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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

Falsifiability, rationality, and the growth of knowledge

Lee, Wai-chung, Robert., 李慧忠. January 1975 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Philosophy / Master / Master of Philosophy
2

How scientists reason : the use of unexpected findings

Baker, Lisa M. January 1994 (has links)
While there is much data in the experimental cognitive psychology literature reporting that subjects working on science-like tasks ignore findings inconsistent with their hypotheses, much cognitive science research has found that reasoners focus on unexpected findings. To study how real-world scientists deal with unexpected findings, data was collected from a prominent immunology laboratory. Four lab meetings were analyzed using a standardized coding procedure. The amount of reasoning, interactions, and new hypotheses about unexpected versus expected findings was analyzed. Presenters at the meetings reasoned more about unexpected than expected findings, and group members reasoned and interacted extensively about unexpected findings. Both presenter and group members formed more new hypotheses about unexpected than about expected findings. These results are consistent with the finding in cognitive science research that reasoners focus on unexpected data. It is proposed that several heuristics influence which unexpected findings scientists pay attention to.
3

The implementation of axiomatic method in political science : a justification

Magnant, Michel January 1985 (has links)
No description available.
4

Scientific realism and empiricist antirealism

Avilés, Cuauhtémoc January 1990 (has links)
This dissertation consists of a defence of scientific realism and a critique of empiricist antirealism. Strict empiricism is discussed in Chapter 1, in which it is argued that this variety of empiricism adequately describes only the initial stages of scientific research. Bas van Frassen's empiricist antirealism is then discussed in Chapter 2. Here, it is argued that this new position, although more sophisticated than earlier forms of empiricist antirealism, fails to constitute a genuinely acceptable alternative to scientific realism. The two main constituents of scientific realism--scientism and critical realism--are then defended in Chapters 3 and 4. Lastly, the superempirical virtues and their role in theory evaluation is discussed in Chapter 5, wherein they are presented as a nonempirical source of quality control on our theorizing.
5

The implementation of axiomatic method in political science : a justification

Magnant, Michel January 1985 (has links)
No description available.
6

Scientific realism and empiricist antirealism

Avilés, Cuauhtémoc January 1990 (has links)
No description available.
7

How scientists reason : the use of unexpected findings

Baker, Lisa M. January 1994 (has links)
No description available.
8

Confirmation, explanation and the growth of science

Ng, Ngoi-yee, Margaret, 吳靄儀 January 1975 (has links)
published_or_final_version / Philosophy / Master / Master of Arts
9

Nomic subsumptive explanation

Sack, Susan Mary January 1980 (has links)
No description available.
10

Intelligent inference and the web of belief : in defense of a post-foundationalist epistemology

Pine, Ronald C January 1996 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 330-347). / Microfiche. / xviii, 347 leaves, bound ill. 29 cm

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