A new operationalization was used to model a schema-based approach to moral judgment, as well as compare it to predictions based on the Social Intuitionist Model. Judgments were made about the moral wrongness of killing different animals. At Time 1, only moral judgments were made. At Time 2 judgments were made again, with questions and scales relating to attributing morally relevant cognitive capacities also included; further, two randomized conditions varied the presentation order of the scales. Differences between Time 1 and 2 indicated a reversed perspective-taking effect, with animals of lower capacities rated less empathically at Time 2. Affective ratings and attributed capacities were compared as different predictors, showing attributed capacities being more powerful. A group comparison was also made between active animal rights proponents and non-proponents, showing differences on several factors. These and other findings are discussed with relation to the Social Intuitionist Model and a schema-based account of morality.

This is a review of what the currently dominant theories of moral decision-making are and where they derive from. While the introduction serves as a common ground to explain what moral decision-making is, the earlier parts of the thesis describe older traditionalist theories within the field,  theories of emotional decision-making, in the form of the somatic marker hypothesis, as well as critique of the older traditionalist theories through the social intuitionist model. Both of these two theories are explained as the foundation of the current theories of moral decision-making and after establishing a clear basis on what the currently dominant theories of moral decision-making are built on, said theories are introduced in the form of the dual-processing theory and the event-feature-emotion complexes which are thoroughly reviewed, explained in detail and serves as the core of the text. This is afterward followed by criticism as well as arguments in favor of both theories as well as criticisms from other researchers who disagree with the methodology which the theories of moral decision-making are conducted on. The essay reviews the current state of the field of moral decision-making which has been split up into two different approaches, the locationist approach and the constructionist approach. The essay concludes that there are terms which needs to be clarified in order for the field to move forward and studies to be made regarding the social implications of gut reactions in moral decision-making.

No description available.