The progress of science depends partly, upon the acceptance of indeterminate tacit premisses about the nature of science and the object of science. These premisses are tacit because (i) they extend to what is beyond the limitations of present data, -not the empirical or the imaginative- and therefore involve heuristic anticipations. (ii) they also involve personal and interpersonal mechanisms such as the personal presuppositions and commitments of the scientist operating within a given community. This community confers values on scientific work in the form of publications, research grants, professional positions, etc.. This transcends the objective subjective dichotomy since the scientist submits to requirements acknowledged by himself with universal intent, that is the scientist's responsibility to pursue his research and confer his judgements as his vision of reality would have him hold as universally necessary. (iii)their acceptance is largely a-critical - they are functional interpretative systems rather than static objects. Although when they are the object of study, they are facts, they are not the fact since they play a vectorial role in establishing facts. They make factuaiity possible. There is a strong case for tacit knowledge. Therefore, Polanyi submits, we should question a concept of scientific objectivity which rests solely upon logical and empirical foundations. Even though numerous mathematics and technical procedures can be employed, the objective value of a scientific theory cannot be wholly formally assessed. Polanyi's theory, in differentiating rationality from formal inference, shows the way towards a non-normative but non-subjectivist epistemology of science beyond the accounts of the practice of science of Kuhn, Lakatos and Laudan.

´Scientific revolution´, as a concept, is both ´philosophically general´ and ´historically unique´. Both dual-sense of the term alludes to the occurrence of great changes in science. The former defines the changes in science as a continual process while the latter designate them, particularly, as the ´upheaval´ which took place during the early modern period. This research aims to demonstrate how the historicists´ critique of the justification of the traditional claims of science on the basis of the scientific processes and norms of the 16th and 17th centuries, illustrates the historical/local determinacy of the science claims. It argues that their identification of the contextual and historical character of scientific processes warrants a reconsideration of our notion of the universality of science. It affirms that the universality of science has to be sought in the role of such sources like scientific instruments, practical training and the acquisition of methodological routines / "Revolución científica", como concepto, se refiere a la vez a algo «filosóficamente general» e « históricamente único". Ambos sentidos del término aluden a la ocurrencia de grandes cambios en la ciencia. El primero define los cambios en la ciencia como un proceso continuo, mientras que el último los designa, en particular, como la "transformación", que tuvo lugar durante la Edad Moderna. Esta investigación tiene como objetivo demostrar cómo la crítica de los historicistas a la justificación de las características tradicionales de la ciencia sobre la base de los procesos y normas científicos de los siglos XVI y XVII, ilustra la determinación histórica y local de los atributos de la ciencia. Se argumenta que la identificación del carácter contextual e histórico de los procesos científicos justifica una reconsideración de nuestra noción de la universalidad de la ciencia. Se afirma que la universalidad de la ciencia se ha de buscar en el papel de tales fuentes como instrumentos científicos, la formación práctica y la adquisición de rutinas metodológicas