Thesis (Ph. D.)--Freie Universität Berlin, 1999. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 226-234). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Freie Universität Berlin, 1999.

Diss.--München--Hochschule für Philosophie, 1998. / Bibliogr. p. 197-202. Index.

The purpose of this thesis is to attempt to demonstrate the function of the Hylas myth in Propertius 1.20. The first chapter consists of a text and translation of the poem. Chapter 2 introduces the question of the role of mythological exempla in Propertius' poetry. It is found that while scholars recognize the relevance and importance of mythological material in other elegies they deny that the Hylas tale bears more than a superficial relevance to its context. Chapter 3 considers the poetry of the Monobiblos, to which 1.20 belongs. Three elegies are analysed so as to illustrate Propertius' purpose and methods in adducing mythological material in his poems. It is concluded from these analyses that mythological exempla not only illustrate the poet's portrayal of contemporary figures and situations but also contribute new elements that suggest or develop aspects of his theme not otherwise made explicit. Four general means by which Propertius adapts traditional mythology for his own purposes are noted. A study of 1.20, to which Chapter 4 is devoted, begins with a brief discussion of the Hylas myth as it was known in Propertius' day. Texts of Apollonius Rhodius' and Theocritus' versions of the tale, the two most important extant literary accounts, and several illustrations of the myth in art are provided. The main component of the chapter, however, is an analysis of 1.20 that attempts to reveal the skilful manner in which Propertius narrates the tale of Hylas, adapting traditional material with a purpose and method similar to that observed in his other elegies, and presenting it as a relevant and integral part of his portrayal of the contemporary figures and situation with which the poem is concerned. There follow an appendix and a bibliography. / Arts, Faculty of / Classical, Near Eastern and Religious Studies, Department of / Graduate

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Frankfurt a.M., 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 256-279).

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Frankfurt a.M., 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 256-279).

The production of equipollence is the most important part of the Pyrrhonian skeptic’s method for bringing about the suspension of judgment. The skeptic produces equipollence methodically, by opposing arguments, propositions, or appearances, in anyway whatsoever, until he produces an equality of “weightiness” on both sides of the conflicting views. Having no appropriate criterion to break the deadlock of equipollence, the skeptic (or his interlocutor) is left with no reason to accept either view. I have two main aims in this paper. My first aim is to distinguish between two different types of equipollence; that produced in the Pyrrhonist, called Psychological Equipollence, and that demonstrated to the dogmatist by the Pyrrhonist, called Normative Equipollence. My second aim in this paper is to argue that equipollence cannot be produced when the skeptic uses only epistemic possibility of error to oppose some compelling p.

Recent work on the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel has emphasized his interest in skeptical concerns. These contemporary scholars argue that, despite common opinions to the contrary, Hegel actually had a very keen interest in skepticism, one that informed and motivated much of his overall project. While I welcome this recent literature, I argue here that contemporary scholars have overemphasized the importance of skepticism for Hegel. By looking closely at Hegel’s arguments against skepticism in the Phenomenology of Spirit, I argue that Hegel’s anti-skeptical arguments are in fact major failures. Hegel’s failure is at odds with the emphasis that contemporary literature places on Hegel’s interests in skepticism. For a philosopher who was supposedly centrally concerned with skeptical issues, Hegel sure does not act like it. I conclude that the tension here is the result of contemporary scholars’ overemphasis of the role that skepticism plays in Hegel’s project.

Programm--K. Studienanstalt Speier. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record.