<p>This essay aims to analyse if the Russian military operation carried out against Georgia between the 7^th and 12^th of august 2008 were executed with adherence to the Russian principles for military deception, <em>maskirovka</em>.</p><p>   A superior purpose is to assess the situation according to the Swedish Armed Forces task of identifying possible needs for new or changed needs for abilities and competence.</p><p>   The method used is two-alternative hypotheses which are tried by comparing actual events before and during the Russian-Georgian war with the ten methods of <em>maskirovka</em>, compiled from military analytical literature. Such traces of resemblance are further examined, both individually and as a part of a larger indication.</p><p>   Further the essay describes the Russian art of war, the prerequisites for military surprise, information warfare in Russian doctrine, the disputed territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the principles for <em>maskirovka</em>.</p><p>   The conclusion is that the Russian operation was executed with some adherence to maskirovka, though unspecified of to what degree.</p><p>   Author of this essay is Cadet Martin Svensson of the Swedish Army, currently a student at the Armed Forces Technical School in Halmstad.</p>

This essay aims to analyse if the Russian military operation carried out against Georgia between the 7th and 12th of august 2008 were executed with adherence to the Russian principles for military deception, maskirovka.    A superior purpose is to assess the situation according to the Swedish Armed Forces task of identifying possible needs for new or changed needs for abilities and competence.    The method used is two-alternative hypotheses which are tried by comparing actual events before and during the Russian-Georgian war with the ten methods of maskirovka, compiled from military analytical literature. Such traces of resemblance are further examined, both individually and as a part of a larger indication.    Further the essay describes the Russian art of war, the prerequisites for military surprise, information warfare in Russian doctrine, the disputed territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the principles for maskirovka.    The conclusion is that the Russian operation was executed with some adherence to maskirovka, though unspecified of to what degree.    Author of this essay is Cadet Martin Svensson of the Swedish Army, currently a student at the Armed Forces Technical School in Halmstad.

Russian government justified the war with Georgia by a set of normatively-legislative arguments. Intervention in Georgia was in accordance to those arguments legitimate. This rationalization proved to be invalid. Main goal of this diploma thesis was therefore to find Russian motives for the war with Georgia. Our hypothesis was that the reaction to Georgian military operation in South Ossetia was a result of a certain dilemma in Russian government. We used two methodological concepts introduced in the book of Graham T. Allison "Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis" for the analysis. The first model, "rational actor", presumes that countries act in the international relations always rationally. "Rational actor" showed that Russian reaction was a result of the rational choice - Russia evaluated military confrontation with Georgia as the most advantageous alternative. The governments' behavior is in accordance to the second model, "organizational process", always limited by behavior of their parts - organizations. The second model revealed that the Russian reaction was result of activated programs, whose character led to massive military action. Our analysis showed that the model which fits better in the case of finding motives of Russian government for the intervention in Georgia...