In contrast with the procedural orientation of Athenian law in his day, Aristotle thinks that the lawcode should include principles which explain the rules of the lawcode and guide the interpretation of these rules in difficult cases. It should be determined by majority vote whether the decisions and proposals of political experts are consistent with the principles of the lawcode. Aristotle's views on practical explanation support his views on political deliberation. Someone has a techne rather than mere empeiria if he can give an account of the principles of an art and is able to explain the results of his deliberations in the art in terms of the principles. Such explanation does not have the same status as apodeixis in the epistemai, in that such an explanation cannot demonstrate that a conclusion follows necessarily from the principles of the art. However, a person who has experience in the art is able to evaluate deliberative options based on such arguments. / Aristotle has an account of practical intellection which, like Plato's, is theory-based. Aristotle's account is an adjustment of Plato's account in the light of Isocrates' criticisms of Plato. Aristotle combines the accounts of Plato and Isocrates---the emphasis of the one on explanation and the emphasis of the other on practical principles. Aristotle's views on practical intellection allow him to solve a problem associated with Plato's proposals in the Laws, which resemble in important respects Aristotle's own proposals. Plato intends in the Laws to introduce an arrangement on which the polis is governed by non-philosopher citizens educated by the lawcode. However, because of his views on practical intellection, Plato is forced to put the 'Nocturnal Council' in charge of 'preserving the laws'. Because of his views on practical intellection, Aristotle can accept that the majority can be in charge of preserving the law. Aristotle's views on practical intellection also allow him to say that one ought to spell out the principles of the lawcode and privilege them in the interpretation of the law---which is different from the Athenian, procedural approach to the law---even though no universally true claims are possible on practical issues.

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Of the many and varied institutions which make up a particular culture or society, enabling it to survive and prosper, and judgement as to relative importance or significance is perhaps impossible. Yet it is difficult to deny that law, defined in its broadest sense, with its accompanying legal institutions, normally plays a significant role. To the historian dealing with ancient history, the Code of Hammurabi, the Russkais Pravda of Yaroslavi the Wise, the Laws of Manu, and the Acts of the Saxon Kings are documents of immense importance. They portray in clear terms property relationships, behavior patterns, and class structure. In addition, however, they represent value judgements. Each prohibition, each effort to provide restitution for injury, each rule governing the conduct of the individual or the group, rests implicitly on a positive “ought”. Each era, historically speaking, makes ethical judgements which are enshrined in law. The historical entity which we label the “Chinese civilization” is no exception. As one uniquely qualified observer has noted, “A county could not possibly have lasted so long without sound legal principles as her foundation and without having continually drunk from the life-giving fountain of justice to perpetually renovate herself.”1 It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the Chinese legal system not only was the third earliest historically, preceded so far as is known only by the Egyptian and that of Mesopotamia, but also had the unique distinction of being the only ancient system that survived continuously to the 20th century.2 In this study an attempt has been made to paint a broad picture of the role of law in Chinese society down through the centuries of Chinese recorded history. The similarities and contracts particularly the latter, between the structure of function of law and legal institutions in Western civilizations and those in China are investigated. The role of the almost indefinable “li” and its never-ending struggle with the forces of positive law are surveyed. Beginning with the development of law in ancient and feudal China, and the, historically speaking, early conflict between the Confucianists, exponents of the “li”, and the Legalists, advocates of positive law, the study proceeds to an historical survey of the sources of positive law, from the classic texts through the unbroken line of codes. An attempt is made to analyze the apparent lack of a clear distinction in Chinese laq between the civil and the criminal aspects, seemingly so “foreign” to Western thinking. FInally, the Westernization of Chinese law in 20th century is described, concluding with some tentative observations of the developing structure of law in Communist China and the difficulties faced by a society attempting to reconcile its role as historical heir to the “li” - “law” dichotomy and political heir to Marxist legal theories.

The social, revolutionary upheavals that frequently exploded on the American scene during the past ten years provided a contemporary, if not sophisticated, framework for the teaching of English history to secondary students. The insights gained from this relational approach emphasized two specific issues during the eras in which England developed into a modern nation: (1) historical events set the stage for social dissatisfaction; and, (2) parliamentary actions reflected the awareness levels that gradually seeped into the social consciousness of the English politic. In isolation, five of these societal insurrections, the Peasant Revolt of 1381, the Ket Uprising in 1549, the Gunpowder Plot in 1605, the Monmouth Rebellion in 1685 and the Jacobin Revolt of 1715 not only focused attention on the prevailing conditions in England at five particular periods of history, but insured a sufficient span of time, 369 years, for a more accurate analysis of revolutionary activity, of changes in legal practices and of an evolution in social consciousness.