This thesis deals with the topic of privilege against self-incrimination of legal entity in administrative proceedings and in offence proceedings. The following reasons led me to the choice of this topic. First of all, it is a multidisciplinary topic involving criminal law, criminal administrative law, constitutional law, and private law, especially the regulation of legal entities. Furthermore, with the exemption of decision-making praxis of courts, and a few academic essays, attention hasn't been paid to this topic in its complexity. For this reason, this topic has offered novelty and the possibility of observing the progressive development of judicature, especially the decision-making praxis of the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic, the Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic as well as the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic and the European Court of Human Rights. The first part deals with the historical origins of privilege against self-incrimination and development of the criminal proceedings over the centuries. Special attention is paid to the fact, that privilege against self-incrimination was originally part of criminal proceedings until the 12th century, when this privilege was removed from the canon law and replaced with the inquisitional process which was linked with the...

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the silence principle (i.e. the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination) and to determine its place within procedural and constitutional law. Should the silence principle be entirely abolished, sustained as a limited evidentiary rule or elevated to the status of a constitutional right? The central question to be argued is whether the silence principle has a rationally justifiable and valid procedural place within the accusatorial-adversarial Anglo-American system of criminal justice. The methodology employed in the main body of this thesis involves a critical and comparative examination of the silence principle and is founded on the following four legs : a) A historical analysis of the silence principle and its antecedents. Does the historical silence principle support the modern silence principle in description and scope? b) An analysis of the distinction between a "right" and a "privilege". Why is the accused's right to silence distinguished from the witness privilege? Is there a philosophical justification for the silence principle? c) A comparative study of the two major jurisdictions of the Anglo-American system of justice, namely : i) The American silence principle constituted as the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and entrenched within the U.S. Constitution; ii) The English silence principle constituted until recently as a common law evidentiary rule contained within a body of ill-defined principles loosely referred to as the unwritten English Constitution. The common law rule has been statutorily formalized in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and will be greatly influenced by the new Human Rights Act 1998. iii) The South African interpretation of a silence principle is caught between the two extremes of an American absolute right and an English evidentiary rule. Silence in South Africa is a relative right subject to a balance of interest and reasonable limitation. Which of these definitions is better suited as a template for an ideal silence principle? vi d) A comparative international study of the procedural differences between an inquisitorial and an accusatorial system. How does a principle of silence function outside the accusatorial system? The conclusion of the thesis is that the most suitable role of a silence principle within the accusatorial system is one of a flexible compromise. While it does not deserve abolition neither does it deserve elevation into a constitutional right. Silence is best suited to the role of a procedural evidentiary rule. A circumstantial item of evidence with its trial admissibility determined by the criteria of relevancy and prejudice. If the legal, political and cultural pressures upon a particular jurisdiction are such as to demand constitutional entrenchment then the second best alternative is to define the silence principle as a relative right susceptible to a properly applied balance of interest test. The worst alternative is to define the silence principle in absolute terms. Silence as an evidentiary rule or a relative right means that it will sometimes be necessary to emphasise the autonomous interests of the individual in remaining silent and at other times the societal interest in crime prevention. Which interest is to be preferred and to what extent will depend on the prevailing social pressures of the day. It shall be argued that the elevation of a silence principle into a constitutional right stifles a critical examination of the essentiale of silence by disguising its inherent irrationality and lack of a philosophical raison de etre. The interpretation of a silence principle as an absolute constitutional right by the Supreme Court of the United States is confusing, contradictory and riddled with innumerable exceptions. By contrast the English approach to silence is pragmatic and highly successful. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 gives a meaningful interpretation of silence which takes into account its logical flaws. The English statute is a successful compromise between the need to protect the individual during the criminal process and the need to combating crime in the most efficient manner possible. While the South African interpretation of silence is a workable compromise, South Africa may have been better served by defining its silence principle in terms of the pragmatic English statutory model which allows for the efficient but carefully controlled use of silence in the combating of crime. / Jurisprudence / LL.D. (Jurisprudence)

Thesis (LL.D.)--University of South Africa, 2001.

Nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare principle Abstract The thesis deals with the nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare principle, which represents one of the fundamental procedural rights in criminal proceedings. The European Court of Human Rights considers it an inseparable part of the right to a just trial. Especially considering the problems arising in connection to interpretation and application of he said principle, the thesis tries to _ the most problematic areas of the principle's application and the different opinions as to what it entails. The first chapter contains the history of the principle's application, both on the European continent in civil law and in common law in both the United Kingdom and the United States. The second chapter summarizes the evolution of rulings of the European Court for Human Rights. Attention is paid to the relation between the nemo tenetur principle and the right to a fair trial contained in the Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and also to the relation o other right contained in the same treaty, especially focusing on freedom from torture in order to obtain an evidence of a criminal act. The third chapter summarizes the Czech legislation on the topic, both on Constitutional level - especially focusing on those articles of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and...

Thesis (M.S.)--University of North Texas, Aug., 2009. / Title from title page display. Includes bibliographical references.

This study examined the effects that a defendant's pleading of the fifth amendment during a criminal trial had on simulated juror's decisions regarding verdict, likelihood of guilt, certainty of guilt, sentence severity, and perceptions of the defendant's character. One hundred fifty-five undergraduate psychology students read one of three versions of a transcript, based on a trial of a man charged with theft, in which the defendant did not plead the fifth (control), plead the fifth, or plead the fifth possibly for reasons other than hiding involvement in the crime (i.e. having an affair). Results showed that the two fifth amendment conditions found the defendant to be more likely guilty than the control condition. Also, a factor analysis suggested that an honest and a relaxed dimension best described the defendant's character. In addition, it was discovered that perceptions of the defendant's honesty mediated the effects of perceived likelihood of guilt. / Department of Psychological Science

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Texas at El Paso, 2008. / Title from title screen. Vita. CD-ROM. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universiẗat, Göttingen, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 291-317).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of North Texas, Aug., 2009. / Title from title page display. Includes bibliographical references.

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the silence principle (i.e. the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination) and to determine its place within procedural and constitutional law. Should the silence principle be entirely abolished, sustained as a limited evidentiary rule or elevated to the status of a constitutional right? The central question to be argued is whether the silence principle has a rationally justifiable and valid procedural place within the accusatorial-adversarial Anglo-American system of criminal justice. The methodology employed in the main body of this thesis involves a critical and comparative examination of the silence principle and is founded on the following four legs : a) A historical analysis of the silence principle and its antecedents. Does the historical silence principle support the modern silence principle in description and scope? b) An analysis of the distinction between a "right" and a "privilege". Why is the accused's right to silence distinguished from the witness privilege? Is there a philosophical justification for the silence principle? c) A comparative study of the two major jurisdictions of the Anglo-American system of justice, namely : i) The American silence principle constituted as the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and entrenched within the U.S. Constitution; ii) The English silence principle constituted until recently as a common law evidentiary rule contained within a body of ill-defined principles loosely referred to as the unwritten English Constitution. The common law rule has been statutorily formalized in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and will be greatly influenced by the new Human Rights Act 1998. iii) The South African interpretation of a silence principle is caught between the two extremes of an American absolute right and an English evidentiary rule. Silence in South Africa is a relative right subject to a balance of interest and reasonable limitation. Which of these definitions is better suited as a template for an ideal silence principle? vi d) A comparative international study of the procedural differences between an inquisitorial and an accusatorial system. How does a principle of silence function outside the accusatorial system? The conclusion of the thesis is that the most suitable role of a silence principle within the accusatorial system is one of a flexible compromise. While it does not deserve abolition neither does it deserve elevation into a constitutional right. Silence is best suited to the role of a procedural evidentiary rule. A circumstantial item of evidence with its trial admissibility determined by the criteria of relevancy and prejudice. If the legal, political and cultural pressures upon a particular jurisdiction are such as to demand constitutional entrenchment then the second best alternative is to define the silence principle as a relative right susceptible to a properly applied balance of interest test. The worst alternative is to define the silence principle in absolute terms. Silence as an evidentiary rule or a relative right means that it will sometimes be necessary to emphasise the autonomous interests of the individual in remaining silent and at other times the societal interest in crime prevention. Which interest is to be preferred and to what extent will depend on the prevailing social pressures of the day. It shall be argued that the elevation of a silence principle into a constitutional right stifles a critical examination of the essentiale of silence by disguising its inherent irrationality and lack of a philosophical raison de etre. The interpretation of a silence principle as an absolute constitutional right by the Supreme Court of the United States is confusing, contradictory and riddled with innumerable exceptions. By contrast the English approach to silence is pragmatic and highly successful. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 gives a meaningful interpretation of silence which takes into account its logical flaws. The English statute is a successful compromise between the need to protect the individual during the criminal process and the need to combating crime in the most efficient manner possible. While the South African interpretation of silence is a workable compromise, South Africa may have been better served by defining its silence principle in terms of the pragmatic English statutory model which allows for the efficient but carefully controlled use of silence in the combating of crime. / Jurisprudence / LL.D. (Jurisprudence)