In modern history governments have had an active role in responding and influencing the economic circumstances of the state. Whether by allocating resources or administering reforms, peacetime economic policies have traditionally impacted actor's public support as the choice of policy can impact the perception of actor's legitimacy. Despite the plethora of competing definitions, political scientists agree on considering legitimacy as a basic condition of governance -as it entails the acceptance and commitment of a people to a political authority. Rather than a unique characteristic of the state, governance becomes an attribute belonging to any social arrangement that exercises "function of statehood". By focusing on the comparison between the Syrian, the Libyan, and the Yemeni civil war this thesis aim is to enquire whether a positive relationship can be assessed between government economic choices and rebel's legitimacy. Given the neopatrimonial character of the three states this dissertation will focus on the actor's economic behavior to assess legitimacy. For the purpose of this analysis, I have chosen to adopt an Elitist framework as it focuses on bargain dynamics between political actors and elites (or constituencies). The methodological approach utilized is that of a comparative case study.

This thesis attempts to explain the reasons states choose to prey on other states or territories. A way of testing significance was devised and three variables were produced: Proclivity to violence, winning coalition size, and whether or not a war of conquest took place. The scope for this project was the time period of 1900-1950 and the location was Europe. The European countries were then refined down to a list of 10 states based on power ratings used in the Correlates of War. Then the leaders of each of these states were rated on a scale of 1 – 5 on personal violence, or how inclined they were to act violently. In order to determine this number their biographies were researched and specific traits were used to determine if they were violent individuals. These include military service, criminal history, participation in violent sports, support of military action, participation in a war effort, and any other examples of violent behavior. Second, the winning coalition size of each of these leader’s states was determined as an indicator of the amount of domestic support a leader had. This was ascertained by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s rating system. The third variable, the occurrence of a war of conquest, was determined by finding if there was a war of conquest that took place during the tenure of the individual leaders. The hypothesis is that a leader with a high proclivity to violence and a small winning coalition size will have presided over more wars of conquest than leaders with a low proclivity to violence and a large winning coalition. The three variables were compiled at the individual leader level totaling 151 cases and 10 countries. Then they were tested using the SPSS statistical program using a binary logistic regression. The results showed no significance between the variables. When tested individually however the independent variable of proclivity towards violence showed a p-value of .054, making it nearly significant at the .05 level. This finding illustrates a potentially significant correlation between the individual violence level of a leader and whether or not they initiate or continue a war of conquest.

The issue of regime change is extremely important in today's politics, as illustrated by recent events in the world. One of the most promising fields in regime studies is the interaction between economic growth and democratization, which is the object of the thesis. Its goal is to propose and test a model that could explain the precise causal mechanism that operates when economic development leads to democratization. The following tasks were set: to analyse the scientific literature debating this issue and see what approaches are best supported theoretically and empirically; to create a model that connects economic and political variables which lead to democratization; to propose a testable hypothesis based on the model; to test the hypothesis by adopting the qualitative process-tracing method and the quantitative survival analysis. The Selectorate theory was used to construct a model, due to the fact that it may embrace the behaviour of both the economic and political actors. On the basis of this theory a game-theoretic model was constructed and a hypothesis proposed, which states that economic growth leads to restructuring of the selectorate and the winning coalition that creates uncertainty and motivates political leaders and their challengers to favour democratic institutions. The hypothesis was tested by applying process-tracing and survival analysis methods. In the former case, three cases (Spanish, Serbian and Belarusian) were analysed, as they were found to be least... [to full text] / Režimų dinamikos klausimas yra tyrinėtas gana plačiai, tačiau institucijų tipo pasikeitimo priežastys vis dar nėra iki galo apibrėžtos. Režimų kaitos problemos aktualumą puikiai iliustruoja ir šiuo metu pasaulyje vykstantys procesai. Viena iš sričių, galinčių suteikti naujų įžvalgų yra ekonominio augimo ir demokratizacijos sąveika. Šis ryšys ir yra tyrimo objektas. Nors yra bandyta paaiškinti, kokiu būdu ekonominiai faktoriai gali skatinti demokratinių institucijų sukūrimą, pateiktos teorijos nėra pakankamai gerai išvystytos. Šio darbo tikslas yra pasiūlyti ir empiriškai patikrinti priežastinio mechanizmo, jungiančio ekonominį augimą ir demokratizaciją, modelį. Siekiant įgyvendinti tikslą iškelti tokie uždaviniai: išanalizuoti mokslinę literatūrą, nagrinėjančią ekonominės raidos ir režimų kaitos santykį bei apsibrėžti geriausiai teoriškai ir empiriškai pagrįstą prieigą; sukurti ekonominius ir politinius kintamuosius jungiantį teorinį modelį; remiantis pateiktu modeliu, iškelti empiriškai patikrinamą hipotezę; patikrinti iškeltą hipotezę, taikant kiekybinį procesų sekimo metodą; patikrinti iškeltą hipotezę, taikant kiekybinę statistinę išlikimo analizę. Siekiant sukonstruoti modelį, galintį paaiškinti kaip ekonominis augimas gali lemti demokratizaciją, pasiremta Selektorato teorija, dėl jos tinkamumo nagrinėjant tiek ekonomių, tiek politinių aktorių veiksmus. Remiantis ja, sukonstruotas žaidimų teorijos modelis ir iškelta hipotezė, teigianti, kad ekonominis augimas nulemia... [toliau žr. visą tekstą]

2011 was a seminal year in the history of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Popularly referred to as the Arab Spring, the region has experienced a wave of revolutions and instability. It can be classified in three broad categories within 2011: Uprisings that have resulted in the overthrow of standing regimes, uprisings that have failed to overthrow standing regimes, and states that have not experienced popular revolts. In the first category Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Tunisia have all experienced uprisings resulting in the respective departure of Muamar Gaddafi, Hosni Mubarak, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali. In contrast Syria and Bahrain have experienced uprisings that have not resulted into the toppling of their regimes thus far. Finally, countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran have experienced none of the instability observed in 2011 within the same time period. In tracking the evolution of selectorates, I identified the rise of actors within the newly developing coalitions whose Islamist preferences are unaccounted for in the standard Selectorate Model. As later explained in detail, Selectorate Theory is driven by the public-private goods argument. The theory states that a leader’s political survival is based on the mix of private payoffs he can provide to his selectorate and public goods provided to the general population. The once secular despots are either gone or are on the way out as evident by the removal of Hosni Mubarak, Zine Abidine Ben-Ali, Saddam Hussein, Muamar Gaddafi, Ali Abdullah Saleh, and the currently embattled Bashar Al- Assad. They are being replaced or have already been removed by governments that are led by Islamic Parties. Therefore, newly elected or appointed leaders must take into account the role of religion in their calculus for political survival in a way that they did not before. This begs the question: what about the regimes in my case studies that have not been toppled such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Bahrain? Although these are highly autocratic governments, the leaders of such governments have a legitimacy that is derived from implicit approval of their Islamist allies. This strengthens the argument that religion must be accounted for beyond the standard Selectorate Model rationale for political survival in MENA. In such context I provide a revised Selectorate Model explanation that accounts for the role of religion. I conclude that the standard Selectorate Theory is insufficient for MENA because it is does not account for the role of religion. By testing the coalitional distribution and evolution of selectorates, I developed a revised Selectorate Model that includes the role of religion along with the standard private payoffs – public goods argument. The role of religion is expressed by the presence of religious stakeholders in the agent based model such as clerics, shura councils or Islamic parties present in all selectorates in MENA. I tracked the selectorates through a series of predictions made throughout the course of 2011 using the Senturion agent based model. It serves as a powerful alternative to standard historical analysis and wisdom. I provide an explanation of why certain regimes fell while others remained relatively stable and why some governments experiencing similar instability remain using agent based modeling (ABM) in application to Selectorate Theory.

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