published_or_final_version / Philosophy / Master / Master of Philosophy

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The contemporary study in the philosophy of language concentrates extensively on a cluster of questions defining the problem of linguistic knowledge (Evans 1981, Davies 1989, Dummett 1991). What explains a speaker's language mastery? Is it knowledge that underwrites our linguistic abilities, and if so, what is the nature of this knowledge? Is rationality an intrinsic feature of language mastery, and if so, how does an account of linguistic knowledge accommodate the connection between language and rationality? While philosophers emphasize the importance of such questions for an account of language, the only systematic response to them has been based almost exclusively on research in psycho-linguistics, and in cognitive science, generally. And prominent cognitivists, such as Chomsky, use their view of linguistic knowledge to promote fervently the naturalistic ideal that the language researcher adhere faithfully to the methodology of the natural scientist, and to provide a thorough critique of any alternative (i.e., non-naturalistic or dualist) approach to language (Chomsky 1995a). / In the thesis, I respond to the negative side of cognitivism, and defend a non-naturalistic approach to linguistic knowledge which I call interpretivism. I argue that when applied to interpretivism the cognitivist's critique is rather inconclusive. And, by itself, the cognitivist's explanation of language does not imply that interpretivism is invalid, but rather leaves room for it. The cognitivist explicates linguistic knowledge either as a system of computational states (Stich 1975) or as a set of intentional states (Dwyer and Pietroski 1996). And while under the computationalist construal the cognitivist cannot address the rationality of language, under the intentionalist construal he does not do full justice to it. The interest of interpretivism lies thus in its emphasis on the rational aspects of language, and on the related idea that linguistic knowledge is multifarious: not only intentional or computational, but also similar in kind to the capacity for thought. Following Sellars [1960/1963], I introduce a broad view of explanations of human behaviour within which both the cognitivist and the interpretivist model of explanation are tenable. I conclude that there is room and a need for a non-naturalistic approach to linguistic knowledge, and that naturalism cannot be the only defensible strategy in the study of language.

Statement of the Problem: Specifically, how suitable is a textual language in communicating “irrational concepts” and religious myths designed to explain the irrational? Furthermore, how important is the mastery of a textual language apropos of our conceptual processes and in what ways can the structure of a specific language-game impact on a person’s conceptual abilities? To undertake this enquiry, certain assumptions will have to be made. For example, it is accepted that everything we interpret and ultimately understand is mediated solely through language in the broad sense (which includes visual cognition or literacy). Here it is accepted that without language we cannot think. Indeed, even our most private thoughts are based on a language, which embodies communally sanctioned criteria. Hypothesis: It is then the premise of this dissertation that the very architecture of a person’s mother-tongue has a profound influence on the worldview and perception of a particular person. Also it is possible to consider that certain languages, by virtue of their very structure, either hinder or facilitate certain cognitive development or potential. Further, if we could but increase the linguistic proficiency of our citizens, we will be better positioned to develop a critical mass of people who are problem solvers, mathematicians and conceptualizers; and who will address the shortfall of graduates in science, engineering, technology and business in South Africa. If in any way accurate, this would tend to imply that (inter alia) the retention rate of potential graduates in the SET and business disciplines will be significantly improved if educational policy-makers embraced even the most basic tenets of the linguistic paradigm.

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陳金鳳. / 手稿本(cops. 2 & 3複印本) / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學. / Shou gao ben (cops. 2 & 3 fu yin ben) / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 149-151. / Chen Jinfeng. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue. / 導言 / Chapter 第一部 --- 認知主義 / Chapter 第一章 --- 自然主義 / Chapter 第二章 --- 直覺主義 / Chapter 第二部 --- 非認知主義 / Chapter 第三章 --- 情緒主義 / Chapter 第四章 --- 規範主義 / 結論