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The development of a semantic scale for the description of the physical environmentVielhauer, Joyce Ardell, January 1900 (has links)
Thesis--Louisiana State University. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 84-87).
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Pejorative bedeutungsentwicklung im französischen mit berücksichtigung allgemeiner fragen der semasiologie ...Jaberg, K. January 1901 (has links)
Inuag.-diss.--Bern. / Lebenslauf. "Vorliegende arbeit wurde in der 'Zeitschrift für romanische philologie, ' bd. XXV, gedruckt. Die forsetzung wird ebendort, bd. XXVI, erscheinen." Bibliography: p. 2-6.
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Eye-tracking investigations of lexical ambiguityMeyer, Aaron M. January 2005 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2005. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file viewed on (July 18, 2006) Vita. Includes bibliographical references.
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Semantic priming a comparison of lexical organization in children and adults /Koo, Mei-lam, Christy. January 2002 (has links)
Thesis (B.Sc)--University of Hong Kong, 2002. / "A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Bachelor of Science (Speech and Hearing Sciences), The University of Hong Kong, May 10, 2002." Also available in print.
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Psychologism, semantics and the subject matter of logic /Godden, David M. Griffin, Nicholas. January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (Ph.D.)--McMaster University, 2004. / Advisor: Nicholas Griffin. Includes bibliographical references (p. 345-353). Also available via World Wide Web.
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The metaphysics of unified science /Ney, Alyssa L. January 2005 (has links)
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Brown University, 2005. / Vita. Thesis advisor: Jaegwon Kim. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 160-167). Also available online.
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Uncovering the "slow mapping" process of word learning through word definition and word association tasksDolena, Alexis Lynn. January 2006 (has links)
Thesis (M.S.)--Villanova University, 2006. / Psychology Dept. Includes bibliographical references.
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Arrow Symbols: Theory for InterpretationKurata, Yohei January 2007 (has links) (PDF)
No description available.
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Taking meaning out of context : essays on the foundations of natural language semanticsCameron, Matthew Dunbar January 2018 (has links)
David Lewis articulated minimal constraints on a formal theory of natural language semantics that have been widely adopted by subsequent theorists: compositionality and sentence truth in a given context. In the process, Lewis distinguished between the compositional semantic value of an expression and its propositional content relative to a context. This dissertation consists of a series of essays in which I address several questions that arise from this distinction, including how we should understand semantic values, how we should understand propositional content, and how we should understand the relation between them. Related to this, I explore and address a number of interesting and unresolved methodological issues that arise in relation to context-sensitivity, and provide an account of the role of speaker intentions in a formal theory of natural language semantics. Additionally, I provide a detailed analysis of the role of context in a theory of natural language semantics and its connection to various aspects of language use and communication. I also motivate coherence with syntactic structure (in the tradition of generative grammar) as an additional constraint on a formal theory of natural language semantics and assess its import for how we theorize about tense and modality and issues related to the syntax-semantics interface, including covert structure and logical form. In broad strokes, this dissertation addresses issues concerning the aims, scope and criteria of a theory of natural language semantics. I approach these issues from the perspective of generative grammar, a theoretical framework that aims to characterize our understanding of natural language independent of its use. These essays help to clarify what should be expected of a formal theory of natural language semantics and its contribution to theories of speech acts and communication.
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Attitudes and their attributionsSen, Manidipa January 1996 (has links)
This doctoral dissertation is on the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions. To be more precise, it is mainly concerned with various kinds of analyses of singular propositional attitude ascriptions. These are sentences of the general form 'X Øs that a is F', where 'X' can be replaced by the name of the person who is in the particular mental state, 'Ø' can be replaced by a propositional attitude verb, like 'believe', 'doubt', 'hope', 'desire', etc., 'a' can be replaced by the name of the individual/object about whom/which the particular attitude is held, and 'F' can be replaced by the name of the property that the individual/object is said to have. The dissertation takes belief to be a paradigmatic example of a propositional attitude, and, thus, focuses mainly on the semantics of ascriptions of beliefs. The thesis it defends is that while a correct analysis of belief ascriptions in general involves a relation between the believer and the proposition which is believed (and which can be regarded as the reference of the 'that'-clause of the belief report), a semantic distinction still needs to be made between de re and de dicto beliefs. This distinction can be made by distinguishing between two different kinds of propositions -- Russellian propositions corresponding to de re beliefs, and Fregean propositions corresponding to de dicto beliefs. This approach is motivated by arguing that the recent proposals of the 'hybrid' type concerning the semantics of belief reports, advocated by such philosophers as Schiffer, Crimmins, Richard, etc., fail. These proposals fail because of overgeneralisation, and, therefore, fail to capture the de re/de dicto distinction. Therefore, if the de re/de dicto distinction is genuine, and the propositions occurring within these two kinds of reports are essentially different, then a single account of belief ascriptions cannot be given. We need two different semantical accounts to capture the distinction. A de re report is best understood by a semantics of the broadly Russellian variety, while a de dicto belief report is best understood by a semantics of the Fregean variety.
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