Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio State University, 2009. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 82-85).

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Thesis focuses on the issue of Georgia's possible receipt of Membership Action Plan (MAP), Thesis strives to represent the possibility of Georgia's MAP receipt and then subsequently in the geopolitics of NATO's enlargement. Main research areas of the thesis include the 1997. Second area of research is focused on the costs and benefits of Georgia's NATO gia's breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South

Abstract: This master's thesis focuses on the obstacles of state building for the defacto states Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic ( Tranistria) and the Republic of Abkhazia. Both of which are break-away states from former soviet republics: Moldova and Georgia. The purpose is to give a cross country comparison of factors which hinder state building. Both states have their unique sets of challenges to integrating into a fully recognized state yet share many of the same obstacles. The factors that will be analyzed are relations to their Patron states; The Russian Federation and how this patron state contributes to these de facto states inability to democratize and gain outside recognition with other member state. These challenges for integration as full dejure states and participation within international institutions are a result of ethnic tension, corruption, authorities and complete dependence on Russia as a parent state. The other factors that will be analyzed is the Foreign policy of the Russian within its near abroad and their soft power tactics towards their compatriots.

The thesis aims to discuss effectiveness of the international conflict resolution in the region of the South Caucasus, analyzing the challenges to international efforts to solve the three conflict cases: the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is among the frozen disputes in the region, the others Abkhazia and the South Ossetia are nominally independent states, however de facto occupied by Russia. It is the fact that three regional players Russia, Turkey and Iran and global players Russia, US, EU have different type of impacts to conflict settlements in the region which directly relate to their political and economic interests. Therefore, after two decades of mediation by powerful states provided no final resolution with numerous attempts at mediation, wherein the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has taken the lead. The complicated and interdepended relations of states make this region highly sensitive area for war and peace in the world theatrical chessboard. Author also analyzes the effectiveness of conflict management between the parties by focusing on conflicts in the South Caucasus region mentioning their historical, political, security and ethnic dimensions, where international organizations, namely OSCE, UN, EU involve.

<p>This essay aims to analyse if the Russian military operation carried out against Georgia between the 7^th and 12^th of august 2008 were executed with adherence to the Russian principles for military deception, <em>maskirovka</em>.</p><p>   A superior purpose is to assess the situation according to the Swedish Armed Forces task of identifying possible needs for new or changed needs for abilities and competence.</p><p>   The method used is two-alternative hypotheses which are tried by comparing actual events before and during the Russian-Georgian war with the ten methods of <em>maskirovka</em>, compiled from military analytical literature. Such traces of resemblance are further examined, both individually and as a part of a larger indication.</p><p>   Further the essay describes the Russian art of war, the prerequisites for military surprise, information warfare in Russian doctrine, the disputed territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the principles for <em>maskirovka</em>.</p><p>   The conclusion is that the Russian operation was executed with some adherence to maskirovka, though unspecified of to what degree.</p><p>   Author of this essay is Cadet Martin Svensson of the Swedish Army, currently a student at the Armed Forces Technical School in Halmstad.</p>

This essay aims to analyse if the Russian military operation carried out against Georgia between the 7th and 12th of august 2008 were executed with adherence to the Russian principles for military deception, maskirovka.    A superior purpose is to assess the situation according to the Swedish Armed Forces task of identifying possible needs for new or changed needs for abilities and competence.    The method used is two-alternative hypotheses which are tried by comparing actual events before and during the Russian-Georgian war with the ten methods of maskirovka, compiled from military analytical literature. Such traces of resemblance are further examined, both individually and as a part of a larger indication.    Further the essay describes the Russian art of war, the prerequisites for military surprise, information warfare in Russian doctrine, the disputed territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the principles for maskirovka.    The conclusion is that the Russian operation was executed with some adherence to maskirovka, though unspecified of to what degree.    Author of this essay is Cadet Martin Svensson of the Swedish Army, currently a student at the Armed Forces Technical School in Halmstad.

The conceptual divide between “hard power” and “soft power,” and the resources that constitute the basis of each, remain hotly debated topics among International Relations theorists as well as foreign policy advisors and analysts. Two developments in the last decade that have greatly influenced the study of the hard-power/soft-power dichotomy are: (1) the pursuit by many single-state actors of foreign policy strategies identifying and actively incorporating soft-power instruments, and (2) the realization by political theorists that individual policy instruments often exhibit unexpected hard and soft-power characteristics and effects, sometimes resulting in hard power acting soft and soft power acting hard. Exploring this dichotomy further, I examine the Russian Federation’s use of its hard and soft power with respect to the de facto independent Georgian separatist region of Abkhazia from 1999-2009 by identifying specific Russian foreign policy instruments employed in the bilateral relationship and analyzing how these instruments draw upon and project Russian hard and soft power. My findings support research addressing instances when traditionally defined hard-power instruments display soft-power effects, and vice versa, and highlight examples of individual policy instruments producing both hard and soft-power effects simultaneously; coercing a subject while they co-opt its interests. In addition, I find that the Russian Federation is actively employing soft-power methods of engagement in its contemporary foreign policy strategy, having substantially increased this employment between 1999-2009— particularly with respect to Abkhazia. Concerning the Russia-Abkhazia relationship specifically, I conclude that, based on Russia’s engagement of the region from 1999- 2009, ties between the country and the de facto state will continue to strengthen, however, with Abkhazia in an increasingly supplicant position. / text