Historians and political scientists have explained the pre-eminence of Social Credit in British Columbia during the last half of this century as an institutionalized protest against the seeming inactivity of partisan governments and as a reaction to the strength of the social democratic element in the province's political culture. This thesis examines the period from 1932 up to and including the BC Social Credit movement's electoral breakthrough in 1952 and suggests that economic and political conditions during that time affected the way that Social Crediters organized and changed the focus of Social Credit ideology in BC from monetary reform to a call for good government and conservative values. It also suggests that some previous conclusions about BC's Social Credit movement - that it was an outgrowth of Alberta Social Credit, that it was a populist organization, that it was too small to be intellectually significant - should be modified in the light of new evidence. This thesis should serve as a starting point for more specialized studies of the Social Credit movement in British Columbia.

This thesis examines anti-Semitism in the Alberta Social Credit Party under the Aberhart and Manning regimes. It is based on various archival sources from the Glenbow Archives-Institute in Calgary, Alberta, the Premiers' Papers at the Provincial Archives of Alberta in Edmonton, contemporary press reports, and the Social Credit Party's national organ, the Canadian Social Crediter. It argues that anti-Semitism in the Alberta Social Credit Party was not the purview of a marginal, extreme wing of the Party, but that it was an integral element of Social Credit ideology. This ideology was espoused by most Social Crediters, including premiers Aberhart and Manning. When Ernest Manning purged the Movement of its anti-Semites in 1947-1948, he was attempting, unsuccessfully, to eradicate the very essence of Social Credit ideology. The consequence of thirty-six years of Social Credit rule is the persistence of an Albertan political culture which breeds provincialism and intolerance.

Historians and political scientists have explained the pre-eminence of Social Credit in British Columbia during the last half of this century as an institutionalized protest against the seeming inactivity of partisan governments and as a reaction to the strength of the social democratic element in the province's political culture. This thesis examines the period from 1932 up to and including the BC Social Credit movement's electoral breakthrough in 1952 and suggests that economic and political conditions during that time affected the way that Social Crediters organized and changed the focus of Social Credit ideology in BC from monetary reform to a call for good government and conservative values. It also suggests that some previous conclusions about BC's Social Credit movement - that it was an outgrowth of Alberta Social Credit, that it was a populist organization, that it was too small to be intellectually significant - should be modified in the light of new evidence. This thesis should serve as a starting point for more specialized studies of the Social Credit movement in British Columbia. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

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The centrist theory of the lower middle class is widely used to explain the Social Credit movement in Alberta. The theory assumes that members of this class are ultimately conservative, if not reactionary, in both outlook and behaviour. However, the application of the theory to the Alberta movement is shown to be problematic for several reasons. Those offering this explanation do not back up their claims with evidence. Empirical analyses of the provincial elections of 1935 and 1940 present findings which are at odds with the conventional interpretation. A review of the Social Credit philosophy and the party's first term of office also reveals that the standard class analysis has some serious shortcomings. An alternative interpretation is provided.

This thesis is a review and analysis of the selection of William N. Vander Zalm as the third leader of the British Columbia Social Credit party on July 30, 1986. It examines in detail the events and circumstances which allowed the last candidate to enter the most contested leadership race in Canadian history to win the convention. This thesis incorporates an overview of the British Columbia Social Credit party, its traditions, leaders, and criteria for selecting its leaders. The sixty-nine day campaign is chronicled and the other eleven candidates and their campaigns are examined. In addition to reviewing the public and private record on these matters, several interviews were conducted. This thesis also benefits greatly from the analysis and articles on the Social Credit leadership contests produced by the University of British Columbia’s Political Science department. Personal observations are also incorporated into this paper, as the writer was a voting delegate. (I have been a Social Credit party member since 1981. At the leadership convention I supported Vander Zalm on all four ballots. While I readily acknowledge my political biases, I nevertheless have endeavoured to write a balanced academic account of this event). The Vander Zalm victory contradicts much of the conventional wisdom on the organization and conduct of successful leadership campaigns. The Vander Zalm campaign effort was poorly organized with no real strategic planning. The campaign finances were modest. The candidate had little caucus support and no endorsements from the party elites. Furthermore, the candidate did not enter the contest until it was half over and eleven other candidates were already in the race. How then did he win? In this thesis, I argue that the Vander Zalm victory was the result of four factors, all linked and all essential to his success. First, Vander Zalm himself offered a populist style and persona many delegates found attractive. Second, the party’s antiquated constitution provided only one delegate category, those selected directly by the membership. This not only prevented manipulation or control of delegate categories (as seen in other party contests), but ensured that several long-time party activists who were predisposed to the Vander Zalm candidacy would emerge as delegates. Third, Vander Zalm’s candidacy was boosted greatly by polls during the campaign showing him to be the party’s best hope to lead them to victory in the upcoming provincial election. And finally, many delegates saw a vote for Vander Zalm as a means to repudiate the modernization and isolation of the party and government seen during the last years of outgoing Premier W.R. Bennett, and return the party to its populist origins.

The traditional objectives of leadership conventions have been two-fold; First, the choice of a new party leader; second, the reaffirmation and renewal of party activists as well as unification of them behind the newly chosen leader. This thesis analyzes the Social Credit party leadership selection process with particular focus on the 1991 leadership convention. The study draws upon data and written material with respect to the 1986 leadership convention, but primarily information gathered from an extensive survey of behavior and attitudes of the nearly 1900 delegates to the 1991 leadership convention as well as newspapers and personal observation and interviews with attendees. It explores how the Social Credit party tried but failed to achieve both of the traditional objectives with their 1991 leadership convention. They chose a new party leader. However, entering the 1991 convention, the party was divided by numerous rifts which had developed during the 1986 leadership convention and since that event. Rather than heal the rifts, the 1991 leadership convention exacerbated them. Thus, as the 1991 leadership convention closed the party was more divided than when the year's leadership politics had begun.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the anti-Semitic propaganda of Social Credit movement in the 1930s and 1940s and its impact on organized Canadian Jewry. During World War Two, the Alberta Social Credit government and its provincial land national parties engaged in the dissemination of anti-Semitic propaganda, which greatly concerned the Canadian Jewish Congress, the national representative organization for Canadian Jewry. The Canadian Jewish Congress responded by attempting to confront and end this propaganda; however, it lacked a public relations philosophy effective and assertive enough to do so. Eventually the Social Credit movement realized the political liabilities of engaging in anti-Semitic propaganda; yet despite Congress's years of efforts, it could take little credit for Social Credit's purge of anti-Semitism. An examination of the relationship between the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Social Credit movement adds a new perspective on the history of both organizations, and reveals much about ethnic organization in Canada and the nation's political culture of intolerance. / The sources for this thesis come from the Canadian Jewish Congress National Archives in Montreal, the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa, the Provincial Archives of Manitoba in Winnipeg, the Glenbow Archives-Institute in Calgary, and the Provincial Archives of Alberta in Edmonton. The Canadian Social Crediter, Vers Demain, and other Canadian newspapers were used extensively. The sources on the Social Credit movement held at the Canadian Jewish Congress National Archives have not been used before, which makes this thesis a significant departure from previous works.

The traditional objectives of leadership conventions have been two-fold; First, the choice of a new party leader; second, the reaffirmation and renewal of party activists as well as unification of them behind the newly chosen leader. This thesis analyzes the Social Credit party leadership selection process with particular focus on the 1991 leadership convention. The study draws upon data and written material with respect to the 1986 leadership convention, but primarily information gathered from an extensive survey of behavior and attitudes of the nearly 1900 delegates to the 1991 leadership convention as well as newspapers and personal observation and interviews with attendees. It explores how the Social Credit party tried but failed to achieve both of the traditional objectives with their 1991 leadership convention. They chose a new party leader. However, entering the 1991 convention, the party was divided by numerous rifts which had developed during the 1986 leadership convention and since that event. Rather than heal the rifts, the 1991 leadership convention exacerbated them. Thus, as the 1991 leadership convention closed the party was more divided than when the year's leadership politics had begun. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate