Abstract not available

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2003. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains viii, 145 p.; also includes graphics. Includes abstract and vita. Advisor: Louise M. Antony, Dept. of Philosophy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 142-145).

<p>This thesis will attempt to show how computer simulated models can act as a tool for philosophers. To accomplish this goal, this thesis will be broken down into six sections. The first three sections will go into more detail regarding the nature of the term &lsquo;computer simulated model.&rsquo; They will discuss the history of computer simulated models, outline the process of constructing computer simulated models, and give context for the current use of computer simulated models in science. These sections will rely heavily on the work of Eric Winsberg to give a proper understanding of the functions of computer simulated models. The forth section will give a historical overview of different philosophical methods, including the dialectical method, Conceptual Analysis, and the work of Paul Churchland with Artificial Neural Networks. This section will also attempt to show how these philosophical methods relate to computer simulated models. The fifth section will discuss how American Pragmatism provides a positive framework for the utilization of computer simulated models by philosophers, specifically pulling from the works of Charles Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. The sixth and final section will address the notion that computer simulated models are reliable without seeking truth and use that notion to tie together the argument that computer simulated models can serve as a tool for philosophers. </p>

<p> Models of memory in cognitive science and philosophy have traditionally explained human remembering in terms of storage and retrieval. This tendency has been entrenched by reliance on computationalist explanations over the course of the twentieth century; even research programs that eschew computationalism in name, or attempt the revision of traditional models, demonstrate tacit commitment to computationalist assumptions. It is assumed that memory must be stored by means of an isomorphic trace, that memory processes must divide into conceptually distinct systems and phases, and that human remembering consists in inner, cognitive processes that are implemented by distinct neural processes. This dissertation draws on recent empirical work, and on philosophical arguments from Ludwig Wittgenstein and others, to demonstrate that this latent computationalism in the study of memory is problematic, and that it can and should be eliminated. Cognitive psychologists studying memory have encountered numerous data in recent decades that belie archival models. In cognitive neuroscience, establishing the neural basis of storage and retrieval processes has proven elusive. A number of revised models on offer in memory science, that have taken these issues into account, fail to sufficiently extricate the archival framework. Several impasses in memory science are products of these underlying computationalist assumptions. Wittgenstein and other philosophers offer a number of arguments against the need for, and the efficacy of, the storage and retrieval of traces in human remembering. A study of these arguments clarifies the ways that these computationalist assumptions are presently impeding the science of memory, and provides ways forward in removing them. We can and should characterize and model human memory without invoking the storage and retrieval of traces. A range of work in connectionism, dynamical systems theory, and recent philosophical accounts of memory demonstrate how the science of memory can proceed without these assumptions, toward non-archival models of remembering.</p>

The thesis focuses on what impact the use of idealizations has on the realism/anti-realism debate concerning the fundamental laws of physics. My aim is modest. It is not to present an argument for either the realist or the anti-realist position but rather to show where the debate stands once we have considered recent arguments by Laymon and Cartwright which have made use of the notion of idealization assumptions. My intent is to point out the difficulties of Laymon's argument for realism in the hope of showing what must be accomplished in providing a more convincing argument for realism. I will also suggest that although Laymon's proposal is problematic, it still poses a serious problem for van Fraassen's form of anti-realism, constructive empiricism.

No description available.

<p> Utilizing a postphenomenological lens, in this study, I analyze Human Security Era (1990s&ndash;2010s), techno-futurist films as case studies to explore how humans and technology can and do co-shape a more harmonious world, resulting in TechnoHumanity. To build a techno-humane world, humans must find a way to spur technological innovation and advancement, embedding ethics in design to avoid a dystopian path to dehumanization. Films, and specifically the content or text of the films, provide case studies for a postphenomenological analysis to explore designed, in-design, and future technologies and their interrelationship with humanity.</p><p>

In this essay I have considered some of the philosophical problems involved in attempting to settle the question, What are scientific theories about? And in order to expose these problems, I have dealt with two influential responses to this question of the referents of scientific theories - namely, logical empiricism and realism.

This dissertation challenges the conflict thesis between science and religion promoted by philosophers Alvin Plantinga and Philip Kitcher. I analyze their conflict thesis as an epistemological disagreement about the nature of inquiry. Alvin Plantinga argues that a fideistic method of reasoning is required to make sense of science, while Philip Kitcher promotes a scientisim as the only way to make sense of religion. I argue that fideism and scientism are acceptable in a disciplinary context of inquiry. However, the investigation of the relationship between science and religion is an interdisciplinary context of inquiry where fideism and scientism instigate conflict. Therefore, conflict between science and religion is an artifact of Plantinga's and Kitcher's extension of disciplinary forms of inquiry into an interdisciplinary context. I look to the work of virtue epistemology, having identified the nature of inquiry as a primary cause of their conflict, to help distinguish disciplinary from interdisciplinary forms of inquiry. Disciplinary forms of inquiry are inquires where intellectual faculty virtues are more prominent than character virtues. Thus, one finds a consensus in disciplinary inquiry in how to proceed with research, e.g., Plantinga's fideism and Kitcher's scientism. Interdisciplinary research is a form of inquiry where the method of inquiry itself is in question, a form of inquiry has not been agreed to in terms of how to proceed with inquiry. Thus, intellectual character virtues take precedence to faculty virtues as agents are navigating the borders of different forms of inquiry. This distinction allows me to understand Plantinga and Kitcher as engaging in excellent disciplinary research but less-than-excellent interdisciplinary research. The dissertation concludes with showing how their work represents poor instances of interdisciplinary research, providing a positive example in the work of Michael Ruse. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester 2015. / July 15, 2015. / Alvin Plantinga, interdisciplinary, Michael Ruse, Philip Kitcher, science and religion, virtue epistemology / Includes bibliographical references. / Michael Ruse, Professor Directing Dissertation; John Kelsay, University Representative; Russell Dancy, Committee Member; Piers Rawling, Committee Member.

No description available.