeois" interests.
Western diplomats who have negotiated with the Soviets describe Russian tactics fairly specifically, but rarely do they mention any use of their own tactics. The implication is that many Westerners may have a narrow view of the negotiating process. That is, they see the Russians using tactics but not themselves. This dichotomy is incorrect because Westerners utilize negotiating tactics such as those related to propaganda and offensive maneuvers. Two types of maneuvers which the West has not utilized are duplicity and obstruction, neither of which are really related to the bargaining process.
When overt acknowledgment of Western tactics occurs, East-West bargaining should not be as difficult, frustrating or disappointing as Westerners claim it now is. All Soviet actions will not be construed as vile once Westerners accept many Soviet tactics as a legitimate part of the bargaining process. Westerners should also consider that the Soviets are probably wary of Western negotiating tactics. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate
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US and Russia: resetting relations : nternational cooperation from geopolitical perspectiveHonzík, Jakub January 2012 (has links)
This work aims to provide an analysis of the potential for international cooperation between the United States and Russian Federation. It will employ analytical and empirical approach and will introduce a geopolitical perspective on bi-lateral relations between the two nations. It will include an analysis of geopolitical objectives and strategies of the two nations and identify areas where their respective interests converge as well as those where they diverge. Then, it will provide an in-depth analysis of the development of mutual relations during the era of Bush-Putin presidencies and during the era of Obama-Medvedev presidencies, in order to determine the various strategies that these two nations employ in bilateral relations with one another, as well as results of such strategies. This work will focus on the different impact of various policies on relations between the countries from a geopolitical perspective and will refer to geopolitical thinking, strategies and objectives of these two nations while analyzing various political initiatives. The overall purpose will then be to evaluate the potential for international cooperation as well as main obstacles to it. It will also assess the impact of leadership composition on the ability of these two nations to overcome differences in their approach...
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Courting the West : Nicholas I, cultural diplomacy and the State Hermitage Museum in 1852Digout, Amy Erica. January 2006 (has links)
No description available.
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