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Ce travail aborde la question du renseignement militaire de la guerre de succession d’Autriche (1740) au traité de Paris (1763). Le renseignement militaire est d’abord replacé dans la réflexion stratégique de la période qui l’évoque peu tout en soulignent paradoxalement l’importance pour les armées. Les différentes sources de l’information militaire constituent la seconde partie. L’espion d’armée, figure méconnue de la période joue un rôle quotidien auprès des armées d’Ancien Régime. Situé à la marge de la société civile et de la sphère militaire, attiré par le gain mais aussi par le goût de l’aventure, une reconnaissance sociale ou incité par un patriotisme naissant, l’espion prend des risques pour satisfaire un commanditaire. La troisième partie s’intéresse au secret militaire, difficile à préserver et dévoilé dans une logique de réseau, à différentes échelles et selon des organisations plus ou moins complexes. L’espion s’inscrit dans un rapport personnel avec un supérieur dont il est le « client ». L’étude s’intéresse dans un dernier temps à la transmission et la protection du renseignement obtenu. Les risques sont divers (interception postale mais surtout espions ennemis). La conclusion pose la question de l’efficacité du renseignement militaire, peu décisif du fait des contraintes logistiques et de la méfiance généralisée sur les informations et sur les acteurs qui les collectent. Dans une période de structuration de l’armée et de centralisation du pouvoir politique, le renseignement militaire oppose un fonctionnement décentralisé. La nécessité d’une information fiable entraîne une militarisation des civils, transformant ces derniers en auxiliaires de renseignement. / This work tackles the question of the military intelligence from the war of Austrian succession (1740) to the treaty of Paris (1763). The military intelligence is initially replaced in the strategic thinking of the period which evokes it little while paradoxically highlighting its importance for the armies. The various sources of military information are the second part. The army Spy, unrecognized figure of the period, plays a daily role within the armies of the Ancien Regime. Located at the margins of society and the military sphere, attracted by profit but also by the sense of adventure, social recognition or induced by a nascent patriotism, the spy takes risks to satisfy a sleeping partner. The third part focuses on the military secret, hard to preserve and unveiled in logic of networks, at different scales and in a more or less complex organizations. The spy takes part of a personal relationship with a supervisor whom he is the "client." The study examines in a final time the transmission and protection of information obtained. The risks are varied (postal interception but especially enemy spies). The conclusion raises the question of the effectiveness of the military information, not very decisive because of the logistic constraints and widespread distrust about information and the actors who collect them. In a period of structuring of the army and centralization of political power, military intelligence is in contrary a decentralized operation. The need for reliable information leads to a militarization of civilians, transforming them into auxiliary information.

This dissertation examines militarisation in Scotland and North America from the Jacobite Uprising of 1745-46 to the outbreak of the American Revolutionary War in 1775. Employing a biographical, case study approach, it investigates the cultural paradigms guiding the actions and understandings of British Army officers as they waged war, pacified hostile peoples, and attempted to assimilate 'other' population groups within the British Empire. In doing so, it demonstrates the impact of the Jacobite Uprising on British imperialism in North America and the role of militarisation in affecting the imperial attitudes of military officers during a transformative period of imperial expansion, areas underexplored in the current historiography. It argues that militarisation caused several paradigm shifts that fundamentally altered how officers viewed imperial populations and implemented empire in geographical fringes. Changes in attitude led to the development of a markedly different understanding of imperial loyalty and identity. Civilising savages became less important as officers moved away from the assimilation of 'other' populations towards their accommodation within the empire. Concurrently, the status of colonial settlers as Britons was contested due to their perceived disloyalty during and after the French and Indian War. 'Othering' colonial settlers, officers questioned the sustainability of an 'empire of negotiation' and began advocating for imperial reform, including closer regulation of the thirteen colonies. And, as the colonies appeared to edge closer to rebellion, those officers drew upon prior experiences in Scotland and North America to urge the military pacification of a hostile population group to ensure imperial security. Militarisation, therefore, provides important insights into how cultural imperialism was implemented in Scotland and how it was transferred and adapted to North America. Further, it demonstrates the longer-term interactions and understandings that influenced transformations in eighteenth-century imperial policy.