The texts that play a major role in my dissertation include Hobbes's Leviathan, Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason, and Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil and Toward a Genealogy of Morals. My research is situated on the border between ethics and politics because I challenge the belief that ethical conduct always requires universal laws. The articulation of an ethical sensibility that is not grounded on a universal law has been one of the thorniest issues in political theory. Ethical reflection has been unnecessarily trapped between the poles of moral universalism and/or relativism. Through readings of Hobbes, Kant, and Nietzsche in reference to foundations and specific human feelings, I demonstrate that the absence of moral universals does not put an end to ethics but is the condition for a new ethical sensibility that overcomes the this opposition. A critical ethic confronts the difficulty of articulating the relationship between ethics and politics in an age of disenchantment.

The aim of my dissertation is to explore the aesthetic approaches to questions of authority and justice in a post-metaphysical age in the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and Hannah Arendt. Both turn from a rationalist foundation for political order, and suggest that our aesthetic response to the world is central in forming our sense of legitimacy and allegiance as well as in orienting us ethically. Central to this response is a celebration of the plurality and relativity of human affairs in the form of a sense of tragic pleasure which I argue is of great ethical relevance to our post-metaphysical condition. This "aestheticization" places both Nietzsche and Arendt's work in great tension with conceptions of politics based primarily on concerns about social and economic justice. I explore these tensions, and argue that the line of thinking begun by Nietzsche is brought to real fruition in Arendt's work. As such, she offers an important alternative to the nihilistic and anti-political tendencies in Nietzsche's work, tendencies which haunt post-structuralist thinkers indebted to Nietzsche. Hence, this dissertation is situated between modernist rationalism and post-structuralist relativism.

The idea of a feminist science has been treated as settled knowledge. Philosophers of science have, implicitly or explicitly, defined it as a science guided by feminist values. For a long time, feminist philosophers were concerned with defending its conceptual possibility (Longino, 1987), and they largely succeeded; the value-free ideal is in retreat (Holman and Wilholt, 2022). But now that they may finally unclench from their defensive posture, what comes next for their positive program to theorize feminist science? The dissertation takes up this question and attempts to clarify and advance new research questions. I ask: what follows if we take seriously the constraints under which feminist scientists must labor? Which values in science are feminist? What does it mean for science to be ‘value-laden’? Are feminist values epistemically or normatively indispensable? If not, how do we justify the importance of doing science as a feminist?

<p> A holoflux theory of consciousness as energy is hypothesized and shown to support both local and non-local properties. This thesis emerges from an integral evaluation of evidence drawn from three sources: (1) the holonomic mind/brain theories of Karl Pribram, (2) the ontological interpretation of quantum theory by David Bohm, and (3) the hyperphysics of consciousness developed by Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Applying an integral methodology to superimpose and correlate seemingly disparate concepts from among these sources and others, a composite theory emerges, a &ldquo;holoflux&rdquo; theory of consciousness, after the term favored by Karl Pribram to describe David Bohm&rsquo;s &ldquo;holomovement.&rdquo; This Pribram&ndash;Bohm composite holoflux theory is shown to be congruent with established principles of physics, mathematics, and electrical engineering, as well as with what Pierre Teilhard de Chardin termed &ldquo;hyperphysics.&rdquo; </p><p> Extending the panpsychist paradigm that consciousness is inherent in the structure of the universe, the thesis describes a dynamic energy process bridging the explicate space&ndash;time domain with a transcendent flux domain located at the spatial center, everywhere. This center is hypothesized to be synonymous with three key concepts: Karl Pribram&rsquo;s &ldquo;flux domain,&rdquo; David Bohm&rsquo;s &ldquo;implicate order,&rdquo; and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin&rsquo;s &ldquo;point Omega.&rdquo; </p><p> Commonly held arguments, both philosophical and technical, dismissive of energy fields as a possible substrate of consciousness, are examined and refuted. Major theories of consciousness developed by Pribram, Bohm, and Teilhard de Chardin are examined in detail, and presented in the context of their life experiences. Extending their theories, the holoflux theory of consciousness views reality as one energy, cycling mathematically, lens-like, in a process of transformation manifesting in three modes: (1) electromagnetic energy in space&ndash;time, (2) holoflux energy in a transcendent order, and (3) vibrating isospheres at the boundary gap separating the implicate from the explicate orders. </p><p> Pierre Teilhard de Chardin&rsquo;s more technical concepts (e.g., centro-complexity, radial energy, tangential energy, complexity-consciousness, noogenesis, centrology, and Omega) are evaluated in detail, and interpreted within the framework of holoflux theory, to provide new insights into his hyperphysics of centro-complexity. </p><p> The plausibility of this holoflux theory is examined through identification of correlations between physiological, electromagnetic, and geophysical measurements. </p>

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2015. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis investigates physical and philosophical measurement within the context of a Masters Degree in Visual Arts. By unpacking concepts within science through a philosophical approach to material, this study underscores and investigates questions of certainty and the unknown. This entails the examination of associated terms like ‘accuracy’ and ‘result,’ where such results are expressed and arrived at through chance and temperament rather than mathematical equations or formulas. Using the example of a Universal Conditional Statement, specifically (x)(Px⊃Qx), this physical / philosophical methodology will be applied to a practice-led artistic research. The given Statement simply denotes that what is on both the left and right of the symbol “⊃” are interchangeable, subject to the condition of “if… then”. This symbol is one that encapsulates and encompasses this document, which seeks to explore the relation between ‘if’ and ‘then’, as well as the known and unknown. Towards this end, and to understand, connect and manipulate through the measuring of material, aspects such as ‘Facts’, ‘Laws’ and ‘Quasiserial Arrangements’ are investigated. In addition, through the study of a physical measuring tool, the metre, and the history of the metric system, this thesis also tracks and discloses information regarding the quest for accuracy, demonstrating how this ever-evolving objective goes hand in hand with inaccuracy, something especially apparent in the calculation of the immeasurable and the unknown. Part of this focus looks at Werner Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, which reveals the hybrid and extravagant behaviour of material and also affirms that the result of an experiment is only as accurate as the domain in which it is set. Concepts such as fact, uncertainty and material exploration are used by the artist in the creative process to test, measure and influence material. In this creative process, the body is sited as subject, as one that not only measures, but is measured against. When the body is added to a set of conditions, aimed to question material behaviour, the results prove unpredictable. Though material exploration and the appropriation of measuring through metaphor, the haptic and the tactile provides access and act as placeholders for the moments where material behaves in ways we cannot predict. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Vir die studie tot ’n Meestersgraad in Visuele kunste, ondersoek hierdie tesis die fisiese en filosofiese aspekte van meetbaarheid as konsep. Die studie is geposisioneer binne ‘n wetenskaplike filosofiese benadering tot materiaal. Binne hierdie raamwerk word oomblikke van ‘sekerheid’ beproef en die onbekende word geopenbaar. Dus, terme soos ‘akkuraatheid’ en ‘resultate’ word bevraagteken en getoets, asook hoe hierdie inligting geproduseer word deur oomblikke van ‘kans’ en ‘temperament’, eerder as wiskundige vergelykings of formules. As ‘n methode vir artististiese navorsing word daar gebruik gemaak van ’n voorbeeld van ‘n universele voorwaardelike verklaring soos; (x)(Px⊃Qx), wat dan dien as ‘n metafoor vir fisiese asook filosofiese kwessies vir meetbaarheid. Die gegewe stelling dui aan dat wat aan beide links en regs van die symbool ⊃ is, kan as verwissellende gegewes beskou word - onderhewig aan ‘n voorwaarde soos; ‘as … dan’. Hierdie simbool som hierdie navorsing op en mik om die verhouding tussen die ‘as’ en ‘dan’ te verken, asook die verhouding tussen dit wat bekend en wat onbekend is. Om materiaal te verken, deur die proses van meet en manipulasie, word aspekte soos ‘feite’, ‘wette’ en “quasiserial arrangements” ondersoek. Deur die bestudering van ‘n fisiese meetinstrument, naamlik die metre, asook die geskiedenis van die metrieke stelsel, wys hierdie tesis op die voortdurende soeke na meetbare akkuraatheid. Wat dit demonstreer, is hoe hierdie fisiese instrument ‘n ewig-veranderende aspek saamdra, en is daarvolgens gekoppel aan onakkuraatheid. Dus, hierdie inligting word slegs weerpeel deur middel van - en is akkurraat volgens en is die instumente wat beskikbaar is. Die instrument bepaal die resultaat. Deel van hierdie ondersoek verwys ook terug na Werner Heisenberg se ‘onsekerheidsbeginsel’ wat die onbekende en buitensporige gedrag van materiaal tentoonstel, asook hoe dit bevestig dat die uitslag van ‘n eksperiment sleg akkuraat is binne die konteks van die domein waarin dit afspeel. Konsepte soos ‘feite’, ‘onsekerheid’ en ‘materiaal verkenning’ word voortdurend deur die kunstenaar in sy kreatiewe proses getoets. Dit is juis in hierdie proses waar die meet en invloed van material ‘n groot rol speel. Die kunstenaar benader die liggaam as ’n onderwerp wat meet en waarteen gemeet word. Wanneer die liggaam saam met ‘n stel voorwaardes gevoeg word, word die gedrag van dit wat ondersoek word onbepaalbaar en word die onvoorspelbaarheid van material beklemtoon. Deur die aanwending van meet deur metafoor, vir die doeleinde vir ‘materiaal verkenning’, word die haptiese en die tasbare toegang tot material plekhouers vir die oomblikke waar materiaal onvoorspelbaar kan optree.

<p> This dissertation looks at the life and work of famed English Aristocrat Robert Boyle. Specifically, I examine his treatment of generation and its organizing forces&mdash;seminal principles, plastic powers, and petrifick spirits. Generation, I argue, provided the context by which Boyle was introduced both to chymistry and anatomy. The problem of generation would remain at the forefront of his concerns as he experimented in chymistry, pneumatics, minerals, anatomy, transmutation, and plants. Looking at the various communities in Europe with which Robert Boyle interacted, I show that the mechanical philosophy was actually quite diverse. As one of the most influential scholars of his time, Boyle presents a distinctly mechanical account of generation that would have a profound effect upon Western science.</p>

<p> Cognitive science has been beset for thirty years by foundational disputes about the nature and extension of cognition&mdash;e.g. whether cognition is necessarily representational, whether cognitive processes extend outside the brain or body, and whether plants or microbes have them. Whereas previous philosophical work aimed to settle these disputes, I aim to understand what conception of cognition scientists could share given that they disagree so fundamentally. To this end, I develop a number of variations on traditional conceptual explication, and defend a novel explication of cognition called the sensitive management hypothesis.</p><p> Since expert judgments about the extension of &ldquo;cognition&rdquo; vary so much, I argue that there is value in explication that accurately models the variance in judgments rather than taking sides or treating that variance as noise. I say of explications that accomplish this that they are <i> ecumenically extensionally adequate</i>. Thus, rather than adjudicating whether, say, plants can have cognitive processes like humans, an ecumenically adequate explication should classify these cases differently: human cognitive processes as paradigmatically cognitive, and plant processes as controversially cognitive.</p><p> I achieve ecumenical adequacy by articulating conceptual explications with <i>parameters</i>, or terms that can be assigned a number of distinct interpretations based on the background commitments of participants in a discourse. For example, an explication might require that cognition cause &ldquo;behavior,&rdquo; and imply that plant processes are cognitive or not depending on whether anything plants do can be considered &ldquo;behavior.&rdquo; Parameterization provides a unified treatment of embattled concepts by isolating topics of disagreement in a small number of parameters.</p><p> I incorporate these innovations into an account on which cognition is the &ldquo;sensitive management of organismal behavior.&rdquo; The sensitive management hypothesis is ecumenically extensionally adequate, accurately classifying a broad variety of cases as paradigmatically or controversially cognitive phenomena. I also describe an extremely permissive version of the sensitive management hypothesis, arguing that it has the potential to explain several features of cognitive scientific discourse, including various facts about the way cognitive scientists ascribe representations to cognitive systems. </p>

by Keith, Ka-fu Chan. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 94-98). / Acknowledgements / Abbreviations / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Kuhn's Philosophy of Science as Opposition. to Traditional.View --- p.2 / Chapter 1.2 --- Purpose and Structure --- p.9 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- The Development of Kuhn's Incommensurability Thesis --- p.13 / Chapter 2.1 --- The Early Version --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2 --- The Transitional Period --- p.20 / Chapter 2.3 --- The Later Version --- p.26 / Chapter Chapter3 --- Incommensurability verus Indeterminacy --- p.32 / Chapter 3.1 --- Quine's Indeterminacy of Trans- lation --- p.33 / Chapter 3.2 --- The Multiplicity and Failure of Translation. --- p.40 / Chapter 3.3 --- Translation verus Interpretation --- p.43 / Chapter 3.4 --- Inscrutability and Determination of Reference --- p.49 / Chapter 3.5 --- Summary --- p.64 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- Incommensurability as Indeterminacy. --- p.66 / Chapter 4.1 --- Critique of Traditional Theory of Meaning --- p.67 / Chapter 4.2 --- Rejection of Neutral and Objective Criterion. --- p.80 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- Concluding Reflection:Relativism as Understood by Kuhn in his later thought --- p.86 / Bibliography --- p.94

Judgments of symmetry lay at the heart of the classical theory of probability. It was by direct appeal to the symmetries exhibited by the processes underlying simple games of chance that the earliest theorists of probability were able to justify the initial assumptions of equiprobability which allowed them to compute the probabilities of more complex events using combinatorial methods, i.e., by simply counting cases. Nevertheless, in spite of the role that symmetry played in the earliest writings on the subject, in light of the fact it is only in highly contrived settings that a direct appeal to symmetries can suffice to determine the probabilities of events, many philosophers have been led to conclude that the concept of symmetry itself has, at best, a limited role to play in a general theory of probability. In this essay, I argue that this view of the matter is mistaken, and that judgments of symmetry, in fact, have an indispensible role to play in all probabilistic reasoning. In chapter 1, I provide a detailed account of symmetry-based reasoning and argue against the view that the judgments of relevance on which such reasoning is based must be construed in subjective terms if symmetry-based reasoning is to be applied to deterministic processes. In chapter 2, I argue that the two most plausible proposals for how to avoid an appeal to symmetry in the assignment of probabilities (viz., those which are based on a priori principles of epistemic conservatism or the observed frequencies of events) must themselves rely on implicit assumptions of symmetry if they are to defend themselves against the charges of incoherency and arbitrariness. In chapter 3, I consider a decision-theoretic example of symmetry-based reasoning, in which the appeal to symmetry arises in the context of an agent's choice of a deliberative methodology. In this context, the principle of symmetry amounts to the requirement that the agent avoid adopting a biased deliberative methodology, i.e., one which treats two equally legitimate sources of information differently. In the specific context of the exchange paradox, I propose an account of how biased information is to be handled, which, despite suffering from some important defects, does, I believe, capture some of our general intuitions about how a rational agent ought to adjust his expectations to correct for the effects of bias.

The aim of this dissertation is to provide an analysis of central concepts in philosophy of science from the perspective of current molecular and developmental research. Each chapter explores the ways in which particular phenomena or discoveries in molecular biology influences our philosophical understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge. The introductory prologue draws some general connections between the various threads, which revolve around two central themes: causation and explanation. Chapter Two identifies a particular type of causal relation which is widespread across the sciences, but cannot be straightforwardly accommodated by extant accounts of causation and causal explanation. Chapter Three explores how the form of redundant causality identified in the previous chapter plays an important role in causal explanation, by making the effect stable and robust. Chapter Four offers a novel perspective on the debate over biological reductionism by distinguishing between different paradigms of molecular explanation. Chapter Five provides a philosophical analysis of the so-called "Developmental Synthesis" of evolutionary and developmental biology, and suggests a general account of scientific unification grounded in the notion of explanatory relevance. Chapter Six offers an account of dispositional properties inspired by mechanisms of gene regulation, according to which dispositions are not properties of entities, but properties that describe the behavior of abstract idealized models. Finally, Chapter Seven scrutinizes the concept of the molecular ecosystem, a metaphor frequently employed by biologists to describe cellular interactions, but seldom articulated in detail.