Numerous examinations of the weaknesses with Authentication of Key Agreement protocol (AKA) of Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) have been presented by various researchers. It is plausible to suggest that the majority of the proposed solutions of authentication protocols in the reported investigative works are formulated based on asymmetric algorithms which consume more computational overhead than symmetric algorithms. There is no evidence that the symmetric algorithms could lead to the existing weaknesses.

The security of digital Integrated Circuits (ICs) is essential to the security of a computer system that comprises them. We present an improved attack on computer hardware that avoids known defence mechanisms and as such raises awareness for the need of new and improved defence mechanisms. We also present a new defence method for securing computer hardware against modifications from untrusted manufacturing facilities, which is of concern since manufacturing is increasingly outsourced. We improve upon time triggered based backdoors, inserted maliciously in hardware. Prior work has addressed deterministic timer-based triggers — those that are designed to trigger at a specific time with probability 1. We address open questions related to the feasibility of realizing non-deterministic timer-based triggers in hardware — those that are designed with a random component. We show that such timers can be realized in hardware in a manner that is impractical to detect or disable using existing countermeasures of which we are aware. We discuss our design, implementation and analysis of such a timer. We show that the attacker can have surprisingly fine-grained control over the time-window within which the timer triggers. From the attacker’s standpoint our non-deterministic timer has key advantages over traditional timer designs. For example the hardware footprint is smaller which increases the chances of avoiding detection. Also our timer has a much smaller time-window for which a volatile state needs to be maintained which in turn makes the power reset defence mechanisms less effective. Our proposed defence mechanism addresses the threat of a malicious agent at the IC foundry who has information of the circuit and inserts covert, malicious circuitry. The use of 3D IC technology has been suggested as a possible technique to counter this threat. However, to our knowledge, there is no prior work on how such technology can be used effectively. We propose a way to use 3D IC technology for security in this context. Specifically, we obfuscate the circuit by lifting wires to a trusted tier, which is fabricated separately. We provide a precise notion of security that we call k-security and point out that it has interesting similarities and important differences from k-anonymity. We also give a precise specification of the underlying computational problems and their complexity and discuss a comprehensive empirical assessment with benchmark circuits that highlight the security versus cost trade-offs introduced by 3D IC based circuit obfuscation.

Security has consistently been identified as a State prerogative whereby the State holds a monopoly on the governance of all such activities within itself. This understanding has been challenged over the past two decades by the proliferation of security providers in both state and non-state forms. The frameworks of anchored pluralism and private governance have expanded criminologists’ understanding of security governance, moving it beyond a state-centric model. The nodal governance paradigm encompasses these concepts and develops them by emphasizing an increasing ‘pluralisation’ of security governance. This study focuses on the University of Manitoba Security Service as an institution, mapping the ways in which it forms relationships with other security nodes to form a complex system of governance. This thesis illuminates that the University of Manitoba Security Service is a node of security governance, and thus it uses both formal and informal mechanisms to network with other security bodies.

Thesis (M.S.S. (Security Studies) -- University of Pretoria, 2007.

Univ., Habil.-Schr./91--Bonn, 1990.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Sydney, 2002. / Title from title screen (viewed Apr. 24, 2008). Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Dept. of Social Work, Social Policy & Sociology, Faculty of Arts. Includes bibliography. Also available in print form.

Thesis (M.A.)--Si li Zhongguo wen hua xue yuan. / Also issued in print.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northeastern University, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Open University. BLDSC no. DXN107767.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Bern, 1960. / Includes bibliographical references.