Thesis supervisor: Sukumar Ghosh. Includes bibliographic references (p. 136-140).

A sensor is a battery-operated small computer with an antenna and a sensing board that can sense magnetism, sound, heat, etc. Sensors in a network communicate and cooperate with other sensors to perform given tasks. A sensor network is exposed to various dynamic factors and faults, such as topology changes, energy saving features, unreliable communication, and hardware/software failures. Thus, protocols in this sensor network should be able to adapt to dynamic factors and recover from faults. In this dissertation, we focus on designing and analyzing a class of sensor network protocols, called self-stabilizing protocols. A self-stabilizing protocol is guaranteed to return to a state where it performs its intended function correctly, when some dynamic factors or faults corrupt the state of the protocol arbitrarily. Therefore, in order to make a sensor network resilient to dynamic factors and faults, each protocol in the sensor network should be self-stabilizing. We first develop a state-based model that can be used to formally specify sensor network protocols. This model accommodates several unique characteristics of sensor networks, such as unavoidable local broadcast, probabilistic message transmission, asymmetric communication, message collision, and timeout actions and randomization steps. Second, we present analysis methods for verifying and analyzing the correctness and self-stabilization properties of sensor network protocols specified in this model. Third, using the state-based model and analysis methods, we design three self-stabilizing sensor network protocols, prove their self-stabilization properties, and estimate their performance. These three self-stabilizing protocols are a sentry-sleeper protocol that elects a sentry from a group of sensors at the beginning of each time period, a logical grid routing protocol that builds a routing tree whose root is the base station, and a family of flood sequencing protocols that distinguish between fresh and redundant flood messages using sequence numbers. / text

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Operating system security has become a growing concern these days. As the complexity of software layers increases, the vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries increases. Rootkits are gaining much attention these days in cyber-security. Rootkits are installed by an adversary after he/she gains elevated access to the computer system. Rootkits are used to maintain a consistent undetectable presence in the computer system and help as a toolkit to hide all the malware activities from the system administrator and anti-malware tools. Current defense mechanism used to prevent such activities is to strengthen the OS kernel and fix the known vulnerabilities. Software tools are developed at the OS or virtual machine monitor (VMM) levels to monitor the integrity of the kernel and try to catch any suspicious activity after infection. Recognizing the failure of software techniques and attempting to solve the endless war between the anti-rootkit and rootkit camps, in this thesis, we propose an autonomic architecture called SHARK, or Secure Hardware support Against RootKits. This new hardware architecture provides system-level security against the stealth activities of rootkits without trusting the entire software stack. It enhances the relationship of the OS and hardware and rules out the possibility of any hidden activity even when the OS is completely compromised. SHARK proposes a novel hardware manager that provides secure association with every software context making use of hardware resources. It helps system administrators to obtain feedback directly from the hardware to reveal all running processes. This direct feedback makes it impossible for rootkits to conceal running software contexts from the system administrator. We emulated the proposed architecture SHARK by using Bochs hardware simulator and a modified Linux kernel version 2.6.16.33 for the proposed architectural extension. In our emulated environment, we installed several real rootkits to compromise the kernel and concealed malware processes. SHARK is shown to be very effective in defending against a variety of rootkits employing different software schemes. Also, we performed performance analysis using SIMICS simulations and the results show a negligible overhead, making the proposed solution very practical.

Thesis (M. S.)--Electrical and Computer Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2009. / Committee Chair: Lee, Hsien-Hsin; Committee Member: Blough, Douglas; Committee Member: Copeland, John. Part of the SMARTech Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Collection.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Electrical and Computer Engineering, Georgia Institute of Technology, 2006. / Schwan, Karsten, Committee Member ; Schimmel, David, Committee Member ; Copeland, John, Committee Member ; Owen, Henry, Committee Chair ; Wills, Linda, Committee Member.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 164-170).