Thesis (M.A.)--Emmanuel School of Religion, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [61]-63).

Thesis (M.A.)--Emmanuel School of Religion, 2004. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [61]-63).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2004. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 162-166). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2004. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 162-166). Also available on the Internet.

No description available.

This thesis presents a case for the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity by construing it along the lines that God exists as actus purus. My formulation of divine simplicity draws upon the medieval insight that God is what He is in virtue of what He does in one, eternal act of will with which He is identical. In chapter I, I survey the contemporary literature on divine simplicity. In chapter II, I critique Alvin Plantinga??s Platonic theory of the divine attributes as formulated in Does God Have a Nature? I contend it brings with it the cost of abandoning the doctrine of God??s aseity, as well as a problematic understanding of the very notion of what it means to claim that God has a particular property. In chapter III, I provide rejoinders to all of Plantinga??s defeaters against divine simplicity. I argue that by understanding the origin of God??s attributes to be the result of what He does, Plantinga??s two major criticisms against divine simplicity fail. In chapter IV, I develop a viable theory of divine simplicity, given an actus purus conception of God, and I formulate a number of arguments supporting it. By drawing upon the resources of action theory, I clarify, in detail, what exactly it means to claim that God is identical with His act of will. And I demonstrate the fruitfulness of an actus purus construal of divine simplicity by showing how it solves a large number of problems that theists face.In the last chapter, I note some of the difficulties with my position due to its commitment to an eternal God, and I suggest some of the ways that these problems can be overcome. However, in addition to showing the difficulties that face my position, I also demonstrate the rich number of implications that follow from it. As such, I seek to demonstrate that the traditional understanding of the divine essence is something that is worthy for theists to embrace and to explore, because it is full of truth and wisdom that deserves to be preserved for later generations to celebrate and enjoy.

No description available.

Thesis advisor: Jean-Luc Solère / Thesis advisor: Marius Stan / My dissertation focuses on the problem of matter's divisibility in the 17th-18th centuries. The problem of material divisibility is a focal point at which the metaphysical principle of simplicity and the mathematical principle of space's infinite divisibility conflict. The principle of simplicity is the metaphysical requirement that there must be a simple or indivisible being that is the constitutive foundation of all composite things in nature. Without simple beings, there cannot be composite beings. The mathematical principle of space's infinite divisibility is a staple of Euclidean geometry: space must be divisible into infinitely smaller parts because indivisibles or points cannot compose extension. Without reconciling these metaphysical and mathematical principles, one can call into question the integrity of mathematics and metaphysics. Metaphysical contradiction results from the application of metaphysical simplicity to the composition of material bodies that occupy infinitely divisible space. How can a simple being constitute a material object while occupying a space that lacks a smallest part? Should we assume that a composite material object (such as the paper in front of the reader) exists in an infinitely divisible space, then the simple beings must occupy a space that consists of ever smaller spaces. The simple being thereby appears to consist of parts simpler than itself--a metaphysical contradiction. Philosophers resolve this contradiction by either modifying the metaphysical principle of simplicity to allow for the occupation of infinitely divisible space, or have simply dismissed one principle for the sake of preserving the other principle. The rejection of one principle for preserving the other principle is an undesirable path. Philosophers would either forfeit any attempt to account for the composition of material reality by rejecting simplicity or deny understanding of geometry heretofore via the rejection of space's infinite divisibility. My objective in this dissertation is two-fold: 1.) to provide an historical analysis of various philosophers' attempts to reconcile simplicity and infinite divisibility or to argue for the exclusive nature of the said principles; 2.) to articulate a reconciliation between simplicity and infinite divisibility. Underlying both objectives is my attempt to draw a connection between the metaphysical principle of simplicity and the metaphysical principle of sufficient reason. Having shown in the historical section that each philosopher implicitly references a modified version of the principle of sufficient reason when articulating their theories of metaphysical simplicity, I will use this common principle to develop a Neo-Aristotelian solution to the problem of material divisibility. This Neo-Aristotelian solution differs from other accounts in the historical section by including a potential parts theory of material divisibility while modifying the principle of simplicity: simple beings are no longer conceived as constitutive parts of a material thing, but as the sources of unity for a natural composite being. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Typescript (photocopy). / Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries

Thesis (D. Min.)--Concordia Theological Seminary, Ft. Wayne, 1994. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 130-132).