This study aims to account for the high degree of influence and intensity displayed in bi-lateral relations between Russia and the other post-Soviet states - specifically Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan (BUK.) It seeks to do so by employing an analytical framework based around the concept of 'post-Imperialism,' arguing that persistent legacies of the imperial past have both ensured a high degree of intensity in bilateral relationships as well as providing pathways of influence over certain policy areas - primarily for Russia, but in some instances for BUK as well. It also seeks to examine imperial legacy issues as distinct 'types' - from physical economic and military infrastructure, to cross-border constellations of elite personnel to the normative and cognitive inheritances of imperialism amongst both the elite and the population at large. It concludes that Russia has been able to mobilise and employ power resources not available to alternative actors in order to 'punch above its weight' when competing with other powers for influence in the post-Soviet space, and preserve certain Soviet era patterns of relations. It is not the focus of this study, but it is to be hoped that the framework will prove useful for researchers in other former imperial polities in future.

Cette thèse analyse les formes et les conditions de l’action collective dans des contextes contraignants à partir des mobilisations de la jeunesse en faveur et contre l’ordre politique établi en Russie et en Biélorussie dans les années 2000. En confrontant mouvements contestataires et organisations loyales au pouvoir et en les analysant dans leurs rapports asymétriques à l’État, ce travail saisit l’émergence de ces structures à la faveur des « révolutions de couleurs » et des évolutions internes aux deux pays. Il distingue trois formes de militantisme : militantisme contestataire à conflit frontal avec le pouvoir, militantisme du pouvoir en Biélorussie vécu sur le mode consensuel du souci des autres (zabota) et, enfin, militantisme du pouvoir en Russie qui associe conflictualité et zabota dans le cadre du conflit « négocié ». Conflit et zabota déterminent ensuite le rapport des jeunes au politique et leurs projets de société, leur attitude à la rue, leurs formes d’action et leurs logiques d’engagement. Cette recherche met aussi en évidence l’action des organisations qui mobilisent la jeunesse, tout en entretenant des relations consensuelles avec le pouvoir et envisageant leur action dans la continuité de l’État, mais qui promeuvent la loyauté politique parmi les jeunes à travers la mobilisation politique dans la rue en Russie et l’encadrement social en Biélorussie. Ce travail appréhende enfin les effets des contextes contraignants tant sur les jeunes contestataires, qui sont obligés d’adapter leurs modes de structuration, leurs répertoires d’action ainsi qu’à se socialiser à la répression, que sur les militants du pouvoir, qui doivent s’adapter aux objectifs des autorités. / This research endeavors to analyze forms and conditions of the collective action in constraining contexts on the example of youth mobilization in favor or against the government in Russia and Belarus throughout 2000’s. By confronting protest movements and loyal organizations and by analyzing them in their asymmetric relations with the State, this dissertation shows how those structures emerge following the “color revolutions” and internal political events. It also makes a distinction between three forms of youth activism: protest activism that is based on a frontal conflict with authorities, “power” activism in Belarus that is experienced in a consensual way of caring about others (zabota) and, finally, “power” activism in Russia that associates conflict with zabota in the frame of what we called a “negotiated conflict”. Conflict and zabota determine then the youth’ relations to the politics, their societal projects, their forms of action and individual logics of engagement. This research highlights also the existence of organizations that mobilize the youth, while maintaining consensual relations with the government and conceiving their action in continuity with the State, but that promote political loyalty among the young through their mobilization in the streets in Russia and social supervision and support to them in Belarus. Finally, this research apprehends effects of constraining contexts both on young protestors, who have to adapt their structuration modes, their repertoires of action and to socialize their members to the repression, and on “power” activists who have to adjust to new objectives set by the government.

Goal of this master thesis is to show that the myth of the Great Patriotic War is a source of Russian soft power in Belarus. After the methodology chapter, the thesis continues with connecting the concept of soft power authored by Joseph Nye with the concept of myth which is here defined on the basis of theories of Eliade and Malinowski. The next part discusses Russian soft power in the Post-Soviet area in general and in Belarus in particular. It demonstrates that Russian soft power rests largely on common history shared by Russians and other Post-Soviet nations. As a consequence, the main sources of Russian soft power rest on identities and narratives, including myths. The myth of the Great Patriotic War was at the center of Soviet mythology and it has preserved its dominant position also in the Post-Soviet period, what holds true particularly for Belarus. The following part retraces the evolution of the myth of the Great Patriotic War from its emergence during the Second World War until today. It shows that the essence of this myth is a feeling of togetherness and of community that unites the former Soviet nations. The last part presents an interpretative analysis of five qualitative interviews with Belarusians. The analysis of individual cases to a large extent confirmed that the myth of the...