<p>The visible light photon counter (VLPC) is a high quantum efficiency (QE), Si-based, single-photon detector with high gain, low-noise multiplication, low timing jitter, and photon number resolution. While the VLPC has high QE in the visible wavelengths, the QE in the ultraviolet and infrared is low due to minimal absorption within the active layers of the device. In the ultraviolet, the absorption coefficient of Si is high and most of the incident photons are absorbed within the top contact of the device, whereas, in the infrared, Si is practically transparent. A number of applications in quantum information science would benefit from use of the VLPC if the QE was improved in the ultraviolet (e.g., state detection of trapped ions) and the infrared (e.g., long-distance quantum cryptography). This thesis describes the development of the ultraviolet photon counter (UVPC) and the infrared photon counter (IRPC), which are modified versions of the VLPC with increased QE in the ultraviolet and infrared wavelengths, respectively. The UVPC has a transparent metal Schottky contact to reduce absorption within the top contact of the VLPC, resulting in an increase in the QE in the ultraviolet by several orders of magnitude. The IRPC is a proposed device that has an InGaAs absorption layer that is wafer-fusion bonded to the VLPC. The band alignment of the resulting InGaAs/Si heterojunction is measured and shows a large discontinuity in the valence band that impedes carrier transport at the interface. A ultra-high vacuum wafer-bonding system was developed to understand the impact of the surface chemistry of the bonded wafers on the band alignment of the InGaAs/Si heterojunction of the IRPC.</p> / Dissertation

No description available.

<p>This doctoral thesis summarizes research in quantum cryptography done at the Department of Electronics and Telecommunications at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) from 1998 through 2007.</p><p>The opening parts contain a brief introduction into quantum cryptography as well as an overview of all existing single photon detection techniques for visible and near infrared light. Then, our implementation of a fiber optic quantum key distribution (QKD) system is described. We employ a one-way phase coding scheme with a 1310 nm attenuated laser source and a polarization-maintaining Mach-Zehnder interferometer. A feature of our scheme is that it tracks phase drift in the interferometer at the single photon level instead of employing hardware phase control measures. An optimal phase tracking algorithm has been developed, implemented and tested. Phase tracking accuracy of +-10 degrees is achieved when approximately 200 photon counts are collected in each cycle of adjustment. Another feature of our QKD system is that it uses a single photon detector based on a germanium avalanche photodiode gated at 20 MHz. To make possible this relatively high gating rate, we have developed, implemented and tested an afterpulse blocking technique, when a number of gating pulses is blocked after each registered avalanche. This technique allows to increase the key generation rate nearly proportionally to the increase of the gating rate. QKD has been demonstrated in the laboratory setting with only a very limited success: by the time of the thesis completion we had malfunctioning components in the setup, and the quantum bit error rate remained unstable with its lowest registered value of about 4%.</p><p>More than half of the thesis is devoted to various security aspects of QKD. We have studied several attacks that exploit component imperfections and loopholes in optical schemes. In a large pulse attack, settings of modulators inside Alice's and Bob's setups are read out by external interrogating light pulses, without interacting with quantum states and without raising security alarms. An external measurement of phase shift at Alice's phase modulator in our setup has been demonstrated experimentally. In a faked states attack, Eve intercepts Alice's qubits and then utilizes various optical imperfections in Bob's scheme to construct and resend light pulses in such a way that Bob does not distinguish his detection results from normal, whereas they give Bob the basis and bit value chosen at Eve's discretion. Construction of such faked states using several different imperfections is discussed. Also, we sketch a practical workflow of breaking into a running quantum cryptolink for the two abovementioned classes of attacks. A special attention is paid to a common imperfection when sensitivity of Bob's two detectors relative to one another can be controlled by Eve via an external parameter, for example via the timing of the incoming pulse. This imperfection is illustrated by measurements on two different single photon detectors. Quantitative results for a faked states attack on the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) and the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocols using this imperfection are obtained. It is shown how faked states can in principle be constructed for quantum cryptosystems that use a phase-time encoding, the differential phase shift keying (DPSK) and the Ekert protocols. Furthermore we have attempted to integrate this imperfection of detectors into the general security proof for the BB84 protocol. For all attacks, their applicability to and implications for various known QKD schemes are considered, and countermeasures against the attacks are proposed.</p><p>The thesis incorporates published papers [J. Mod. Opt. 48, 2023 (2001)], [Appl. Opt. 43, 4385 (2004)], [J. Mod. Opt. 52, 691 (2005)], [Phys. Rev. A 74, 022313 (2006)], and [quant-ph/0702262].</p>

This doctoral thesis summarizes research in quantum cryptography done at the Department of Electronics and Telecommunications at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) from 1998 through 2007. The opening parts contain a brief introduction into quantum cryptography as well as an overview of all existing single photon detection techniques for visible and near infrared light. Then, our implementation of a fiber optic quantum key distribution (QKD) system is described. We employ a one-way phase coding scheme with a 1310 nm attenuated laser source and a polarization-maintaining Mach-Zehnder interferometer. A feature of our scheme is that it tracks phase drift in the interferometer at the single photon level instead of employing hardware phase control measures. An optimal phase tracking algorithm has been developed, implemented and tested. Phase tracking accuracy of +-10 degrees is achieved when approximately 200 photon counts are collected in each cycle of adjustment. Another feature of our QKD system is that it uses a single photon detector based on a germanium avalanche photodiode gated at 20 MHz. To make possible this relatively high gating rate, we have developed, implemented and tested an afterpulse blocking technique, when a number of gating pulses is blocked after each registered avalanche. This technique allows to increase the key generation rate nearly proportionally to the increase of the gating rate. QKD has been demonstrated in the laboratory setting with only a very limited success: by the time of the thesis completion we had malfunctioning components in the setup, and the quantum bit error rate remained unstable with its lowest registered value of about 4%. More than half of the thesis is devoted to various security aspects of QKD. We have studied several attacks that exploit component imperfections and loopholes in optical schemes. In a large pulse attack, settings of modulators inside Alice's and Bob's setups are read out by external interrogating light pulses, without interacting with quantum states and without raising security alarms. An external measurement of phase shift at Alice's phase modulator in our setup has been demonstrated experimentally. In a faked states attack, Eve intercepts Alice's qubits and then utilizes various optical imperfections in Bob's scheme to construct and resend light pulses in such a way that Bob does not distinguish his detection results from normal, whereas they give Bob the basis and bit value chosen at Eve's discretion. Construction of such faked states using several different imperfections is discussed. Also, we sketch a practical workflow of breaking into a running quantum cryptolink for the two abovementioned classes of attacks. A special attention is paid to a common imperfection when sensitivity of Bob's two detectors relative to one another can be controlled by Eve via an external parameter, for example via the timing of the incoming pulse. This imperfection is illustrated by measurements on two different single photon detectors. Quantitative results for a faked states attack on the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) and the Scarani-Acin-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 (SARG04) protocols using this imperfection are obtained. It is shown how faked states can in principle be constructed for quantum cryptosystems that use a phase-time encoding, the differential phase shift keying (DPSK) and the Ekert protocols. Furthermore we have attempted to integrate this imperfection of detectors into the general security proof for the BB84 protocol. For all attacks, their applicability to and implications for various known QKD schemes are considered, and countermeasures against the attacks are proposed. The thesis incorporates published papers [J. Mod. Opt. 48, 2023 (2001)], [Appl. Opt. 43, 4385 (2004)], [J. Mod. Opt. 52, 691 (2005)], [Phys. Rev. A 74, 022313 (2006)], and [quant-ph/0702262].

L’expérience JEM-EUSO (traduction de Observatoire spatial de l’univers extrême à bord du module de l'expérience japonaise) est conçu pour observer les UHECR en détectant la lumière fluorescente UV émise par la gerbe qui se développe lorsque les UHECR interagissent avec l'atmosphère terrestre. Les gerbes atmosphériques sont constituées de dizaines de milliards de particules secondaires ou plus traversant l'atmosphère quasiment à la vitesse de la lumière, excitant les molécules d'azote qui émettent ensuite de la lumière dans la gamme UV. Alors que cette « technique de fluorescence » est habituellement utilisée au sol, en opérant ainsi à partir de l'espace, JEM-EUSO, pour la première fois, fournira des statistiques élevées sur ces événements. Avec un large champ de vue de ± 30 °, JEM-EUSO pourra observer depuis l’espace un volume d'atmosphère beaucoup plus grand que ce qui est possible du sol, en collectant un nombre sans précédent d'événements UHECR aux plus hautes énergies.Pour les quatre prototypes d’expériences construites par la collaboration, nous avons développé un ensemble commun d'électronique, en particulier le système central d'acquisition de données capable de fonctionner au sol, sur des ballons à haute altitude et dans l'espace.Ces expériences utilisent toutes un détecteur composé d'un module de détection de photo (PDM) identique aux 137 qui seront présents sur la surface focale JEM-EUSO. La lumière UV générée par les gerbes atmosphériques à haute énergie passe le filtre UV et frappe les tubes à photomultiplicateurs multi-anodes (MAPMT). Les photons UV sont alors transformés en électrons, qui sont multipliés par les MAPMT et le courant qu’ils créent est amplifié par des cartes ASIC de circuit intégré (EC-ASIC), qui effectuent également le comptage des photons et l'estimation de charge. Une carte FPGA nommé PDM board s'interface avec ces cartes ASIC, fournissant des paramètres d'alimentation et de configuration à ces cartes ASIC, collecte alors les données et exécute le déclenchement d’acquisition de niveau 1.Dans le cadre de ces travaux, je me suis occupée de la conception, du développement, de l'intégration et du test la carte FPGA PDM board pour les missions EUSO-TA et EUSO-Balloon ainsi que des tests d'algorithme de déclenchement autonomes d’acquisitions et j'ai également analysé les données de vol d’EUSO-Balloon et de la campagne sol EUSO-TA d’octobre 2015.Dans cette thèse, je donnerai un bref aperçu des rayons cosmiques à haute énergie, y compris de leur technique de détection et des principales expériences pour les détecter (chapitre 1), je décrirai JEM-EUSO et ses pathfinders (chapitre 2), je présenterai les détails de la conception et de la fabrication du PDM (chapitre 3) et de la carte FPGA PDM board (chapitre 4), ainsi que des tests d'intégration d’EUSO-TA et d’EUSO-Balloon (chapitre 5). Je ferai un rapport sur la campagne EUSO-Balloon de 2014 (chapitre 6) et sur ses résultats (chapitre 7), y compris une analyse spécifique développée pour rechercher des variations globales de l'émissivité UV au sol et j’appliquerai une analyse similaire aux données collectées sur le site de Telescope Array (Chapitre 8). Enfin, je présenterai la mise en œuvre et le test du déclencheur de premier niveau (L1) dans la carte de contrôle FPGA (chapitre 9). Un bref résumé de la thèse sera donné au chapitre 10. / The JEM-EUSO (Extreme Universe Space Observatory on-board the Japanese Experiment Module) international space mission is designed to observe UHECRs by detecting the UV fluorescence light emitted by the so-called Extensive Air Shower (EAS) which develop when UHECRs interact with the Earth’s atmosphere. The showers consist of tens of billions or more secondary particles crossing the atmosphere at nearly the speed of light, which excite nitrogen molecules which then emit light in the UV range. While this so-called “fluorescence technique'” is routinely used from the ground, by operating from space, JEM-EUSO will, for the first time, provide high-statistics on these events. Operating from space, with a large Field-of-View of ±30 °, allows JEM-EUSO to observe a much larger volume of atmosphere, than possible from the ground, collecting an unprecedented number of UHECR events at the highest energies.For the four pathfinder experiments built within the collaboration, we have been developing a common set of electronics, in particular the central data acquisition system, capable of operating from the ground, high altitude balloons, and space.These pathfinder experiments all use a detector consisting of one Photo-detection Modules (PDMs) identical to the 137 that will be present on the JEM-EUSO focal surface. UV light generated by high-energy particle air showers passes the UV filter and impacts the Multi-anode Photomultiplier Tubes (MAPMT). Here UV photons are converted into electrons, which are multiplied by the MAPMTs and fed into Elementary Cell Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (EC-ASIC) boards, which perform the photon counting and charge estimation. The PDM control board interfaces with these ASIC boards, providing power and configuration parameters, collecting data and performing the level 1 trigger. I was in charge of designing, developing, integrating, and testing the PDM control board for the EUSO-TA and EUSO-Balloon missions as well as the autonomous trigger algorithm testing and I also performed some analysis of the EUSO-Balloon flight data and data from the EUSO-TA October 2015 run.In this thesis, I will give a short overview of high-energy cosmic rays, including their detection technique and the leading experiments (Chapter 1), describe JEM-EUSO and its pathfinders including a description of each instrument (Chapter 2), present the details of the design and the fabrication of the PDM (Chapter 3) and PDM control board (Chapter 4), as well as the EUSO-TA and EUSO-Balloon integration tests (Chapter 5). I will report on the EUSO-Balloon campaign (Chapter 6) and results (Chapter 7), including a specific analysis developed to search for global variations of the ground UV emissivity, and apply a similar analysis to data collected at the site of Telescope Array (Chapter 8). Finally, I will present the implementation and testing of the first-level trigger (L1) within the FPGA of the PDM control board (Chapter 9). A short summary of the thesis will be given in Chapter 10.