Cold War Soviet foreign policy was driven by a strategic competition. A competition-detente cycle based on the superpower rivalry between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including the Warsaw Pact dependencies, and the United States of America and its respective alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) existed for over forty-five years. Following the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the implosion of the USSR, remnant Soviet and subsequent Russian foreign policy, changed dramatically. Though some fragmentary Soviet style vertical controls of the foreign policy of the transitional Gorbachev years and the first years of Yeltsin's first administration were recognizable, their respective foreign relations operated on the defensive realities of a splintered empire in every conceivable manner. This dissertation will track and analyze each president's foreign policy goals within the dependent variables of social, economic and political influences of post Cold War realities. In an absolute sense, each president formulated Russian foreign policy based on domestic considerations. This fact constitutes the independent variable in this analysis. From the bellicosity of the Cold War through the opposition of Russia to America's unilateralist approach to the second Iraqi war, Russia attempted to return as a major player in international relations as a whole and as an interlocutor with the United States in a strategic sense. This engagement has produced the gambit of political polemics, from the strident Soviet "launch on warning" correlation of forces fighting doctrine to the interactive and more personal political good will venue between Bush and Putin. It is this "push-pull" political history that prompts the primary research question: Is the present Russian strategic relationship with the post 9.11 United States the beginning of a new and unique post Cold War international relationship or is it simply a continuation of the familiar confrontation-detente cycle historically endemic to Russian-American relations? Has the American occupation of Iraq, a perennial Russian client state, derailed the post 9.11 accommodation between the two countries?

Power inequalities and mistrust have characterized many interstate relationships. Yet most international relations theories do not take into account power and mistrust when explaining cooperation. While some scholars argue that power relations inhibit cooperation between states, other scholars expect interstate cooperation regardless of the power relations and level of trust. I argue that although states benefit from cooperation, they are also wary of the power relations between states, making cooperation difficult. Successful and cooperative bilateral relationships are formed between strong and weak states that are power asymmetric and have mistrust of one another, but they are built in such as way as to overcome the problem of power asymmetry and distrust. In this dissertation, I answer how and why states that are in power asymmetry and have mistrust of one another are able to build a cooperative bilateral relationship. I argue that states forge a relationship due to strategic needs such as economic or security needs. I have developed a database composed of the whole population of bilateral treaties between Russia and each of the former Soviet republics, and examine all of the bilateral relationships formed between Russia and the former Soviet republics. I find that Russia indeed forged relationships with the former republics based on its strategic interests. However, despite Russia's strategic interests, it had to build a bilateral relationship that would address the issues of mistrust and power asymmetry between the states. To achieve this, Russia and the former Soviet republics created treaty networks, which served to legitimize as well as legalize the independent status of each of the former republics while also increasing the cost to Russia of violating any of the treaties. I argue that strong treaty networks account for a more cooperative relationship between states, allowing both states to cooperate by alleviating the problems of mistrust and power asymmetry.

The aim of the diploma thesis is to review the position of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet area by means of the analysis of the Russian foreign policy in this region after the year 2000. The first chapter identifies the theoretical and methodological basis applied in the diploma thesis. The second chapter deals with the formulation of the Russian foreign policy after the dissolution of the USSR and its development in the 1990s. Subsequently, the third chapter contains the analysis of the Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet area after the year 2000 based on four levels of analysis -- the international system level, the state level, the domestic influences level and the individual level. The forth chapter focuses on the analysis of the bilateral relations between Russia and post-Soviet republics on the other hand. With the aim to illustrate different approaches used in the Russian foreign policy in relation to various post-Soviet republics, the examples of Georgia and Armenia have been chosen. The last chapter provides the features of the Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet area after the year 2008 in the light of the Foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation published in 2008.

<p>The study analyzes Russian foreign policy discourse on NATO during and after the Georgian war as constructed in on-line news articles from the state-run RIA Novosti news agency. The thesis adopts constructivist and discourse analytical approach. Namely, it is based on the interplay between the three main theoretical pillars: language as constitutive part of social reality; media as a type of discourse; and the constructivist understanding of the foreign policy discourse as being embedded in the domestic social and cultural dimensions.  <em></em></p><p>The research has shown that the discourse on NATO constructed in the news articles of Ria Novosti to a great extent reflected the official Russian government’s discourse.  The overall unfavorable representation of the organization was evident throughout the analyzed material. This ‘negative-other representation’ served to establish political frontiers between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ of the discourse. In the context of the Georgian war, the questions of the future power balance as well as effective transatlantic security mechanism gained particular prominence. The geopolitics of the regional security was represented as bipolar, comprising NATO (or ‘the West’ in its broad sense) on the one hand and Russia as the legitimate leader in most of the post-Soviet space, on the other. Such representation tended to possess distinctive features of the Cold War discourse.</p><p> </p>

This thesis aims to examine the evolution of the discourse of Eurasianism and its impact on the formulation and implementation of post-Soviet Russian foreign policy. The thesis argues that both of Russia&rsquo / s post-Soviet leaders: Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin have used the discourse of neo-Eurasianism pragmatically whenever it suited Russia&rsquo / s interests. Moscow ignored this discourse when its foreign policy interests contradicted with the main tenets of this ideology. The thesis has five chapters. Following the introductory chapter, the second chapter explores the evolution of Eurasianism as a discourse and its main variants in post-Soviet era. The third chapter examines the relationship between the Eurasianist discourse and Russian foreign policy under Boris Yeltsin. The fourth chapter discusses the same relationship under Vladimir Putin. The concluding chapter evaluates the main findings of this thesis.

The aim of the dissertation thesis is to compare the political relations of the Russian Federation and four Visegrad countries and to identify various aspects which contribute most to the differences in the form, content and closeness of the relations. The core of the thesis is a comparative case study focused on the comparison of context of individual bilateral relations. These will be viewed as a clash of two foreign policies. Neoclassical realism will serve as the theoretical background for the analysis of Russian and Visegrad countries´ foreign policies. The methodological apparatus of international political economy will be used as well.

5 Abstract This thesis aims to provide an overview of Russia's narratives surrounding the anti-Russian sanctions implemented by the West in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis. Employing the concept of "strategic narratives", the thesis aspires to outline the content and usage variation of Russia's strategic communication regarding the sanctions regime. After exploring what countries can, in theory, do to defend themselves against sanctions, it was predicted that Russia would strive to reach two goals with its strategic narratives, delegitimizing the sanctions regime and downplaying the sanctions' negative economic effects. The qualitative method of thematic analysis was used to explore the statements of Russia's political leaders on the sanctions and found that Russia indeed seeks to delegitimize the sanctions and downplay their effects. When investigating the usage of the two strategic narratives over time with the help of a quantitative Chi-square test, no significant differences could be found between economically turbulent and prosperous times for two out of three politicians, with the third one resorting more often to the delegitimizing strategic narrative in economically prosperous times. Meanwhile, two other external factors were identified as significantly influencing the strategic narratives' usage...

This thesis seeks to analyze Russia&rsquo / s responses to globalization under Vladimir Putin in the fields of energy and foreign policy. This thesis argues that Russia under Vladimir Putin has redefined its process of globalization through a nationalistic perspective as its policies in the field of energy and foreign policy demonstrate. The thesis has seven chapters including introduction and conclusion chapters. The concept of globalization is explored in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 examines Russia&rsquo / s globalization under Boris Yeltsin and his energy and foreign policies. In Chapter 4, responses of Russian communist, nationalist and liberal intellectuals, to the globalization of Russia under Boris Yeltsin are evaluated. Chapter 5 explores the energy policy of Vladimir Putin while Chapter 6 discusses foreign policy of Russia under Vladimir Putin.

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN RUSSIA&rsquo / S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES IN EURASIA (2000-2005) Dereli, Pinar M. Sc., Department of Eurasian Studies Supervisor: Assit. Prof. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrisever June 2006, 112 pages This thesis seeks to analyze change and continuity in Russia&rsquo / s relations with the United States (US) in Eurasia under the leadership of Vladimir Putin between 2000 and 2005. The thesis argues that the fundamental change in Russia&rsquo / s relations with the US came immediately after Putin&rsquo / s presidency, rather than 9/11 terrorist attacks, as his foreign policy priorities required the establishment of close relations with the US as much as possible. The September 11 terrorist attacks have only facilitated the implementation of Putin&rsquo / s this pragmatic foreign policy. In fact, the continuation of differences between Russia and the US concerning bilateral and regional issues shows that their strategic partnership is mainly rhetoric driven by the short-term tactical considerations rather than shared global values and long-term interests. For this reason, Eurasia continued to be an area of confrontation in Russia&rsquo / s relations with the US in the post-9/11 era. The thesis consists of four main chapters apart from introduction and conclusion. The first main chapter discusses the evolution of Russian foreign policy towards the US between 1991 and 2000. The following chapter deals with the sources of change in Russian foreign policy towards the US before 9/11 events. The next chapter examines Russian-US bilateral relations after 9/11. Finally, the last chapter discusses the impact of 9/11 on the Russian-US relations in Eurasia. Keywords: Pragmatism, Vladimir Putin, Russian foreign policy, the United States, September 11.

Situated within a global context of political unease over Russia’s involvement in Ukraine, this thesis challenges views of Russian foreign policy as enigmatic and unpredictable. It examines the relationship between identity politics, conceptions of security, and the foreign policy preferences of the Russian political elite. It shows how particular aspects of Russian identity that are dominant in different international contexts work to structure policy preferences. This contributes to the pursuit of apparently contradictory objectives across these settings, and to inconsistencies between the rhetoric and reality of Russian security policy. Previous studies have looked into the impact of Russian identity on its policy preferences, but most have taken a limited, instrumentalist view of identity as a tool that is mobilised by political elites to further their existing policy preferences. By contrast, this thesis argues that conscious elite mobilisation of identity provides only part of the picture. Visions of Russian identity (and consequently of its international role) are constrained by institutional factors. These include the linked historical development of the Russian military, economy and education/research sectors. Following a discursive understanding of institutions, they also include the limited number of ways in which identity has previously been represented. These factors produce subconscious constraints on the imagining of Russian identity. This limited conceptualisation of Russian identity has become even more specific in the Putin era, due to the political elite’s frequent repetition of one, highly restrictive, narrative of a ‘usable’ history, presented as the factual background to policy discussion. This narrative foregrounds favoured events, associating them with preferred identity themes. Resultant ‘truths’ of Russian identity then provide a framework for foreign policy. Particular elements of this framework dominate Russia’s relationships with different multinational bodies, impacting on the type of policy cooperation pursued. In relations with the EU, focus on Russia’s equal contribution to European civilisation brings normative incompatibilities between the parties to the fore and acts as a barrier to compromise. With contrasting visions of their identities in their shared region, of what security there should look like, and of how it should be achieved, Russia-EU cooperation has been most effective when undertaken in a specific, sectoral manner. Anticipating the ‘West’s’ relative decline in global influence, Russia has gradually downgraded EU relations whilst pursuing a ‘multivector’ foreign policy that emphasises alternative partners. Capitalising on its identity as one of the BRICS rising powers, Russia has been able to pursue a joint challenge to the contemporary structure of the international order, facilitated by members’ shared convictions of the inequities of the existing system, and of their subordinate positions within it. Here, Russia’s identity as a cultural bridge has been emphasised, giving it a unique possibility to negotiate between the old and the new global powers. Most recently, Russia has built upon its identity as a continent-straddling regional leader, and a supposedly natural representative of Eurasia. In developing the Eurasian Union, Russia seeks to use its privileged regional role to ensure continued global relevance during an anticipated, and desired, transition to global multipolarity. This is a new reading of Russian ‘great power’, in which Russia’s multiple international roles are combined to give it the greatest possible level of influence in determining new global structures.