Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento CientÃfico e TecnolÃgico / In this work, letâs apply auction theory to solve a parsimonious procurement model in a situation where there is a contracting firm by the Government. Itâs a natural extension of the bidimensional auction model proposed by Yeon-Koo Che (1993) to model actions of the Department of Defense (DoD) in United States. The extension will be made based in a secret reservation price model proposed by Laffont et at. (1994) to unidimensional case. At end, we will make a short numerical analysis of the model proposed in this work. / Neste trabalho, vamos aplicar a teoria dos leilÃes para resolver um modelo parcimonioso de uma licitaÃÃo pÃblica em uma situaÃÃo em que hà a contrataÃÃo de uma firma pelo Governo. Trata-se de uma extensÃo natural do modelo de leilÃo bidimensional proposto por Yeon-Koo Che (1993) para modelar leilÃes do Departamento de Defesa dos Estados Unidos. A extensÃo serà feita baseada em um modelo de preÃo reserva secreto proposto por Laffont et al. (1994) para o caso unidimensional. Por fim, faremos uma breve anÃlise numÃrica do modelo desenvolvido neste trabalho.

Submitted by Helena Laneuville Teixeira Garcia (laneuvillehelena@gmail.com) on 2017-05-26T19:21:45Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_Final.pdf: 698751 bytes, checksum: a42e995534698e498fe856b2bc63c1d1 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2017-05-30T13:36:26Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_Final.pdf: 698751 bytes, checksum: a42e995534698e498fe856b2bc63c1d1 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-05-30T13:36:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao_Final.pdf: 698751 bytes, checksum: a42e995534698e498fe856b2bc63c1d1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-24 / This thesis develops a simple model to represent a procurement situation with two main features. The first is that the optimal level of production cannot be fully anticipated when suppliers build their plants due to demand shocks. The second is that producers competing for a supply contract typically have different technologies within an efficient frontier, characterized by a trade-off between the marginal cost of production and the fixed cost per unit of capacity. With this framework in mind, we investigate how the shape of the frontier and the distribution of shocks affect efficient technology choices when the planner knows firms' technologies (first-best) and when she doesn't (second-best). In addition, we characterize how and when a well established real-life mechanism such as a quasi-linear score auction may implement second-best social welfare. We find that, if there is a strict preference over technologies in first-best, a quasi-linear score auction may implement second-best allocations. However, there is a non-neglectable case in which countervailing incentives arise, i.e. firms' allocations may be distorted either upwards or downwards with respect to first-best depending on their technologies. In that case, the planner may optimally choose to hire more than one firm, and there is no quasi-linear score auction that provides the social welfare achieved in second-best.