The Indian Ocean has experienced a process of profound change in its political and strategic map since World War II. This began with the British withdrawal from East of Suez, and was followed by the entry of the superpowers into the Indian Ocean, the growth of superpower naval rivalry, and the proliferation of security problems of the states in the region. The essence of these developments is the transformation of the Indian Ocean from the stability of one-power domination to the instability of superpower rivalry. The thesis examines the process of this transformation and the Sri Lankan response from a historical perspective. The transformation of the power structure in the Indian Ocean was essentially an outcome of the changes in power configurations in world politics. The growth of superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean must be understood in relation to the evolution of political, economic, and strategic interests of the superpowers, advances in weapons systems and naval technology, and political developments in the region. The superpower naval rivalry has three interrelated elements, viz, naval deployments, weapons deals, and jockeying for bases/logistic support in the region. It evolves in three phases: from 1968 to the 1973 oil crisis; from the oil crisis to 1978; and since 1978. There are definite linkages between superpower naval rivalry and the conflict patterns in the region. The states in the region count on the superpowers for their security because of the inherent weaknessess of the ruling elites in the region, the limits of their security options, and economic dependence. The invariable outcome is a chain reaction resulting in military pacts, puppet governments, political supression, and proxy war, which forms the texture of the international politics of the Indian Ocean region. Sri Lankan responses to superpower naval rivalry can be explained in relation to the geo-political framework of her strategic thinking, and her internal political and economic processes. In the period 1948-56, Sri Lanka identified herself with the British defence structure in the Indian Ocean. With the changes introduced by the M.E.P. regime, non-alignment became the foreign policy approach of Sri Lanka after 1956. In accordance with the growth of superpower naval presence, Sri Lanka became more sensitive to Indian Ocean strategic issues in the 1960s. After 1970, Sri Lankan policy towards the Indian Ocean took a more coherent form and was designed to balance two considerations - first, at the sub-regional level, how to deal with India; and at the Indian Ocean level, how to check superpower naval rivalry and the increasing militarization of the Indian Ocean. This was reflected in Sri Lanka's proposal for an Indian Ocean Peace Zone (IOPZ). After 1977, under the changed internal and international situation, Sri Lanka soft-pedalled her earlier more articulated position regarding superpower naval riavlry in the Indian Ocean. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. / This thesis examines the role U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) is performing in the maritime domain as the new Unified Command responsible for homeland defense. NORTHCOM does not currently have a permanent maritime component assigned for missions. Instead, it relies on contingency planning for future events and theoretically acts as a coordinating bridge between the Navy and Coast Guard for Maritime Homeland Defense/ Security issues. The primary objective of this research is to answer the question: Can NORTHCOM effectively execute maritime homeland defense and support homeland security without having permanently assigned maritime forces?" Secondly, this thesis seeks to scrutinize the seam in transition from Maritime Homeland Security to Maritime Homeland Defense and explicate potential mission priority, service capability, geographic, and cultural mismatches which could potentially stymie command and control in the transition from a HLS to HLD posture in the event of a seaborne terrorist attack. / Lieutenant, United States Navy

When we open the history book of Human Sea Power, there is always an entangled relationship between the scale of navy force and the state of economy within a country. Since 1978, three decades reforming on its economic policy, China has . Eye-witting the First Gulf War, the Kosovo War, the September 11th terrorist attack on America territory, the Second Gulf War, and, most recently, the piracy in Gulf of Aden, China authority is now reconsidering its role on both international and regional security and then amending its navy strategy based on evaluations. Although the ultimate goal is to protect its own profit, yet aggressively expanding its navy force might generate instability status and will break the Strait balance and its peace progress in Asia Pacific. No doubt, due to the modernized strategic of China Navy which has created tension in its neighborhood area, and, particularly, it is obvious that the force gap between China and Taiwan has yawned by steadily economy boom in China. By the end of Taiwan President Election in 2008, the stalemate prevailed under Chen era is now melting and quickly treading toward peace, yet national security couldn¡¦t merely rely on jubilant atmosphere of diplomacy but on staid force. Facing problems between the Strait, China has adopted both peace and war strategies simultaneously and never give up its intention to invade Taiwan. Frankly, it is undoubtedly best to solve political conundrum under peaceful diplomatic progress, but facing the threat of China¡¦s invasion, we still need to grasp the status of its development of navy, to forecast the pattern of its navy expanding, and to mull best way to defiance, to ensure the national security of Taiwan.

Thesis (M.S. in Information Technology Management)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2004. / Thesis advisor(s): Alex Bordetsky. Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-85). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2004. / Thesis advisor(s): Daniel Moran, James Russell. Includes bibliographical references (p. 41-45). Also available online.

At the conclusion of the First World War, Great Britain ranked highest among the world's great maritime Powers, with a fleet materially enriched by the wartime construction of over fifteen hundred vessels and a naval establishment edified by its 1914-1918 experience in the use of the new Navy. Consequently, it was not apparent to other than the most astute observer that the Royal Navy had, in fact, reached the pinnacle of its ascendancy. [...]

Inaug.-Diss.-Münster. / Lebenslauf. "Quellen und literaturnachweise": p. ii-vii.

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Cover title. "September 2002." AD-A406 973. Includes bibliographical references. Also available via the World Wide Web.

Inaug.-Diss.-Münster. / Lebenslauf. "Quellen und literaturnachweise": p. ii-vii.

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2006. / "14 April 2006." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 71-77).