The purpose of this thesis is to posit an explanation for the rather spectacular reversal of Social Credit fortunes in British Columbia during the 1972-75 period and the concomitant creation of the province's present two-party system. A detailed examination of the political events of the period was undertaken in an attempt to determine what had taken place and in what order. The research involved analysis of electoral statistics and press clippings, personal interviews and the traditional review of available academic literature. The thesis rejected a monocausal explanation of Social Credit's 1975 electoral victory. Research indicates that Socred leader Bill Bennett was able to capitalize on "the widespread -and largely self-created - disenchantment with the NDP government and position his party to be seen by the public as the only credible alternative. Contrary to popular perception, the post-1972 version of Social Credit was not a "coalition" in the political sense. Rather, Liberal and Conservative elites recognized Bennett's success in projecting Social Credit as the only realistic alternative to the NDP and joined him to protect their legislative seats and further their respective political careers. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

This thesis is a review and analysis of the selection of William N. Vander Zalm as the third leader of the British Columbia Social Credit party on July 30, 1986. It examines in detail the events and circumstances which allowed the last candidate to enter the most contested leadership race in Canadian history to win the convention. This thesis incorporates an overview of the British Columbia Social Credit party, its traditions, leaders, and criteria for selecting its leaders. The sixty-nine day campaign is chronicled and the other eleven candidates and their campaigns are examined. In addition to reviewing the public and private record on these matters, several interviews were conducted. This thesis also benefits greatly from the analysis and articles on the Social Credit leadership contests produced by the University of British Columbia’s Political Science department. Personal observations are also incorporated into this paper, as the writer was a voting delegate. (I have been a Social Credit party member since 1981. At the leadership convention I supported Vander Zalm on all four ballots. While I readily acknowledge my political biases, I nevertheless have endeavoured to write a balanced academic account of this event). The Vander Zalm victory contradicts much of the conventional wisdom on the organization and conduct of successful leadership campaigns. The Vander Zalm campaign effort was poorly organized with no real strategic planning. The campaign finances were modest. The candidate had little caucus support and no endorsements from the party elites. Furthermore, the candidate did not enter the contest until it was half over and eleven other candidates were already in the race. How then did he win? In this thesis, I argue that the Vander Zalm victory was the result of four factors, all linked and all essential to his success. First, Vander Zalm himself offered a populist style and persona many delegates found attractive. Second, the party’s antiquated constitution provided only one delegate category, those selected directly by the membership. This not only prevented manipulation or control of delegate categories (as seen in other party contests), but ensured that several long-time party activists who were predisposed to the Vander Zalm candidacy would emerge as delegates. Third, Vander Zalm’s candidacy was boosted greatly by polls during the campaign showing him to be the party’s best hope to lead them to victory in the upcoming provincial election. And finally, many delegates saw a vote for Vander Zalm as a means to repudiate the modernization and isolation of the party and government seen during the last years of outgoing Premier W.R. Bennett, and return the party to its populist origins. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

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The Barrett (1972-1975) and Harcourt-Clark (1991-2001) New Democratic Party (NDP) governments attempted to redefine their relationship with the mining industry by changing the regulatory structures that governed mining in British Columbia. In both cases the mining industry publicly resisted these attempts, and was successful in having the reforms dismantled by subsequent free-enterprise oriented governments. These instances of conflict were centred on a foundational debate over government’s role in, and/or duty to, the mining industry. Intense industry-led resistance occurred when the traditional industry-government compact, which required government to serve as a promoter of the industry, and a liquidator of Crown owned mineral resources, was perceived to have been violated. The Barrett government more stringently asserted its ownership of public mineral resources through the enactment of a mineral royalty, and by assuming greater regulatory authority over mining operations. These actions instigated a substantial public relations campaign against the Barrett government over taxation laws. The Harcourt-Clark government pursued the development of strategic land-use plans and rejected the historic consensus that mining was innately the highest and best use of the land. This led to substantial anti-government rhetoric and an industry withdrawal from all public engagement and land-use planning processes. In both cases the mining industry was able to revive the traditional relationship when free-enterprise oriented governments replaced the NDP administrations. / Graduate / 2018-12-15