In this study, I use Section 404(b) of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act as an exogenous shock to examine the effect of auditors’ assessment of internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) on audit fees, cost of debt, and net value of compliance between 2002 and 2010. Using firms themselves as their own control, this study conducts firm-fixed effects analyses to explore the close causal effect of SOX 404(b) on compliance costs (proxied by audit fees), compliance benefit (proxied by cost of debt) and net compliance benefit (proxied by Tobin’s q). Through analyzing how SOX 404(b) affects firms’ compliance cost, compliance benefit, and net compliance benefit, the results suggest that SOX 404(b) decreases firms’ cost of debt, but also imposes compliance costs. Overall, SOX 404(b) increases firm value premium by around 8.63%. The study also examines whether the 2007 reforms have achieved their purpose by comparing audit fees before and after the 2007 reforms.

This study investigates whether disclosures of material weaknesses in a firm’s internal control over financial reporting are associated with lower investor perceived earnings quality. I measure investor perceived earnings quality by a market returns based representation of earnings quality called e-loading developed by Ecker et al. (2006). My empirical tests use sample firms that disclosed at least one material weakness from August 2002 to October 2005. The cross-sectional univariate analysis shows that firms disclosing internal control material weaknesses have lower investor perceived earnings quality than matched firms that disclose no internal control problems. However, further cross-sectional multivariate regression analysis reveals that after controlling for firm characteristics, only disclosures of company-level material weaknesses have an incremental impact on investor perceived earnings quality, while disclosures of the less pervasive account-specific material weaknesses do not have a measurable effect on perceived earnings quality. From intertemporal within-firm analysis, I find no evidence that firms experienced a change in their perceived earnings quality after their first disclosure of internal control material weaknesses as per SOX 302 or 404. In contrast, I find that firms experienced an increase in perceived earnings quality after they received their first unqualified SOX 404 audit report indicating remediation of previously disclosed material weaknesses. This suggests that, although investors did not find the initial SOX disclosures of internal control weaknesses to be incrementally informative, the legislation motivated firms to remediate weak controls; moreover, the SOX-induced improvement in weak internal controls enhanced investors’ perception of the offending firms’ financial reporting quality. / Thesis (Ph.D, Management) -- Queen's University, 2009-12-17 11:41:11.323

This study investigates whether the current lack of structure of internal control weakness disclosures (a narrative about the reliability of the financial reporting system) leads nonprofessional investors to make differential investment decisions. Using the non-accelerated filer (smaller public company) setting, where nonprofessional investors are likely to consume unaudited internal control reports in their investing judgments and decisions, I examine two facets of internal control disclosure formats: presentation salience and disaggregation of material weaknesses. A 2 x 2 between-participants behavioral experiment was conducted with internal control presentation salience (bulleted vs. in-text) and disaggregation level (a single material weakness vs. a combination of multiple control deficiencies that is a material weakness). I find that nonprofessional investors reward companies that disclose internal control weaknesses more saliently. The results also indicate that disaggregation interacts with salience in that it increases the effect of salience on investing judgments such that salient (stealth) disclosure of a combination of control deficiencies is viewed more positively (negatively) than salient (stealth) disclosure of a material weakness. These findings are contrary to Rennekamp (2012) who finds that processing fluency in bad news leads to more negative investment judgements. Additional analyses indicated that the results related to management trust and credibility are consistent with prior literature. The findings contribute to academia and practice by shedding light on the importance that needs to be placed on the presentation format of internal control disclosures.