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This dissertation is a defence of a logical approach to presupposition. In it (1) I enumerate, by way of apologia, some fundamental assumptions underlying both antagonistic and protagonistic treatments of such an approach, and argue that they are conceptually unnecessary, methodologically untoward, and/or logically contradictory. Most saliently, (a) I demonstrate the conceptual and logical contradiction in the view that presuppositional logic might be compatible with (or even imply) an ambiguity of natural language negation, (b) I provide a critique of the now traditional disassociation of the problems of presupposition-definition and presupposition- projection, (c) I provide a critique of the view that presuppositional logic -might be compatible with (or imply) logical trivalence. (2) In the light of a discussion of the conceptual distinction, I propose logical criteria for the distinction between a three-valued logic and a two-valued logic with truth-value gaps. (3) I demonstrate that, by these criteria, the standard (Strawsonian) Definition of Presupposition (SLDP) induces a trivalent logic. (4) I present a distinct (but comparable) revised logical definition of presupposition (RLDP)showing that it induces a system that conforms to the proposed criteria for a two-valued logic with truth-value gaps. (5) By showing that the several problems associated with the SLDP do not arise (are 'solved') in the framework of the RLDP I show (a) that the problems encountered by the SLDP stem more or less directly from its trivalence and (b) that the facts of presupposition-projection are (and should be) immanent in the concept (and hence the definition) of presupposition itself, rather than represented as properties of logical functors. I also show that the revised definition reveals an unsuspected connection between compound counter-examples and simple counter-examples to the SLDP.

The notion of literalness in linguistics is based on the following assumptions: Linguistic expressions are vehicle-meaning p airs (since literal meaning has to be the meaning of something). Linguistic expressions have to be cognised a nd used (especially uttered) in order for their meanings to be regarded as literally theirs. "Linguistie, vehicle-meaning relations are fixed and autonomous- - rather than having particular meanings in virtue of being used to express those meanings," linguistie' vehicle-meaning p airs are used to express certain meanings in virtue of having the meanings th at they have. This thesis criticises Chomsky's and Sperber and Wilson's attempts to establish the autonomy of "linguistie'vehicle-meaning pairs. I argue that " Both Chomsky and Sperber and Wilson fail to distinguish "linguistie' semantics from the "real" semantics of what "linguistic" vehicle-meaning pairs are used to express. " They persist in the idea that "linguistic" vehicles are specifically for being uttered (physically instantiated), thus defeating their own purpose of setting the linguistic absolutely apart from what it is used for. " Neither Chomsky's internalist conception of language nor Sperber and Wilson's relevance framework is able to account for the phenomenon of "language misuse", i.e. the use of a "linguistic" vehicle to express the "wrong" meaning. Burton-Roberts' representational conjecture is applied and developed in the presentation of an alternative non/ extra-linguistic account of "literal meaning" and "language use/ misuse". This account has it that neither "linguistic" vehicles nor "linguistic" vehicle-meaning relations are actually linguistic. It avoids the problems attending the notion of linguistic expressions as objects with sortally disjoint and arbitrarily conjoint properties (i.e. physically instantiable "vehicle" and mentally constituted "meaning"), and resolves the unease within Chomsky's Minimalist Program about the inclusion of phonology in I-language. Finally, by way of this resolution, I address some seemingly unrelated issues concerning vehicle-less "meanings" and the relations between l anguage,thought and consciousness.

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Typescript. / Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1979. / Bibliography: leaves [207]-211. / Microfiche. / vii, 211 leaves 29 cm

As information systems become more complex it is infeasible for a non-expert to understand how the information system has evolved. Accurate models of these systems and the changes occurring to them are required for interpreters to understand, reason over, and learn from evolution of these systems. Ontologies purport to model the semantics of the domain encapsulated in the system. Existing approaches to using ontologies do not capture the rationale for change but instead focus on the direct differences between one version of a model and the subsequent version. Some changes to ontologies are caused by a larger context or goal that is temporally separated from each specific change to the ontology. Current approaches to supporting change in ontologies are insufficient for reasoning over changes and allow changes that lead to inconsistent ontologies. / In this thesis we examine the existing approaches and their limitations and present a four-level classification system for models representing change. We address the shortcomings in current techniques by introducing a new approach, augmenting ontologies with operations for capturing and representing change. In this approach changes are represented as a series of connected, related and non-sequential smaller changes. The new approach improves on existing approaches by capturing root causes of change, by representing causal relationships between changes linking temporally disconnected changes to a root cause and by preventing inconsistencies in the evolution of the ontology. The new approach also explicitly links changes in an ontology to the motivating real-world changes. We present an abstract machine that defines the execution of operations on ontologies. A case study is then used to explain the new approach and to demonstrate how it improves on existing ways of supporting change in ontologies. The new approach is an important step towards providing ontologies with the capacity to go beyond representing an aspect of a domain to include ways in which that representation can change.

As information systems become more complex it is infeasible for a non-expert to understand how the information system has evolved. Accurate models of these systems and the changes occurring to them are required for interpreters to understand, reason over, and learn from evolution of these systems. Ontologies purport to model the semantics of the domain encapsulated in the system. Existing approaches to using ontologies do not capture the rationale for change but instead focus on the direct differences between one version of a model and the subsequent version. Some changes to ontologies are caused by a larger context or goal that is temporally separated from each specific change to the ontology. Current approaches to supporting change in ontologies are insufficient for reasoning over changes and allow changes that lead to inconsistent ontologies. / In this thesis we examine the existing approaches and their limitations and present a four-level classification system for models representing change. We address the shortcomings in current techniques by introducing a new approach, augmenting ontologies with operations for capturing and representing change. In this approach changes are represented as a series of connected, related and non-sequential smaller changes. The new approach improves on existing approaches by capturing root causes of change, by representing causal relationships between changes linking temporally disconnected changes to a root cause and by preventing inconsistencies in the evolution of the ontology. The new approach also explicitly links changes in an ontology to the motivating real-world changes. We present an abstract machine that defines the execution of operations on ontologies. A case study is then used to explain the new approach and to demonstrate how it improves on existing ways of supporting change in ontologies. The new approach is an important step towards providing ontologies with the capacity to go beyond representing an aspect of a domain to include ways in which that representation can change.

Amongst the multiple and diverse meanings and functions passive constructions hold, this study considers that the primary function of passives in Japanese is to portray an event from the point of view of an affected entity. The thesis identifies three types of affectedness in Japanese passive constructions: emotive affectedness, direct / physical affectedness, and objective affectedness. Emotive affectedness, often referred to as �adversative� meaning, has drawn attention from many researchers. It has been strongly associated in the past with the syntactic category called the �indirect passive�, but is actually also observed in many instances of the �direct passive�. Direct / physical affectedness is detected mainly in the construction here referred to as the �direct sentient passive�. This meaning is common in passives in many other languages, including English. The last type � objective affectedness � is primarily associated with �non-sentient passives�, more specifically with what is here called the �plain passive�. Many previous researchers have claimed a complete and apparently transparent correlation between syntactic and semantic distinctions of the Japanese passive. The present study rejects these direct correlations. In analysing authentic data, it becomes evident that the correlation is much more subtle than has generally been recognised, and that is a matter of degree or continuum, rather than a discrete, black and white issue. To reflect this view, this study proposes separate sets of categories for syntactic and semantic distinctions. The ultimate aim of this study is to reveal how Japanese passives are actually used in real contexts. In order to achieve this aim, detailed examination of authentic written and spoken data is conducted. Some findings of the data analysis in the present study contradict previous claims, such as the finding of a large proportion of passives with a non-sentient subject and very low frequency of occurrence of indirect passives. This research also finds that, although more than half of the propositional meanings in the passive data examined are �negative�, a considerable number of passives still appear in a proposition with a neutral or positive meaning. Another prominent finding regarding propositional meaning is that it seems to be related to the degree of centrality of the passive subject to the event. With regard to the syntactic classification of passive, in particular, it is observed that the lower the degree of the centrality of the subject of the passive to the event, the greater the likelihood that the passive clause involves a negative proposition.