Thesis (Ph.D.)--Brown University, 2002. / Available in film copy from University Microfilms International. Vita. Thesis advisor: Ellen Rooney. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Contemporary Western legal storytelling relies heavily on images and discourses in popular culture to secure meaning and give credibility to certain legal arguments. This thesis focuses on the legal stories told in the trial of a celebrity in Western society. As a system of meaning, the celebrity sign operates on the levels of signification and affect. The ambiguous semiotic power of the celebrity sign forces an examination by the legal audience regarding the "real" nature of the celebrity. Reality and truth are seen to emanate from this private self. Moreover, the affective power of the celebrity sign guarantees that, at times, emotion will dictate how much credibility will be given to particular celebrity legal stories and what stories will be considered plausible by a jury. In the trial of a celebrity "Other" — that is, one of the celebrated few who defies the white male norm -- celebrity legal storytelling looks towards issues of race, class, and gender, in addition to celebrity, in order to secure meaning and effect credibility. The aesthetic acceptance of the celebrity "Other," along with discourses of authenticity in Western society, work to shape what is considered credible and true in a courtroom. These factors place limits on the semiotic and affective power of the celebrity "Other" and, thus, on what celebrity legal stories will be accepted as truth in the courtroom. Looking specifically at the 1949 acquittal of jazz singer, Billie Holiday, and the 1994 acquittal/partial conviction of gangsta rapper, Tupac Shakur, this thesis will demonstrate the ways in which law, culture, race, gender, class, and the celebrity intersect in the Western mass media and how this intersection affects legal process and the trial tactics utilized in the trial of a celebrity "Other."

In contrast with the procedural orientation of Athenian law in his day, Aristotle thinks that the lawcode should include principles which explain the rules of the lawcode and guide the interpretation of these rules in difficult cases. It should be determined by majority vote whether the decisions and proposals of political experts are consistent with the principles of the lawcode. Aristotle's views on practical explanation support his views on political deliberation. Someone has a techne rather than mere empeiria if he can give an account of the principles of an art and is able to explain the results of his deliberations in the art in terms of the principles. Such explanation does not have the same status as apodeixis in the epistemai, in that such an explanation cannot demonstrate that a conclusion follows necessarily from the principles of the art. However, a person who has experience in the art is able to evaluate deliberative options based on such arguments. / Aristotle has an account of practical intellection which, like Plato's, is theory-based. Aristotle's account is an adjustment of Plato's account in the light of Isocrates' criticisms of Plato. Aristotle combines the accounts of Plato and Isocrates---the emphasis of the one on explanation and the emphasis of the other on practical principles. Aristotle's views on practical intellection allow him to solve a problem associated with Plato's proposals in the Laws, which resemble in important respects Aristotle's own proposals. Plato intends in the Laws to introduce an arrangement on which the polis is governed by non-philosopher citizens educated by the lawcode. However, because of his views on practical intellection, Plato is forced to put the 'Nocturnal Council' in charge of 'preserving the laws'. Because of his views on practical intellection, Aristotle can accept that the majority can be in charge of preserving the law. Aristotle's views on practical intellection also allow him to say that one ought to spell out the principles of the lawcode and privilege them in the interpretation of the law---which is different from the Athenian, procedural approach to the law---even though no universally true claims are possible on practical issues.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Murdoch University, 2004. / Thesis submitted to the Division of Arts. Bibliography: leaves [260]-275.

Thesis--Cologne. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 241-265).

Habilitationsschrift-Hamburg. / Bibliography: p. [269]-288.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Northeastern University, 2008. / Title from title page (viewed Aug. 4, 2008). Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Law, Policy and Society Program. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis--Cologne. / Vita. Bibliography: p. 241-265.

Thesis--Universitetet i Lund, 1983. / ACQ MSG: E 49-140. Extra t.p. with thesis statement inserted. Summary in English. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1971. / Transcript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.