A dissertação procura estabelecer os fundamentos constitucionais e legais do princípio da cooperação no processo civil, descrevendo-o como um princípio constitucional implícito, decorrente do princípio da solidariedade (art. 3, I, CF/1988), da isonomia (art. 5., caput, CF/1988), do acesso à ordem jurídica justa (art. 5., XXXV, CF/1988), do devido processo legal (art. 5., LIV, CF/1988), do contraditório, da ampla defesa (art. 5., LV, CF/1988) e da duração razoável do processo (art. 5., LXXVIII, CF/1988). O trabalho procura demonstrar que o princípio da cooperação é a ideia base de vários dispositivos do Código de Processo Civil (CPC) de 1973 e do Projeto do Novo CPC, entre eles o art. 339 do CPC/1973 e aqueles que disciplinam a exibição de documento ou coisa. A dissertação procura estabelecer os limites do princípio da cooperação existentes no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, em especial o direito à privacidade (art. 5., X, CF/1988) e o direito ao silêncio (art. 5., LXIII, CF/1988). Enfim, a dissertação procura estabelecer o conteúdo do princípio da cooperação e a forma como este opera no processo civil. / The dissertation seeks to establish the constitutional and legal foundations of the principle of cooperation in civil procedure, describing it as an implicit constitutional principle deriving from the principle of solidarity (art. 3., I, Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil - CFRB), access to justice (art. 5., XXXV , CFRB), due process of law (art. 5, LIV , CFRB), adversary system (art. 5., LV , CF/1988) and reasonable duration of proceedings ( art. 5. , LXXVIII , CF/1988) . The essay seeks to demonstrate that the principle of cooperation is the basic idea of various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) of 1973 and of the Project of the New CPC, including the art. 339 of CPC/1973 and those that discipline the disclosure of documents and things. The dissertation seeks to establish the limits to the principle of cooperation in the Brazilian legal system, in particular the right to privacy (art. 5. , X, CF/1988) and the right to remain silent (art. 5. , LXIII , CF / 1988). At last, the dissertation seeks to establish the essence of the principle of cooperation and the way it operates in civil procedure.

A dissertação procura estabelecer os fundamentos constitucionais e legais do princípio da cooperação no processo civil, descrevendo-o como um princípio constitucional implícito, decorrente do princípio da solidariedade (art. 3, I, CF/1988), da isonomia (art. 5., caput, CF/1988), do acesso à ordem jurídica justa (art. 5., XXXV, CF/1988), do devido processo legal (art. 5., LIV, CF/1988), do contraditório, da ampla defesa (art. 5., LV, CF/1988) e da duração razoável do processo (art. 5., LXXVIII, CF/1988). O trabalho procura demonstrar que o princípio da cooperação é a ideia base de vários dispositivos do Código de Processo Civil (CPC) de 1973 e do Projeto do Novo CPC, entre eles o art. 339 do CPC/1973 e aqueles que disciplinam a exibição de documento ou coisa. A dissertação procura estabelecer os limites do princípio da cooperação existentes no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, em especial o direito à privacidade (art. 5., X, CF/1988) e o direito ao silêncio (art. 5., LXIII, CF/1988). Enfim, a dissertação procura estabelecer o conteúdo do princípio da cooperação e a forma como este opera no processo civil. / The dissertation seeks to establish the constitutional and legal foundations of the principle of cooperation in civil procedure, describing it as an implicit constitutional principle deriving from the principle of solidarity (art. 3., I, Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil - CFRB), access to justice (art. 5., XXXV , CFRB), due process of law (art. 5, LIV , CFRB), adversary system (art. 5., LV , CF/1988) and reasonable duration of proceedings ( art. 5. , LXXVIII , CF/1988) . The essay seeks to demonstrate that the principle of cooperation is the basic idea of various provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) of 1973 and of the Project of the New CPC, including the art. 339 of CPC/1973 and those that discipline the disclosure of documents and things. The dissertation seeks to establish the limits to the principle of cooperation in the Brazilian legal system, in particular the right to privacy (art. 5. , X, CF/1988) and the right to remain silent (art. 5. , LXIII , CF / 1988). At last, the dissertation seeks to establish the essence of the principle of cooperation and the way it operates in civil procedure.

Text in Afrikaans / Die sogenaamde vermoede van onskuld is via die Engelse Reg in ons reg oorgeneem en tot konstitusionele status verhoog met die daarstelling van artikel 25(3)(c) van die Grondwet, No. 200 van 1993. Hierdie reg om onskuldig geag te word en die gepaardgaande swygreg, wat hier kortliks aangeraak word, kan egter aan beperking onderhewig wees soos bepaal deur artikel 33 van die Grondwet. Die beginsels soos ontwikkel in Kanada en Amerika word ondersoek. Die slotsom waartoe geraak word is dat, alhoewel historiese en ander verskille deurgaans voor oe gehou sal moet word, die regspraak in genoemde jurisdiksies, en meer spesifiek Kanada, 'n groat rol sal speel by die inhoud wat die SuidA: frik:aanse howe, in die konteks van statutere vermoedens, aan die konstitusionele reg om onskuldig geag te word, sal gee. / The so-called presumption of innocence has been inherited from the English common law and awarded constitutional status by the introduction of section 25(3)(c) ofthe Constitution, Act 200 ofl993. This right to be presumed innocent and the accompanying right to remain silent, which is briefly touched upon, are however not absolute and can be subject to limitation as provided for by section 33 ofthe Constitution. The principles, as they have been developed in Canada and America, are investigated. The conclusion which is drawn is that, despite historical and other differences, it can be expected that foreign jurisprudence, particularly that of Canada, will play a major role in the content that will be given by the South African courts to the right to be presumed innocent in the context of statutory presumptions. / Criminal & Procedural Law / LL. M.

Le pouvoir de détenir une personne à des fins d'enquête n'est pas une technique d'investigation nouvelle et tire son origine du droit anglais. Mais cette méthode d'enquête, qui consiste à restreindre temporairement la liberté de mouvement d'une personne que l'on soupçonne pour des motifs raisonnables d'être impliquée dans une activité criminelle, ne fut reconnue officiellement au Canada qu'en juillet 2004 suite au jugement rendu par la Cour suprême dans l'affaire R. c. Mann. Au moment d'écrire ces lignes, cette stratégie d'enquête policière ne fait toujours pas l'objet d'une réglementation spécifique au Code criminel. L'approbation de cette technique d'enquête, en l'absence de toute forme de législation, ne s'est pas faite sans critiques de la part des auteurs et des commentateurs judiciaires qui y voient une intrusion dans un champ de compétences normalement réservé au Parlement. L'arrêt Mann laisse également en suspens une question cruciale qui se rapporte directement aux droits constitutionnels des citoyens faisant l'objet d'une détention semblable: il s'agit du droit d'avoir recours sans délai à l'assistance d'un avocat. Le présent travail se veut donc une étude approfondie du concept de la détention à des fins d'enquête en droit criminel canadien et de son impact sur les droits constitutionnels dont bénéficient les citoyens de notre pays. Pour accomplir cette tâche, l'auteur propose une analyse de la question en trois chapitres distincts. Dans le premier chapitre, l'auteur se penche sur le rôle et les fonctions dévolus aux agents de la paix qui exécutent leur mission à l'intérieur d'une société libre et démocratique comme celle qui prévaut au Canada. Cette étude permettra au lecteur de mieux connaître les principaux acteurs qui assurent le maintien de l'ordre sur le territoire québécois, les crimes qu'ils sont le plus souvent appelés à combattre ainsi que les méthodes d'enquête qu'ils emploient pour les réprimer. Le deuxième chapitre est entièrement dédié au concept de la détention à des fins d'enquête en droit criminel canadien. En plus de l'arrêt R. c. Mann qui fera l'objet d'une étude détaillée, plusieurs autres sujets en lien avec cette notion seront abordés. Des thèmes tels que la notion de «détention» au sens des articles 9 et 10b) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, la différence entre la détention à des fins d'enquête et l'arrestation, les motifs pouvant légalement justifier une intervention policière de même que les limites et l'entendue de la détention d'une personne pour fins d'enquête, seront aussi analysés. Au troisième chapitre, l'auteur se consacre à la question du droit d'avoir recours sans délai à l'assistance d'un avocat (et d'être informé de ce droit) ainsi que du droit de garder le silence dans des circonstances permettant aux agents de la paix de détenir une personne à des fins d'enquête. Faisant l'analogie avec d'autres jugements rendus par nos tribunaux, l'auteur suggère quelques pistes de solutions susceptibles de combler les lacunes qui auront été préalablement identifiées dans les arrêts Mann et Clayton. / The power to detain a person for investigative purposes is not a new technique of investigation and has its origin in English law. But this method of investigation, which is to temporarily restrict freedom of movement of a person suspected on reasonable grounds to be involved in criminal activity, was officially recognized in Canada in July 2004, following the judgement by the Supreme Court in the case of R. c. Mann. At the time of this writing, this strategy of investigation is not subject to specific regulations to the Criminal Code. The approval of this investigative technique, in the absence of any form of legislation, has not been without criticism from writers and commentators who see it as judicial intrusion into a field of expertise normally reserved for Parliament. The judgement of Mann also leaves open a critical issue that relates directly to the constitutional rights of citizens subjected to a similar kind of detention, namely the right to obtain immediately the assistance of a lawyer. This work is a thorough study of the concept of investigative detention in Canadian criminal law and its impact on the constitutional rights enjoyed by all citizens of our country. To accomplish this task, the author suggests studying this issue in three separate chapters. In the first chapter, the author focuses on the role and functions vested in the peace officers who carry out their mission within a free and democratic society such as the one which prevails in Canada. This study will allow the reader to better understand the main actors responsible for maintaining law and order in Quebec, the crimes they are most often called upon to fight and investigative methods they use to repress those crimes. The second chapter is dedicated to the concept of investigative detention in the context of Canadian criminal law. In addition to the case of R. c. Mann, which will be a study in detail, several other topics related to this concept will he discussed. Themes such as the notion of «detention» within the meaning of Sections 9 and 10b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the difference between the investigative detention and the arrest, the motives which can legally justify a police intervention as well as the limits of the detention of a person for purposes of investigation, will also he analyzed.. The third chapter is devoted to the question of the right to communicate immediately with a lawyer (and to he informed of that right) and the right to remain silent in circumstances enabling peace officers to detain a person for investigative purposes. In making a comparison with other judgments rendered by our courts, the author suggest some possible solutions that could fill gaps that have been previously identified by the Supreme Court in the cases R. c. Mann and R. c. Clayton.

O direito fundamental à não-autoincriminação encontra seu fundamento jurídicoconstitucional na conexão dos princípios constitucionais da dignidade humana, do procedimento correto, da ampla defesa e da presunção de inocência. Todas as condutas passivas cuja adoção diga respeito a uma opção tomada pelo acusado na condição de sujeito processual – dentre as quais o exercício passivo da autodefesa no interrogatório judicial – estão prima facie protegidas pelo direito de não se autoincriminar. O problema da influência do silêncio do acusado no interrogatório judicial apresenta uma colisão do direito à nãoautoincriminação com o bem coletivo da eficiência da justiça penal e exige, consequentemente, soluções de acordo com os critérios da teoria dos princípios e da argumentação jusfundamental. A busca da concordância prática dos princípios colidentes exige a consideração de que, embora o comportamento processual do acusado não esteja sujeito a valorações, a omissão do acusado em responder ao interrogatório pode privar a defesa de uma oportunidade para contribuir à refutação ou ao enfraquecimento do grau de confirmação da hipótese acusatória. / The fundamental right against self-incrimination has its legal-constitutional basis in the connection of the constitutional principles of human dignity, fair trial, ample defense against criminal charges and presumption of innocence. All the passive conducts of which adoption refers to a choice of the accused in the condition of subject of the process – such as the passive exercise of self-defense at the examination – are prima facie protected by the right against self incrimination. The issue of the charged’s silence influence in the judicial examination presents a collision of the right against self incrimination with the collective good of the criminal justice efficiency and demands, therefore, solutions according to the criteria of principles theory and fundamental-legal arguing. The search for practical compliance of the colliding principles requires considering that although the processual behavior of the charged is not submitted to judgments of value, the omission of the accused in answering the examination may deprive defense the opportunity to contribute in denying or minimizing the confirmation degree of the accusatory hypothesis.

Le pouvoir de détenir une personne à des fins d'enquête n'est pas une technique d'investigation nouvelle et tire son origine du droit anglais. Mais cette méthode d'enquête, qui consiste à restreindre temporairement la liberté de mouvement d'une personne que l'on soupçonne pour des motifs raisonnables d'être impliquée dans une activité criminelle, ne fut reconnue officiellement au Canada qu'en juillet 2004 suite au jugement rendu par la Cour suprême dans l'affaire R. c. Mann. Au moment d'écrire ces lignes, cette stratégie d'enquête policière ne fait toujours pas l'objet d'une réglementation spécifique au Code criminel. L'approbation de cette technique d'enquête, en l'absence de toute forme de législation, ne s'est pas faite sans critiques de la part des auteurs et des commentateurs judiciaires qui y voient une intrusion dans un champ de compétences normalement réservé au Parlement. L'arrêt Mann laisse également en suspens une question cruciale qui se rapporte directement aux droits constitutionnels des citoyens faisant l'objet d'une détention semblable: il s'agit du droit d'avoir recours sans délai à l'assistance d'un avocat. Le présent travail se veut donc une étude approfondie du concept de la détention à des fins d'enquête en droit criminel canadien et de son impact sur les droits constitutionnels dont bénéficient les citoyens de notre pays. Pour accomplir cette tâche, l'auteur propose une analyse de la question en trois chapitres distincts. Dans le premier chapitre, l'auteur se penche sur le rôle et les fonctions dévolus aux agents de la paix qui exécutent leur mission à l'intérieur d'une société libre et démocratique comme celle qui prévaut au Canada. Cette étude permettra au lecteur de mieux connaître les principaux acteurs qui assurent le maintien de l'ordre sur le territoire québécois, les crimes qu'ils sont le plus souvent appelés à combattre ainsi que les méthodes d'enquête qu'ils emploient pour les réprimer. Le deuxième chapitre est entièrement dédié au concept de la détention à des fins d'enquête en droit criminel canadien. En plus de l'arrêt R. c. Mann qui fera l'objet d'une étude détaillée, plusieurs autres sujets en lien avec cette notion seront abordés. Des thèmes tels que la notion de «détention» au sens des articles 9 et 10b) de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, la différence entre la détention à des fins d'enquête et l'arrestation, les motifs pouvant légalement justifier une intervention policière de même que les limites et l'entendue de la détention d'une personne pour fins d'enquête, seront aussi analysés. Au troisième chapitre, l'auteur se consacre à la question du droit d'avoir recours sans délai à l'assistance d'un avocat (et d'être informé de ce droit) ainsi que du droit de garder le silence dans des circonstances permettant aux agents de la paix de détenir une personne à des fins d'enquête. Faisant l'analogie avec d'autres jugements rendus par nos tribunaux, l'auteur suggère quelques pistes de solutions susceptibles de combler les lacunes qui auront été préalablement identifiées dans les arrêts Mann et Clayton. / The power to detain a person for investigative purposes is not a new technique of investigation and has its origin in English law. But this method of investigation, which is to temporarily restrict freedom of movement of a person suspected on reasonable grounds to be involved in criminal activity, was officially recognized in Canada in July 2004, following the judgement by the Supreme Court in the case of R. c. Mann. At the time of this writing, this strategy of investigation is not subject to specific regulations to the Criminal Code. The approval of this investigative technique, in the absence of any form of legislation, has not been without criticism from writers and commentators who see it as judicial intrusion into a field of expertise normally reserved for Parliament. The judgement of Mann also leaves open a critical issue that relates directly to the constitutional rights of citizens subjected to a similar kind of detention, namely the right to obtain immediately the assistance of a lawyer. This work is a thorough study of the concept of investigative detention in Canadian criminal law and its impact on the constitutional rights enjoyed by all citizens of our country. To accomplish this task, the author suggests studying this issue in three separate chapters. In the first chapter, the author focuses on the role and functions vested in the peace officers who carry out their mission within a free and democratic society such as the one which prevails in Canada. This study will allow the reader to better understand the main actors responsible for maintaining law and order in Quebec, the crimes they are most often called upon to fight and investigative methods they use to repress those crimes. The second chapter is dedicated to the concept of investigative detention in the context of Canadian criminal law. In addition to the case of R. c. Mann, which will be a study in detail, several other topics related to this concept will he discussed. Themes such as the notion of «detention» within the meaning of Sections 9 and 10b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the difference between the investigative detention and the arrest, the motives which can legally justify a police intervention as well as the limits of the detention of a person for purposes of investigation, will also he analyzed.. The third chapter is devoted to the question of the right to communicate immediately with a lawyer (and to he informed of that right) and the right to remain silent in circumstances enabling peace officers to detain a person for investigative purposes. In making a comparison with other judgments rendered by our courts, the author suggest some possible solutions that could fill gaps that have been previously identified by the Supreme Court in the cases R. c. Mann and R. c. Clayton.

Text in Afrikaans / Die sogenaamde vermoede van onskuld is via die Engelse Reg in ons reg oorgeneem en tot konstitusionele status verhoog met die daarstelling van artikel 25(3)(c) van die Grondwet, No. 200 van 1993. Hierdie reg om onskuldig geag te word en die gepaardgaande swygreg, wat hier kortliks aangeraak word, kan egter aan beperking onderhewig wees soos bepaal deur artikel 33 van die Grondwet. Die beginsels soos ontwikkel in Kanada en Amerika word ondersoek. Die slotsom waartoe geraak word is dat, alhoewel historiese en ander verskille deurgaans voor oe gehou sal moet word, die regspraak in genoemde jurisdiksies, en meer spesifiek Kanada, 'n groat rol sal speel by die inhoud wat die SuidA: frik:aanse howe, in die konteks van statutere vermoedens, aan die konstitusionele reg om onskuldig geag te word, sal gee. / The so-called presumption of innocence has been inherited from the English common law and awarded constitutional status by the introduction of section 25(3)(c) ofthe Constitution, Act 200 ofl993. This right to be presumed innocent and the accompanying right to remain silent, which is briefly touched upon, are however not absolute and can be subject to limitation as provided for by section 33 ofthe Constitution. The principles, as they have been developed in Canada and America, are investigated. The conclusion which is drawn is that, despite historical and other differences, it can be expected that foreign jurisprudence, particularly that of Canada, will play a major role in the content that will be given by the South African courts to the right to be presumed innocent in the context of statutory presumptions. / Criminal and Procedural Law / LL. M.

O direito fundamental à não-autoincriminação encontra seu fundamento jurídicoconstitucional na conexão dos princípios constitucionais da dignidade humana, do procedimento correto, da ampla defesa e da presunção de inocência. Todas as condutas passivas cuja adoção diga respeito a uma opção tomada pelo acusado na condição de sujeito processual – dentre as quais o exercício passivo da autodefesa no interrogatório judicial – estão prima facie protegidas pelo direito de não se autoincriminar. O problema da influência do silêncio do acusado no interrogatório judicial apresenta uma colisão do direito à nãoautoincriminação com o bem coletivo da eficiência da justiça penal e exige, consequentemente, soluções de acordo com os critérios da teoria dos princípios e da argumentação jusfundamental. A busca da concordância prática dos princípios colidentes exige a consideração de que, embora o comportamento processual do acusado não esteja sujeito a valorações, a omissão do acusado em responder ao interrogatório pode privar a defesa de uma oportunidade para contribuir à refutação ou ao enfraquecimento do grau de confirmação da hipótese acusatória. / The fundamental right against self-incrimination has its legal-constitutional basis in the connection of the constitutional principles of human dignity, fair trial, ample defense against criminal charges and presumption of innocence. All the passive conducts of which adoption refers to a choice of the accused in the condition of subject of the process – such as the passive exercise of self-defense at the examination – are prima facie protected by the right against self incrimination. The issue of the charged’s silence influence in the judicial examination presents a collision of the right against self incrimination with the collective good of the criminal justice efficiency and demands, therefore, solutions according to the criteria of principles theory and fundamental-legal arguing. The search for practical compliance of the colliding principles requires considering that although the processual behavior of the charged is not submitted to judgments of value, the omission of the accused in answering the examination may deprive defense the opportunity to contribute in denying or minimizing the confirmation degree of the accusatory hypothesis.

O direito fundamental à não-autoincriminação encontra seu fundamento jurídicoconstitucional na conexão dos princípios constitucionais da dignidade humana, do procedimento correto, da ampla defesa e da presunção de inocência. Todas as condutas passivas cuja adoção diga respeito a uma opção tomada pelo acusado na condição de sujeito processual – dentre as quais o exercício passivo da autodefesa no interrogatório judicial – estão prima facie protegidas pelo direito de não se autoincriminar. O problema da influência do silêncio do acusado no interrogatório judicial apresenta uma colisão do direito à nãoautoincriminação com o bem coletivo da eficiência da justiça penal e exige, consequentemente, soluções de acordo com os critérios da teoria dos princípios e da argumentação jusfundamental. A busca da concordância prática dos princípios colidentes exige a consideração de que, embora o comportamento processual do acusado não esteja sujeito a valorações, a omissão do acusado em responder ao interrogatório pode privar a defesa de uma oportunidade para contribuir à refutação ou ao enfraquecimento do grau de confirmação da hipótese acusatória. / The fundamental right against self-incrimination has its legal-constitutional basis in the connection of the constitutional principles of human dignity, fair trial, ample defense against criminal charges and presumption of innocence. All the passive conducts of which adoption refers to a choice of the accused in the condition of subject of the process – such as the passive exercise of self-defense at the examination – are prima facie protected by the right against self incrimination. The issue of the charged’s silence influence in the judicial examination presents a collision of the right against self incrimination with the collective good of the criminal justice efficiency and demands, therefore, solutions according to the criteria of principles theory and fundamental-legal arguing. The search for practical compliance of the colliding principles requires considering that although the processual behavior of the charged is not submitted to judgments of value, the omission of the accused in answering the examination may deprive defense the opportunity to contribute in denying or minimizing the confirmation degree of the accusatory hypothesis.

La recevabilité de la preuve est sans doute l’une des questions les plusimportantes de l’espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice de l’Union européenne,mais aussi une des plus complexes. Les difficultés relatives à l’utilisation d’unepreuve recueillie dans un État membre, devant les juridictions répressives d’un autreÉtat membre, semblent cependant avoir été sous-estimées par le législateureuropéen. En effet, l’amélioration de l’efficacité de la répression transnationale a étéune des priorités de la politique criminelle de l’Union ces quinze dernières années. Àce titre, le renforcement des mécanismes de coopération judiciaire, y compris ceuxvisant à l’obtention de la preuve transnationale, a été privilégié. Grâce au principe dereconnaissance mutuelle des décisions judiciaires en matière pénale, fondé sur laconfiance réciproque que les États membres se portent, les divergences etéventuelles incompatibilités entre les systèmes nationaux ont été tenues en échec,permettant ainsi la libre circulation des preuves dans l’espace pénal européen.Cependant, cette justification théorique n’est pas suffisante pour assurer larecevabilité mutuelle des preuves, la bonne administration de la preuve pénaledemeurant une question nationale, souverainement appréciée par le juge national.De plus, tant l’étude comparative des régimes probatoires nationaux que laprésentation des instruments de coopération judiciaire montrent des déficiencesprofondes, appelant ainsi à une protection accrue et harmonisée des droitsfondamentaux dans les procédures répressives au niveau européen, dans le butd’assurer la recevabilité mutuelle des preuves pénales dans l’espace pénaleuropéen. / Admissibility of evidence is one of the most crucial and complicatedissues in the European Union’s area of freedom, security and justice. However, thedifficulties regarding the use of evidence gathered in one Member State inproceedings in another Member State through the mechanisms of judicialcooperation seems to have been underestimated by the European Union legislator,and this despite the success of criminal proceedings with a cross-border characterbeing considered a priority for the last fifteen years. Indeed, the EU’s criminal policyhas been striving for the strengthening of the efficiency of judicial cooperationbetween judicial authorities. This requires the improvement of the instrumentsdedicated to obtaining criminal evidence. Thanks to the principle of mutualrecognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters, based on mutual trust betweenMember States, the differences between and potential incompatibilities of nationalsystems should not be an obstacle to the free circulation of evidence in the EUcriminal justice area.However, this theoretical justification is not sufficient to ensure mutual admissibility ofevidence, as the good administration of evidence remains a national issue, with awide margin of appreciation accorded to the national judge. Furthermore, both thestudy of national procedural norms and the study of the European Union legalframework show deficiencies, requiring a coherent concept for the protection offundamental rights in criminal proceedings at the EU-level. A better and harmonisedprotection of procedural guarantees is the path to ensure the mutual admissibility ofevidence, overcoming national differences.