The aim of this thesis is to analyse the silence principle (i.e. the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination) and to determine its place within procedural and constitutional law. Should the silence principle be entirely abolished, sustained as a limited evidentiary rule or elevated to the status of a constitutional right? The central question to be argued is whether the silence principle has a rationally justifiable and valid procedural place within the accusatorial-adversarial Anglo-American system of criminal justice. The methodology employed in the main body of this thesis involves a critical and comparative examination of the silence principle and is founded on the following four legs : a) A historical analysis of the silence principle and its antecedents. Does the historical silence principle support the modern silence principle in description and scope? b) An analysis of the distinction between a "right" and a "privilege". Why is the accused's right to silence distinguished from the witness privilege? Is there a philosophical justification for the silence principle? c) A comparative study of the two major jurisdictions of the Anglo-American system of justice, namely : i) The American silence principle constituted as the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and entrenched within the U.S. Constitution; ii) The English silence principle constituted until recently as a common law evidentiary rule contained within a body of ill-defined principles loosely referred to as the unwritten English Constitution. The common law rule has been statutorily formalized in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and will be greatly influenced by the new Human Rights Act 1998. iii) The South African interpretation of a silence principle is caught between the two extremes of an American absolute right and an English evidentiary rule. Silence in South Africa is a relative right subject to a balance of interest and reasonable limitation. Which of these definitions is better suited as a template for an ideal silence principle? vi d) A comparative international study of the procedural differences between an inquisitorial and an accusatorial system. How does a principle of silence function outside the accusatorial system? The conclusion of the thesis is that the most suitable role of a silence principle within the accusatorial system is one of a flexible compromise. While it does not deserve abolition neither does it deserve elevation into a constitutional right. Silence is best suited to the role of a procedural evidentiary rule. A circumstantial item of evidence with its trial admissibility determined by the criteria of relevancy and prejudice. If the legal, political and cultural pressures upon a particular jurisdiction are such as to demand constitutional entrenchment then the second best alternative is to define the silence principle as a relative right susceptible to a properly applied balance of interest test. The worst alternative is to define the silence principle in absolute terms. Silence as an evidentiary rule or a relative right means that it will sometimes be necessary to emphasise the autonomous interests of the individual in remaining silent and at other times the societal interest in crime prevention. Which interest is to be preferred and to what extent will depend on the prevailing social pressures of the day. It shall be argued that the elevation of a silence principle into a constitutional right stifles a critical examination of the essentiale of silence by disguising its inherent irrationality and lack of a philosophical raison de etre. The interpretation of a silence principle as an absolute constitutional right by the Supreme Court of the United States is confusing, contradictory and riddled with innumerable exceptions. By contrast the English approach to silence is pragmatic and highly successful. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 gives a meaningful interpretation of silence which takes into account its logical flaws. The English statute is a successful compromise between the need to protect the individual during the criminal process and the need to combating crime in the most efficient manner possible. While the South African interpretation of silence is a workable compromise, South Africa may have been better served by defining its silence principle in terms of the pragmatic English statutory model which allows for the efficient but carefully controlled use of silence in the combating of crime. / Jurisprudence / LL.D. (Jurisprudence)

Thesis (LL.D.)--University of South Africa, 2001.

The aim of this thesis is to analyse the silence principle (i.e. the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination) and to determine its place within procedural and constitutional law. Should the silence principle be entirely abolished, sustained as a limited evidentiary rule or elevated to the status of a constitutional right? The central question to be argued is whether the silence principle has a rationally justifiable and valid procedural place within the accusatorial-adversarial Anglo-American system of criminal justice. The methodology employed in the main body of this thesis involves a critical and comparative examination of the silence principle and is founded on the following four legs : a) A historical analysis of the silence principle and its antecedents. Does the historical silence principle support the modern silence principle in description and scope? b) An analysis of the distinction between a "right" and a "privilege". Why is the accused's right to silence distinguished from the witness privilege? Is there a philosophical justification for the silence principle? c) A comparative study of the two major jurisdictions of the Anglo-American system of justice, namely : i) The American silence principle constituted as the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and entrenched within the U.S. Constitution; ii) The English silence principle constituted until recently as a common law evidentiary rule contained within a body of ill-defined principles loosely referred to as the unwritten English Constitution. The common law rule has been statutorily formalized in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 and will be greatly influenced by the new Human Rights Act 1998. iii) The South African interpretation of a silence principle is caught between the two extremes of an American absolute right and an English evidentiary rule. Silence in South Africa is a relative right subject to a balance of interest and reasonable limitation. Which of these definitions is better suited as a template for an ideal silence principle? vi d) A comparative international study of the procedural differences between an inquisitorial and an accusatorial system. How does a principle of silence function outside the accusatorial system? The conclusion of the thesis is that the most suitable role of a silence principle within the accusatorial system is one of a flexible compromise. While it does not deserve abolition neither does it deserve elevation into a constitutional right. Silence is best suited to the role of a procedural evidentiary rule. A circumstantial item of evidence with its trial admissibility determined by the criteria of relevancy and prejudice. If the legal, political and cultural pressures upon a particular jurisdiction are such as to demand constitutional entrenchment then the second best alternative is to define the silence principle as a relative right susceptible to a properly applied balance of interest test. The worst alternative is to define the silence principle in absolute terms. Silence as an evidentiary rule or a relative right means that it will sometimes be necessary to emphasise the autonomous interests of the individual in remaining silent and at other times the societal interest in crime prevention. Which interest is to be preferred and to what extent will depend on the prevailing social pressures of the day. It shall be argued that the elevation of a silence principle into a constitutional right stifles a critical examination of the essentiale of silence by disguising its inherent irrationality and lack of a philosophical raison de etre. The interpretation of a silence principle as an absolute constitutional right by the Supreme Court of the United States is confusing, contradictory and riddled with innumerable exceptions. By contrast the English approach to silence is pragmatic and highly successful. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 gives a meaningful interpretation of silence which takes into account its logical flaws. The English statute is a successful compromise between the need to protect the individual during the criminal process and the need to combating crime in the most efficient manner possible. While the South African interpretation of silence is a workable compromise, South Africa may have been better served by defining its silence principle in terms of the pragmatic English statutory model which allows for the efficient but carefully controlled use of silence in the combating of crime. / Jurisprudence / LL.D. (Jurisprudence)

The composite right to meaningful and informed participation in the criminal process comprises the right to information, the right to understand, the right to be prepared, the right to be present, the right to confrontation and the right to present one’s case. The sub-rights are not of an overarching nature such as the right to legal representation and the right of access to the law. The various rights are grouped together because they show some connection with the ability of the suspect or the accused to participate in the criminal proceedings as a legal subject, and not as an object of the proceedings as in primitive times. These rights ensure that the accused will not participate in the criminal process from an unfavourable position. The heading ‟meaningful and informed participation” is therefore a collective term for these rights. These sub-rights form part of the comprehensive right to a fair trial. The thesis examines aspects of the position of the accused in South Africa and in foreign jurisdictions such as the United States of America, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom and Islamic systems. International instruments such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee are also considered. The thesis first considers the historical perspective of the accused in primitive times when he was regarded as an object of the criminal proceedings, to the present time when he is regarded as a subject of the proceedings. The study on foreign jurisdictions reveals that for the most part, our law is in line with the law of other countries. The study also demonstrates that the various rights are not absolute. In exceptional circumstances, some diminution of the accused’s rights is necessary to protect the interests of society. Nevertheless, the courts should act cautiously and not allow the exceptions to overtake the rule. The judiciary should strive to find a better balance between the constitutional rights of the accused and the interests of society. To this end, the judicial system must be objective yet vigilant. / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL.D.

Text in Afrikaans / Die sogenaamde vermoede van onskuld is via die Engelse Reg in ons reg oorgeneem en tot konstitusionele status verhoog met die daarstelling van artikel 25(3)(c) van die Grondwet, No. 200 van 1993. Hierdie reg om onskuldig geag te word en die gepaardgaande swygreg, wat hier kortliks aangeraak word, kan egter aan beperking onderhewig wees soos bepaal deur artikel 33 van die Grondwet. Die beginsels soos ontwikkel in Kanada en Amerika word ondersoek. Die slotsom waartoe geraak word is dat, alhoewel historiese en ander verskille deurgaans voor oe gehou sal moet word, die regspraak in genoemde jurisdiksies, en meer spesifiek Kanada, 'n groat rol sal speel by die inhoud wat die SuidA: frik:aanse howe, in die konteks van statutere vermoedens, aan die konstitusionele reg om onskuldig geag te word, sal gee. / The so-called presumption of innocence has been inherited from the English common law and awarded constitutional status by the introduction of section 25(3)(c) ofthe Constitution, Act 200 ofl993. This right to be presumed innocent and the accompanying right to remain silent, which is briefly touched upon, are however not absolute and can be subject to limitation as provided for by section 33 ofthe Constitution. The principles, as they have been developed in Canada and America, are investigated. The conclusion which is drawn is that, despite historical and other differences, it can be expected that foreign jurisprudence, particularly that of Canada, will play a major role in the content that will be given by the South African courts to the right to be presumed innocent in the context of statutory presumptions. / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL. M.

Text in Afrikaans / The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 that took effect from 27 April 1994, gave an accused a constitutional right to legal representation. Although the right of an accused to be legally represented formed an integral part of the South African Law, the Constitution gave him the further right ofbeing provided with legal representation at the cost of the State . For the practical implementation ofthe Constitution extensive changes to the current Legal Aid Scheme are essential . This work is an investigation of the justification of an accused's right to legal representation and the right to be provided with legal representation at the expense of the State . The practical implementation of the Constitution is discussed and suggestions are made that might be a solution to the current problem of the provision of legal aid at the State's expense. / Die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 200 van 1993 wat op 27 April 1994 in werking getree het, het konstitusionele erkenning verleen aan 'n beskuldigde se reg op regsverteenwoordiging . Alhoewel die reg van 'n beskuldigde tot regsverteenwoordiging inherent deel van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg was het die Grondwet verder gegaan en 'n beskuldigde die reg gegee om op staatskoste van regsverteenwoordiging voorsien te word . Om die Grondwet prakties uitvoerbaar te maak sal ingrypende veranderings aan die huidige Regshulpskema noodsaaklik wees . Hierdie werk behels 'n regshistoriese - en regsvergelykende studie van die reg van 'n beskuldigde tot regsverteenwoordiging en die reg om op staatskoste van regshulp voorsien te word . Die praktiese uitvoerbaarheid van die Grondwet word bespreek en voorstelle word aan die hand gedoen om die huidige situasie, wat betref die verskaffing van regshulp op staatskoste, te verbeter . / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL. M.

Text in Afrikaans / Wanneer die konstitusionele invloed op borgstelling in die bree bespreek word, moet die bepalings van die Grondwet 200 van 1993 met inbegrip van die Handves van Menseregte en die onderliggende waardes, beginsels en doelstellings daartoe binne die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks inaggeneem word. Die algemene transformasie van die Suid-Afrikaanse gemeenskap in 'n verteenwoordigende demokrasie, veelvolkigheid van die Suid-Afrikaanse gemeenskap, eskalerende misdaadsyfer, wantroue van die gemeenskap in die regstelsel en die beklemtoning van fundamentele regte is aspekte wat figureer binne die Suid-Afrikaanse borgtogreg. Die tradisionele benadering dat die bewyslas op die beskuldigde rus tydens borgtogverrigtinge is binne die moderne borgtogreg en in die lig van die Grondwet 200 van 1993 asook die Tweede Strafproseswysigingswet 75 van 1995 onvanpas. As algemene reel behoort die bewyslas by 'n borgaansoek op die staat te rus op oorwig van waarskynlikhede. In sekere spesifiek omskrewe gevalle soos vervat inartikel60(11) van die Tweede Strafproseswysigingswet rus die bewyslas op die beskuldigde. Hierdie beperking is regverdigbaar in tenne van artike133 van die Grondwet 200 van 1993. Daar bestaan verder nie voldoende rede om nie gebruik te maak van die bewyslasbegrip as gevestigde prosessuele maatreel tydens borgverrigtinge nie. In die moderne Suid-Afrikaanse borgtogreg moet 'n balans gehandhaaf word tussen die belange van die gemeenskap en die fundamentele regte van die individu. Die howe moet in elke spesifieke geval· inhoud aan hierdie beginsel verleen. / When the effect of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 on bail is considered, the transformation of the South African community, multi-racial society, high crimerate, disillusionment of the community with regard to the courtsystem and importance of fundamental rights must be regarded. The traditional approach that the onus is upon the accused (in his capacity as applicant) to prove on a balance of probability that the court should exercise its discretion in favour of granting bail and, in discharging this burden, he must show that the interests of justice will not be prejudiced, is in terms ofthe Constitution 200 of 1993 and the Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act 75 of 1995 unacceptable. It is submitted that the onus should be on the State to place grounds before the Court why there should be an exercise of discretion in favour of the State for further detention of the individual. In terms of certain spesific crimes as described in article 60(11) of the Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act theis placed on the accused. This exception is acceptable as it prescribes to the requirements in article 33 of the Constitution 200 of 1993. It is submitted that there is no reason why onus as excepted evidentiary rule should not be used in bail applications. A balance between the interest of the community and fundamental rights of the individual must be kept in modern law regarding bail. It is in the hands of the courts to substantiate this balance. / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL.M. (Criminal & Procedural Law)

The composite right to meaningful and informed participation in the criminal process comprises the right to information, the right to understand, the right to be prepared, the right to be present, the right to confrontation and the right to present one’s case. The sub-rights are not of an overarching nature such as the right to legal representation and the right of access to the law. The various rights are grouped together because they show some connection with the ability of the suspect or the accused to participate in the criminal proceedings as a legal subject, and not as an object of the proceedings as in primitive times. These rights ensure that the accused will not participate in the criminal process from an unfavourable position. The heading ‟meaningful and informed participation” is therefore a collective term for these rights. These sub-rights form part of the comprehensive right to a fair trial. The thesis examines aspects of the position of the accused in South Africa and in foreign jurisdictions such as the United States of America, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Germany, the United Kingdom and Islamic systems. International instruments such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee are also considered. The thesis first considers the historical perspective of the accused in primitive times when he was regarded as an object of the criminal proceedings, to the present time when he is regarded as a subject of the proceedings. The study on foreign jurisdictions reveals that for the most part, our law is in line with the law of other countries. The study also demonstrates that the various rights are not absolute. In exceptional circumstances, some diminution of the accused’s rights is necessary to protect the interests of society. Nevertheless, the courts should act cautiously and not allow the exceptions to overtake the rule. The judiciary should strive to find a better balance between the constitutional rights of the accused and the interests of society. To this end, the judicial system must be objective yet vigilant. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL.D.

Text in Afrikaans / Die sogenaamde vermoede van onskuld is via die Engelse Reg in ons reg oorgeneem en tot konstitusionele status verhoog met die daarstelling van artikel 25(3)(c) van die Grondwet, No. 200 van 1993. Hierdie reg om onskuldig geag te word en die gepaardgaande swygreg, wat hier kortliks aangeraak word, kan egter aan beperking onderhewig wees soos bepaal deur artikel 33 van die Grondwet. Die beginsels soos ontwikkel in Kanada en Amerika word ondersoek. Die slotsom waartoe geraak word is dat, alhoewel historiese en ander verskille deurgaans voor oe gehou sal moet word, die regspraak in genoemde jurisdiksies, en meer spesifiek Kanada, 'n groat rol sal speel by die inhoud wat die SuidA: frik:aanse howe, in die konteks van statutere vermoedens, aan die konstitusionele reg om onskuldig geag te word, sal gee. / The so-called presumption of innocence has been inherited from the English common law and awarded constitutional status by the introduction of section 25(3)(c) ofthe Constitution, Act 200 ofl993. This right to be presumed innocent and the accompanying right to remain silent, which is briefly touched upon, are however not absolute and can be subject to limitation as provided for by section 33 ofthe Constitution. The principles, as they have been developed in Canada and America, are investigated. The conclusion which is drawn is that, despite historical and other differences, it can be expected that foreign jurisprudence, particularly that of Canada, will play a major role in the content that will be given by the South African courts to the right to be presumed innocent in the context of statutory presumptions. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL. M.

Text in Afrikaans / The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 that took effect from 27 April 1994, gave an accused a constitutional right to legal representation. Although the right of an accused to be legally represented formed an integral part of the South African Law, the Constitution gave him the further right ofbeing provided with legal representation at the cost of the State . For the practical implementation ofthe Constitution extensive changes to the current Legal Aid Scheme are essential . This work is an investigation of the justification of an accused's right to legal representation and the right to be provided with legal representation at the expense of the State . The practical implementation of the Constitution is discussed and suggestions are made that might be a solution to the current problem of the provision of legal aid at the State's expense. / Die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid-Afrika 200 van 1993 wat op 27 April 1994 in werking getree het, het konstitusionele erkenning verleen aan 'n beskuldigde se reg op regsverteenwoordiging . Alhoewel die reg van 'n beskuldigde tot regsverteenwoordiging inherent deel van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg was het die Grondwet verder gegaan en 'n beskuldigde die reg gegee om op staatskoste van regsverteenwoordiging voorsien te word . Om die Grondwet prakties uitvoerbaar te maak sal ingrypende veranderings aan die huidige Regshulpskema noodsaaklik wees . Hierdie werk behels 'n regshistoriese - en regsvergelykende studie van die reg van 'n beskuldigde tot regsverteenwoordiging en die reg om op staatskoste van regshulp voorsien te word . Die praktiese uitvoerbaarheid van die Grondwet word bespreek en voorstelle word aan die hand gedoen om die huidige situasie, wat betref die verskaffing van regshulp op staatskoste, te verbeter . / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL. M.