abstract / Philosophy / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

Quine has been mainly opposed to sentences that feature cross-quantification. That is, he is critical of sentences that involve quantifying into a context that Quine labels 'opaque1. Quine's opposition to cross-quantification grew out of an earlier attack on the notion of combining quantification theory and modal logic. Quine initially dismissed, in 1943, cases of quantifying into modal contexts as meaningless. Later in the same year, Alonzo Church argued that there was a meaningful way to quantify into modal contexts, thus vindicating the notion that quantification theory could be merged with modal logic. In 1956, in "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," Quine pointed out that quantification into belief contexts, though indispensable, also features the improper quantification into opaque contexts. In the same paper, Quine introduced the distinction between a relational and a notional sense of propositional attitude ascriptions. The former sense concerns the problematic sentences that feature cross-quantification. In the thesis that follows, I appropriate Quine's terminology and critically evaluate his reasons for rejecting the relational idiom in both modal and doxastic contexts. Such an evaluation reveals some startling results in the philosophy of language. One of the major problems that Quine sought to address was that of reconciling the evident significance of instances of the relational idiom with their many alleged difficulties. Quine restricted himself to acknowledging the idiom's meaningfulness in doxastic contexts. Most of Quine's criticisms of the relational idiom are argued by me to be unsound. It is contended that some of Quine's criticisms involve the improper exploitation of ambiguities inherent in such sentences. This fallacy is exposed and subjected to a critical evaluation. The exposure of this fallacy, which I term 'the relational fallacy' is a novel contribution to the philosophy of language. Another novel contribution to the philosophy of language is my critique of Quine's use of semantic ascent to account for intuitively meaningful relational modal sentences. A third, slightly less novel, contribution to the philosophy of language involves extending Quine's temporary view that there are meaningful relational sentences in doxastic contents to the analogous observation that there are meaningful relational sentences in modal contexts.

The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that the seventeenth-century religious writer Thomas Traherne an individual who is almost never included in philological enquiries was aware of linguistic issues and added his own unique view to the debatesoftheage. Theprojectisdividedintofourmainchapters. ChapterI, "Traherne's Word Definitions," analyzes Traherne's word definitions and places him withinthecontextofphilosophicallanguagemovements. Ifocusuponhisunpublished CommentariesofHeaven,alargeencyclopediawhichpurportstoopen"TheMysteries ofFelicitie"anddefine"AllThings"asobjectsofhappiness. Despitetheidentification of this manuscript in 1982, much of Traherne scholarship ignores its existence. Chapter n, "Language and the Fall," investigates Traherne's view of prelapsarian speech. It discusses notions of Adam's language, the dumbness of infants, the Tower of Babel, and the way in which these are all sites of linguistic "falls." Chapter in, "Silence in Traherne's Writings," looks at the role of silence in religious practice, politics,andself-identity. AttimesTrahernecelebratessilenceasaspecialincubatory condition which nurtures the individual and blocks out the nefarious forces of language. Atothertimeshedescribesitasdormantandsterile. Thechapteroffersan explanationastowhyhefluctuatesbetweentheseextremes. ChapterIV,"Traherne and the Seventeenth-Century Debate Over Metaphor," analyzes the conformist and nonconformist debate over metaphor which was indicative of deep theological and political controversies of the time. My Epilogue offers a discussion of Traherne's manuscriptTheCeremonialLaw,aworkrecentlydiscoveredin1996. InmythesisI define Traherne's theological and linguistic views, while at the same time I call attention to the manuscripts Commentaries ofHeaven and The Ceremonial Law, and their crucial position in the Traherne canon.

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It has often been alleged that the argument from illusion demonstrates that perceptual judgements expressed in ordinary or material object language are inherently vulnerable to scepticism, are imprecise, ambiguous, inconvenient, and imply somewhat more than we legitimately ought to say. Perceptual judgements about the same experience expressed in sense data language are, on the other hand, allegedly shown to be indubitable, precise, unambiguous, and, as such, to be the raw data from which our empirical knowledge is inferred. I contend there is no such essential asymmetry between an object language judgement (M-judgement) and a sense data language judgement (S-judgement) about the same perceptual experience provided the judgements are intended to have the same function. Arguments from illusion are, I contend, arguments by analogy. They argue that since we may be subject to illusion, then perhaps we are presently subject to illusion. But arguments by analogy are less arguments than hypotheses. We can easily counter that since we may not be subject to illusion, perhaps we are not presently subject to illusion. The problem is to discover whether or not we are subject to illusion and this, in principle we can do. M-judgements, as contingent judgements, can only be held to be contingently doubtful; they may in principle be verified or falsified. Further, if we attend closely to the conditions under which we make M-judgements and to our pragmatic interests and purposes in making them, we discover that such dubitability to which they are prone derives essentially from the fact that they are intended to effect a maximum differentiation of our sensory experience. S-judgements on the other hand are shown to derive their indubitability proportionately to the extent that they minimize differentiation of our experience. Indubitability is achieved only by diminishing the risk of contingency entailed by classifying experience. A completely doubt-free S-judgement then, would effect minimal differentiation of sensory experience and considering our pragmatic interests, would be singularly inutile. Thus it has been shown that such advantages as S-judgements have over M-judgements with respect to doubt derive only from a more radical asymmetry of intention, function, and utility. Further asymmetries regarding precision, ambiguity and convenience are shown either to be similarly untenable or to favor M-language. My conclusions are meant to undermine the tradition of basing sense data philosophy upon an inferiority of ordinary (M-statement) language as allegedly shown by a problematic asymmetry of M-judgements with S-judgements. No such troublesome asymmetry exists. I do recognize that arguments from illusion elucidate the extent to which ordinary language reflects conditions that are purely contingent and that it may well be possible to establish independently a sense data language which is less tied to purely contingent empirical conditions. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

Quine has been mainly opposed to sentences that feature cross-quantification. That is, he is critical of sentences that involve quantifying into a context that Quine labels 'opaque1. Quine's opposition to cross-quantification grew out of an earlier attack on the notion of combining quantification theory and modal logic. Quine initially dismissed, in 1943, cases of quantifying into modal contexts as meaningless. Later in the same year, Alonzo Church argued that there was a meaningful way to quantify into modal contexts, thus vindicating the notion that quantification theory could be merged with modal logic. In 1956, in "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes," Quine pointed out that quantification into belief contexts, though indispensable, also features the improper quantification into opaque contexts. In the same paper, Quine introduced the distinction between a relational and a notional sense of propositional attitude ascriptions. The former sense concerns the problematic sentences that feature cross-quantification. In the thesis that follows, I appropriate Quine's terminology and critically evaluate his reasons for rejecting the relational idiom in both modal and doxastic contexts. Such an evaluation reveals some startling results in the philosophy of language. One of the major problems that Quine sought to address was that of reconciling the evident significance of instances of the relational idiom with their many alleged difficulties. Quine restricted himself to acknowledging the idiom's meaningfulness in doxastic contexts. Most of Quine's criticisms of the relational idiom are argued by me to be unsound. It is contended that some of Quine's criticisms involve the improper exploitation of ambiguities inherent in such sentences. This fallacy is exposed and subjected to a critical evaluation. The exposure of this fallacy, which I term 'the relational fallacy' is a novel contribution to the philosophy of language. Another novel contribution to the philosophy of language is my critique of Quine's use of semantic ascent to account for intuitively meaningful relational modal sentences. A third, slightly less novel, contribution to the philosophy of language involves extending Quine's temporary view that there are meaningful relational sentences in doxastic contents to the analogous observation that there are meaningful relational sentences in modal contexts. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate

Bibliography: pages 370-373. / The theme of this thesis occurred to me while reading Luria's Basic Problems of Neurolinguistics. Many of Luria's patients manifest forms of a disintegration of speech and of the understanding of speech, which resemble the disintegration of movement in space and perception of space of Goldstein's patient, Schneider, the case Merleau-Ponty described in so many of his arguments, particularly those in the chapter of the Phenomenology of Perception entitled "The spatiality of one's own Body and Motility". It seemed to me that I could analyse the speech syndromes Luria reveals, and Luria's explanations, in much the same way that Merleau-Ponty analysed Schneider's syndrome and the explanations offered by Goldstein and others. I felt that in this way I would be able to exhibit certain features of the speaking subject and its relations with others, in the same way that Merleau-Ponty revealed the spatiality of the body and its relations with the world. This seemed to me to be a useful project, firstly because of the central role that the problem of language plays in Merleau-Ponty's later philosophy and because the later reflections on language seem to presuppose such an analysis of pathological forms of speech.

published_or_final_version / Humanities / Master / Master of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / Philosophy / Master / Master of Philosophy

by Keith, Ka-fu Chan. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1995. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 94-98). / Acknowledgements / Abbreviations / Chapter Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Kuhn's Philosophy of Science as Opposition. to Traditional.View --- p.2 / Chapter 1.2 --- Purpose and Structure --- p.9 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- The Development of Kuhn's Incommensurability Thesis --- p.13 / Chapter 2.1 --- The Early Version --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2 --- The Transitional Period --- p.20 / Chapter 2.3 --- The Later Version --- p.26 / Chapter Chapter3 --- Incommensurability verus Indeterminacy --- p.32 / Chapter 3.1 --- Quine's Indeterminacy of Trans- lation --- p.33 / Chapter 3.2 --- The Multiplicity and Failure of Translation. --- p.40 / Chapter 3.3 --- Translation verus Interpretation --- p.43 / Chapter 3.4 --- Inscrutability and Determination of Reference --- p.49 / Chapter 3.5 --- Summary --- p.64 / Chapter Chapter 4 --- Incommensurability as Indeterminacy. --- p.66 / Chapter 4.1 --- Critique of Traditional Theory of Meaning --- p.67 / Chapter 4.2 --- Rejection of Neutral and Objective Criterion. --- p.80 / Chapter Chapter 5 --- Concluding Reflection:Relativism as Understood by Kuhn in his later thought --- p.86 / Bibliography --- p.94