Since the end of the Korean War tensions have continued on the Korean peninsula. This research focuses on the role of coercive persuasion employed by the United States when North Korea provoked several crises from the late 1960 to the early 1990s.  The case studies include the USS <i>Pueblo</i> incident in 1968, the EC-121 incident in 1969, the axe-murder incident in 1976, and the North Korean nuclear inspection crisis in 1993-94.  In addition to examining crisis negotiations, each case introduces an overview of the changing environment surrounding the Korean peninsula, and analyses North Korea’s motives and intentions in causing crises during that given period. In the theoretical debate on international relations, this study introduces two distinct theories about the explanation of state behaviour.   On the one hand, realists predict that states seek security and survival as the most important objective of their national interests when they are faced with outside threats.  Culturalists meanwhile seek to explain states’ behavioural patterns as distinct and different from state to state due to their unique strategic cultures, which are deeply rooted in historical experience, national self-image, and unique ideology.  Overall, the North Korean responses in the several crises under investigation could be best explained by a combination of these two theories, but this study aims at evaluating the persuasiveness of the two theories in the chosen case histories of US-North Korean relations. To assess the cases more thoroughly with historical evidences, this study draws on primary source materials.  It relies substantially on declassified US government documents, although it also examines South Korean and North Korean materials in order to offer a balanced and objective account of the crises.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Indiana University, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 237-265).

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