Diss. Göteborg : Göteborgs universitet, 2009.

Rwanda experienced genocide from April to July 1994 during which over 800,000 people were murdered. Among the far-reaching changes that followed this event among individuals and in society overall, the Rwandan Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) showed that contraceptive prevalence declined from 13% in 1992 to 4% in 2000 among married women of reproductive age. This dissertation has two hypotheses concerning Rwandan women's fertility preferences and behavior following the genocide. It is hypothesized that, first, high levels of conflict reduced women's desire for a child or for additional children and second, that women who experienced relatively high levels of conflict were more likely to act on their wish to not have a child or another child by using modern contraceptives than were women who experienced relatively low levels of conflict. The study's logistic regression dependent (outcome) variables were desire for a or another child and the use of modern contraceptives; the source for these data was the 2000 DHS. Three groups of independent variables were included: socio-demographic variables, also from the 2000 DHS, included age, number of living children, education level, urban/rural residence and socio-economic status; availability of family planning services, assessed using women's perception of distance as a barrier to obtaining health care for themselves, from the 2000 DHS, and quality of health services, assessed with data from the 2001 Service Provision Assessment; and experience of conflict, measured as the percentage of the 1994 commune populations that resided in refugee camps in 1995. Communes were considered `high migration' if 10 percent or more of their populations migrated to camps and `low migration' if less than 10 percent of their populations migrated to camps. Women who lived in high migration communes were considered to have relatively high experience of conflict and those who lived in low migration communes were consider dot have relatively low experience of conflict. Analysis showed that residents of high migration communes were significantly less likely to want a or another child as compared to residents of low migration communes (OR = .74); it appeared that the social environment of high migration had a dampening effect on desire for children. The analysis also showed that residents of high migration communes were significantly less likely to use a modern contraceptive method than were those of low migration communes (OR = .57), even though they were less likely to want a or another child and even when family planning services were reasonably available. The reasons for these results are unclear, and many factors may contribute. The generalized trauma experienced by the population may have had a numbing effect, in which taking action in any domain was difficult. Women may have felt pressured by society to have children as the society emerged from war, despite their own preferences. The population may also have distrusted government health facilities - the only source of services for most - in light of the interactions with officials during and after the genocide. However, another set of reasons specific to women and women's health may also have influenced the findings. There is a pervasive social stigma around reproductive health; these services have generally lagged behind other primary health care components. Moreover, rape was used as a weapon of war in the genocide; these experiences may have reduced women's willingness to seek reproductive health services specifically. Finally, the Rwandan genocide and its preparation were decidedly misogynistic; this pervasive dehumanization may have made it particularly difficult for women to seek care for their sexual and reproductive health needs and desires. This complex personal, social, physical and political context may explain why Rwandan women who may not have wanted a child or additional children nonetheless did not consistently act on their desires in the years following the 1994 genocide. The dissertation includes a series of essays providing the author's personal perspective on working in Rwanda in the 1980s and 1990s and being present in the country at the start of the genocide in April 1994.

When authors write fiction about real, traumatic events, they face ethical challenges about how to portray trauma and its impacts. This dissertation employs methods of close reading and application of theory to investigate authorial choices. I argue that authors writing fiction about trauma often make aesthetic choices that blur the line between figurative and literal language in order to portray bodily experiences. This dissertation takes as its subject novels from sub-Saharan Africa that depict traumas caused directly and indirectly by colonialism. Authors including David Diop (1966-) and Birago Diop (1906-1989) have used these techniques to write about tirailleurs sénégalais, West African men conscripted to serve France’s military in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I bring these authors together with Boris Boubacar Diop (1946-) and Véronique Tadjo (1955-), who wrote books about the Rwandan genocide, because they also perform this translation for the body, asking readers to approach these works with a sensitivity to the ways the body endures trauma. The effect of these choices is a humanizing and integrated portrayal of trauma as a phenomenon that challenges the mind-body separation of cartesian influence and complicates human experience of time as linear. These works create space to think about trauma and recovery as individual as well as communal, to map similarities of human responses to trauma without pathologizing it. Ultimately, these works point to the conclusion that living through/with trauma is possible when the trauma can be incorporated into a new conception of the self.

Ce mémoire vise à comprendre les motivations des États à intervenir militairement dans un autre État pour mettre fin aux violations graves des droits de l’homme tel que le nettoyage ethnique et le génocide. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à comprendre pourquoi il y a eu une variation dans la position américaine face aux cas de génocide au Rwanda en 1994, au Kosovo en 1999 et au Darfour de 2003 à 2008. À partir d’une approche réaliste en Relations Internationales qui met l’accent sur l’intérêt national égoïste comme facteur principal explicatif du comportement des États, nous procédons à l’étude des cas de la position américaine lors de trois crises humanitaires. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à comprendre la non intervention des États-Unis lors du génocide des Tutsis au Rwanda en 1994, l’intervention américaine au Kosovo en 1999, et enfin la non intervention américaine au Darfour de 2003 à 2008. En somme, nos études de cas démontrent que c’est l’intérêt national qui motive les États d’intervenir ou de ne pas intervenir lors des cas de nettoyage ethnique ou de génocide. D’une part, lors du génocide des Tutsis au Rwanda en 1994, les États-Unis ne sont pas intervenus car l’intérêt national interprété comme le repli sur les affaires internes américaines ne serait pas maximisé par l’intervention militaire. Ensuite, l’intervention des États-Unis et de l’OTAN au Kosovo en 1999 est expliquée par l’intérêt national américain dans un contexte de l’après guerre froide d’approfondir son engagement sécuritaire en Europe et de préserver sa position hégémonique et son prestige sur la scène internationale, d’assurer la stabilité régionale et de préserver la crédibilité de l’OTAN. Finalement, l’intérêt national défini en termes de sécurité dans un contexte de la guerre au terrorisme explique la non intervention américaine au Darfour de 2003 à 2008. / This master’s thesis seeks to analyze what motivates a state’s military intervention in another state in order to stop mass human rights violations such as ethnic cleansing and genocide. Particularly, it tries to explain the United States inconsistent behavior towards genocide and ethnic cleansing during the Rwanda 1994, the Kosovo 1999, and the Darfur 2003 to 2008 humanitarian crisis. Using arguments of the realist approach in International Relations, whose main explanatory factor for state behavior is egoistic national self- interest, this paper examines the United States position during these three human rights crisis. Specifically, we seek to understand the United States non intervention during the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the United States intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and finally the United States non intervention during the mass killings in Darfur in 2003 to 2008. These case studies demonstrate that shifting definitions of the national self-interest motivate states to intervene or not intervene in ethnic cleansing and genocide crisis. First, during the 1994 Tutsi genocide in Rwanda, the United States chose to not intervene because the national interest, defined as the concentration on domestic affairs, would not be maximized by a military intervention. Secondly, the United States and NATO military intervention during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 can be explained by the pursuit of national self-interest maximization: in the post cold war context, the United States seek to strengthen their security engagements in Europe, to preserve their position and prestige in the international arena, to ensure regional stability as well as the NATO credibility. Finally, it will be argued that the national security self-interests motivated the United States non intervention in Darfur 2003 to 2008.

Ce mémoire vise à comprendre les motivations des États à intervenir militairement dans un autre État pour mettre fin aux violations graves des droits de l’homme tel que le nettoyage ethnique et le génocide. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à comprendre pourquoi il y a eu une variation dans la position américaine face aux cas de génocide au Rwanda en 1994, au Kosovo en 1999 et au Darfour de 2003 à 2008. À partir d’une approche réaliste en Relations Internationales qui met l’accent sur l’intérêt national égoïste comme facteur principal explicatif du comportement des États, nous procédons à l’étude des cas de la position américaine lors de trois crises humanitaires. Plus précisément, nous cherchons à comprendre la non intervention des États-Unis lors du génocide des Tutsis au Rwanda en 1994, l’intervention américaine au Kosovo en 1999, et enfin la non intervention américaine au Darfour de 2003 à 2008. En somme, nos études de cas démontrent que c’est l’intérêt national qui motive les États d’intervenir ou de ne pas intervenir lors des cas de nettoyage ethnique ou de génocide. D’une part, lors du génocide des Tutsis au Rwanda en 1994, les États-Unis ne sont pas intervenus car l’intérêt national interprété comme le repli sur les affaires internes américaines ne serait pas maximisé par l’intervention militaire. Ensuite, l’intervention des États-Unis et de l’OTAN au Kosovo en 1999 est expliquée par l’intérêt national américain dans un contexte de l’après guerre froide d’approfondir son engagement sécuritaire en Europe et de préserver sa position hégémonique et son prestige sur la scène internationale, d’assurer la stabilité régionale et de préserver la crédibilité de l’OTAN. Finalement, l’intérêt national défini en termes de sécurité dans un contexte de la guerre au terrorisme explique la non intervention américaine au Darfour de 2003 à 2008. / This master’s thesis seeks to analyze what motivates a state’s military intervention in another state in order to stop mass human rights violations such as ethnic cleansing and genocide. Particularly, it tries to explain the United States inconsistent behavior towards genocide and ethnic cleansing during the Rwanda 1994, the Kosovo 1999, and the Darfur 2003 to 2008 humanitarian crisis. Using arguments of the realist approach in International Relations, whose main explanatory factor for state behavior is egoistic national self- interest, this paper examines the United States position during these three human rights crisis. Specifically, we seek to understand the United States non intervention during the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the United States intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and finally the United States non intervention during the mass killings in Darfur in 2003 to 2008. These case studies demonstrate that shifting definitions of the national self-interest motivate states to intervene or not intervene in ethnic cleansing and genocide crisis. First, during the 1994 Tutsi genocide in Rwanda, the United States chose to not intervene because the national interest, defined as the concentration on domestic affairs, would not be maximized by a military intervention. Secondly, the United States and NATO military intervention during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 can be explained by the pursuit of national self-interest maximization: in the post cold war context, the United States seek to strengthen their security engagements in Europe, to preserve their position and prestige in the international arena, to ensure regional stability as well as the NATO credibility. Finally, it will be argued that the national security self-interests motivated the United States non intervention in Darfur 2003 to 2008.